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ABSTRACT: Rationality and Mind 
in Early Buddhism -- F. J. Hoffman 
The Introduction stipulates the meaning of 'early Buddhism' 
for this study as 'the Buddhism of the five Nikä. yas' and out- 
lines a method of approach which lies on the interface between 
philosophy and Buddhology. The use of philosophy is not seen 
as a wholesale imposition of a type of thought as a mold to be 
set on the Buddhist texts. Instead, attention to Pali language 
and to some problems of philosophical interest may jointly be 
useful in making a conceptual map of part of the early Buddhist 
terrain, and in a vigilance as regards applicable internal and 
external criticisms. 
Having argued against considerations of methodological, 
logical, and emotive points (in Chapters 1,2 and 3 respectively) 
which seek to cut off further inquiry by asserting that early 
Buddhism is unintelligible or perversely pessimistic, the next 
three chapters discuss mind. In Ch. 4* a discussion of the terms 
citta, mano and vinnäna. is given in I, and in II the problem of 
the compatibility of 'no soul' (aratta) doctrine and rebirth, and 
the problem of reidentification of persons is discussed. 
The conclusion in outline is that although internal and exter- 
nal understanding are not mutually exclusive (Ch. 1) and early 
Buddhism is neither logically (Ch. 2 ) nor emotively (Ch. 3. ) flaved 
as unintelligible, there is a problem with the reidentification of 
the person on its view of rebirth (Ch. 4'). This problem cannot 
be dispelled by appeal to the Buddhist empiricism thesis, 
according to which one can 'see' rebirth (Ch. 5). But in reject- 
ing the Buddhist empiricism thesis it is not being suggested that 
parinibbäna is a 'transcendent state', for it may be understood 
as 'eternal life' rather than 'endless life' when amata is predic- 
ated of nibbbäna as the limit (parinibbäna), in a way which does 
not conflict with a natta doctrine (Ch. 6. ). 
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This is a study of the Buddhism of the five Nikäyasl For 
convenience the term 'early Buddhism' is used here as a short- 
hand for 'the Buddhism of the five Nikäyas, but in so doing it is 
not being suggested that all parts of the five Nikayas , written 
in Pali, are of the same chronological stratum. Scholars con- 
cerned with chronology may find reason to believe that even in 
the same collection or Nikäya there are passages comparatively 
later than the majority in the collection. The possibility of inter- 
polations creeping in cannot be credibly ruled out by asserting 
dogmatically that the five Nikäyas are the very words of Gotama 
Buddha. 
Nevertheless the Nikäya literature is clearly primary source 
material for the study of Buddhism, and is often appealed to by 
proponents of sects which have introduced other and later texts. 
There are various ways of studying Buddhism, both in terms of 
demarcating which texts to study, and in terms of the discipline 
primarily used to elucidate them (e. g. , sociology, philosophy). 
I make no claim that my procedure is the best or only valid one 
with which to study Buddhism, but only want to make my particular 
bias and interest clear at the outset. Agehananda Bharati once 
remarked on the separation of orientalists and philosophers: 
2 
It is extremely difficult to make them meet, because a lot 
of cross-disciplinary studies are needed for both --- the 
philosophers will have to read some original tracts of Indian 
thought in other Asian languages; and the orientalists will 
have to acquire some knowledge of contemporary philosophy, 
especially on the terminological side. 
Not wishing to be classified exclusively in either camp my 
hope is that this work succeeds in getting philosophers and 
orientalists talking to each other more, counter-acting the narrow- 
minded prejudice that exists in some quarters on both sides, that 
4 
they have nothing to say to one another. In my view the study of 
Asian thought is both accurate and non-trivial to the extent that 
it is both textual and philosophical. Yet this does not mean that 
the texts have to be strait -jacketed into a pre-conceived phil- 
osophical framework. An example of this is to be found in 
Conze's treatment of dhamma in a dialectical manner. 
3 
The 
trouble is, if one begins with a pre-conceived philosophical view 
into which it would be nice if the texts fit, the likelihood is strong 
that one will end by representing the texts as if they were amen- 
able to an alien mold, or of making baseless assertions. 
In this century there has been a movement away from a 
judgmental Christo-centric point of view in the academic study of 
religion toward a more descriptive, less obviously biased view. 
Yet in Pali Buddhist scholarship there remain apologetical strands, 
with proponents of, say, empiricism, ecumenism, and even 
Wittgenstein's thought, offering various interpretive filters through 
which to see Buddhism. 
4 
Although I think that some knowledge of 
contemporary philosophy is an asset in studying Buddhism, it is 
not useful in any wholesale way by the imposition of a type of 
thought as a mold to be set on the Buddhist texts. Philosophical 
sensitivity may be useful in making a conceptual map of part of 
the early Buddhist terrain, and in a vigilance as regards both 
internal and external criticisms which apply to Buddhism. As 
orientalists so rightly insist, attention to the language (in this 
case, Pali) is essential. Having said this I hope that noone will 
perversely insist that I regard any particular philosopher as an 
avatara of the Buddha Gotama. The intent is to turn away from 
apologetics as an over-all strategy and back to description with 
some critical notice, taking understanding as the basic task. 
Where occasionally comparisons are made between what the 
early Buddhist texts say and what philosophy of religion works say, 
5 
the comparisons are not regarded as valuable somehow in their 
own right, nor as causal influence accounts, nor as concealed 
apologetics to make Buddhism seem respectable (for the view 
taken is that it is respectable), but only for the sake of under- 
standing. If it should turn out that there is some clarity in the 
Buddhist vision (along with some difficulties), this should not be 
surprising, nor taken as evidence of apologetic intent. Hence, 
if the philosophy of religion can on some points aid understanding 
without doing violence to the texts, the absence of exact Pali 
equivalents to its distinctions (say, between endless and eternal 
life as two views of immortality -- Ch. 6") will be acceptable as 
a matter of course. 
An underlying assumption of this study is the view that 
differences between religions are at least as important as simil- 
arities. At a sufficiently lofty level of generality various things 
may be said to be similar. But what one needs to keep in mind is: 
what is the point in so saying? Ninian Smart's blistering attack 
on the 'thesis of religious unity' does seem to me clearly on 
the right track. 
5 
By contrast, philosophers and religionists have 
often stressed the importance of unity. F. S. C. Northrop, in 
The Meeting of East and West, holds that philosophical systems 
have been outmoded by science and that what is needed is a 
scientifically grounded philosophy unifying the world. And more 
recently John Hick, in Many Faces of God, offers a thin-line 
theism as the solution to the problem of unity in the face of relig- 
ious pluralism. Rather than taking these sorts of approach, the 
diversity among and competition between-different religions might 
be seen as a sign of great human vitality, rather than as something 
to be homogenized under the respective rubrics of positivism and 
of theism. 
Accordingly, if the differences between religions are instruc- 
tive, a contextual study (here the context is a set of texts) is in 
6 
order. This does not rule out the possibility of criticism, how- 
ever, as Ch. 1 argues. And a contextual approach may bring 
to light what, for some, are surprising possibilities of religion. 
That, e. g. , there is a religion which does not accept the concept 
of a Creator God (Pali: Issara) may indeed surprise those 
accustomed to define religion as belief in God or as man's res- 
ponse to the transcendent. Nihba-na is neither the God of Greek 
or of Biblical tradition, as Ch. 4 explains. And it would be folly 
to suggest that early Buddhism is not a religion at all. For it is 
neither philosophy in the sense of argument and counter-argument 
(the 'wordy warfare' rejected by the Buddhists), nor some sort of 
science or magic, and it plays a structurally analogous role in 
the lives of believers , 
to what we should call religion in the 
West. 
I have said that our basic concern is understanding. From 
this view it is neither necessary nor helpful to assume that early 
Buddhism is either superior or inferior to the later developments 
in Buddhist tradition. It is as unfounded to assume that the mere 
fact of the Nikaya literature being earlier than other Buddhist 
works makes them 'more true' as it is to assume that 'truth is 
an unfolding development' so that (via reductio ad absurdum the 
latest Buddhist trend would have the current, but not the final, 
word. With the eye of an historian, B. C. Law observes that 
early Buddhism provides: 
germs of a philosophical system which came to be more 
logically and consistently systematized later on. 
Taken as the historical point that there is indeed continuity 
and development in the Buddhist tradition, this is surely right. 
But what is not correct is the suggestion that early Buddhism is 
less logical and less consistent than later developments. This 
would require a detailed demonstration, but it is not clear how it 
could be shown. For the early texts and, for example, the 
7 
Abhidhamma texts are not on the same level, and hence compar- 
ison in terms of logic and consistency (characteristics generally 
ascribed more to the latter) amount to stacking the deck in the 
following way. It is rather like comparing the Bible with the 
Summa Theologica, and then dismissing the former as less logi- 
cal and consistent. 
7 
The view that the early Buddhist texts are insufficient by 
themselves and must be supplemented by studies of the commen- 
tator, Buddhaghosa, has particular appeal in some circles, and 
seems to be based on the sort of mistaken view held by Law 
according to which the early Buddhist texts are unsystematic 
ramblings, in need of being 'systematized' (i. e. of becoming a 
different kind of text). The assumption that the texts are insuffic- 
Tent without the commentaries emerges, for example, in a review 
of A. K. Warder's Indian Buddhism in which Alex Wayman writes: 
8 
My own position is that a restriction to either one of 
the two sides (the scriptures and the commentaries) is 
structurally convenient for writing a book and not for solving 
problems: to solve problems one must include all the possi- 
ble evidence and therefore cannot restrict himself to the 
scriptures or to the commentaries exclusively. 
Just reading the commentaries would, indeed, be peculiar, 
since they presuppose knowledge of the texts to which they refer. 
(It is not clear that anyone actually does this, but I leave that 
point aside. The converse, however, is not true. For reading 
early Buddhism without the commentaries enables one to gain an 
understanding which would not be possible if the commentaries 
are taken into account. Of course it is possible, alternatively, 
to gain an understanding of Buddhism by taking both the early 
Buddhist texts and the commentaries into account. One may 
take the former sort of understanding as valuable without saying 
that noone should attempt the latter. Whether, therefore, it is 




the commentaries, depends on what kind of understanding is 
sought for, on what one takes as the problem to be solved. I 
think that an important kind of understanding about Buddhism 
is to see what can be said about the NikTya view on topics 
concerning rationality and mind. If this is the problem that 
one starts with, then not considering the commentaries is 
certainly not a restriction, but a methodological necessity. 
But setting the problem in this way, is what the historical 
Gotama Buddha actually taught uncovered? It would be naive to 
rule out the possibility of interpolations having changed the 
record after all these centuries. From the view point of critical 
scholarship all one can claim is to be studying a set of very early 
texts. 
Even from a Buddhist viewpoint, however, the historicity of 
Gotama in particular does not matter much. For the Buddhist 
path or doctrine does not depend on the historicity of Gotama in 
the way that Christianity depends on the historicity of Jesus and 
on his resurrection. Buddhism 'depends on' Gotama in the sense 
that he is viewed as the turner of the wheel of doctrine in the 
present eon. But Gotarna is not viewed as the first such Buddha, 
nor the last. He is considered as a torch-bearer, not an initiator, 
and the path or doctrine is viable or obtains regardless of 
whether a Tathägata appears in a particular age to illuminate it. 
Thus, the path or doctrine does not 'depend on' Gotama in the 
sense that if he had not become a Buddha (in this eon 'the Buddha) 
one could not possibly achieve the highest goal of Buddhist life. 
Granted that it would be very much more difficult without such a 
Buddha to show the way, yet the way is in principle discoverable 
. by anyone. 
By contrast, whether as a matter of fact or as a 
matter of definition of 'Christian', the vast majority of Christians 
hold that if Jesus were not the Christ and had not redeemed 
9 
mankind, one could not achieve Christian salvation. The result 
is that even if someone were to provide new, cogent evidence to 
show that Gotama did not exist as a historical person at all, such 
a demonstration would not affect the validity of the path or doctrine 
at all. 
Jesus' existence is logically a pre-condition for his undergoing 
a resurrection, as Gotama's existence is logically a pre-condition 
for his becoming a Buddha. Yet whereas if it could be shown that 
the Biblical Jesus did not exist Christianity would be undermined, 
if it could be shown that Gotama did not exist, Buddhism would not 
be undermined. So it is not the historicity i. e. , the existence of 
Gotama, which supports Buddhism, unlike the situation with Christ- 
is nity. 
It should not however be overlooked that it might make some 
difference in practice to the tenacity with which Buddhists hold 
their faith, if it could be shown that although Gotama existed, he 
was an unenlightened charlatan either in reference to his expressed 
view of enlightenment or according to some supposedly more devel- 
oped view of what counts as enlightenment (not fully enlightened). 
In this respect Buddhism is analogous to the Christian situation, 
in which Jesus must be seen as the Christ, if the religion is going 
to be viable. Yet there is this difference: that in these cases one 
is not concerned specifically with the existence, the historicity, of 
the religious leaders. 
For the record, I see no convincing reasons for denying the 
historicity of Gotama. But as the study concerns a set of texts 
which would be regarded as Buddhist even if it turned out that there 
never e:: isted a Gotama, the understanding which this study offers 
is not contingent on the existence of a particular person. 
The overall aim in terms of methodology and content is, in 
terms of methodology, to eliminate several obstacles which some 
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scholars have thought made an understanding of the content 
impossible, and in terms of content, to develop an under- 
standing of rationality and mind in early Buddhism. In select- 
ing specific topics to cover within this scope I have had to be 
somewhat selective, as there are many topics which could be 
considered under the rubrics of rationality and mind. Throughout, 
I develop the overall argument in such a way as to interest both 
philosophers and Buddhologists, and it is this approach, just as 
much as particular conclusions, which marks whatever original- 
ity the work may lay claim to. Although there have been other 
works on the 'psychology' of Pali Buddhism, there are very few 
written by scholars with philosophical training. 
This type of work on the interface between the philosophy of 
religion and Buddhology is a new possibility for religious studies. 
There has long been critically-oriented writing concerning con- 
ceptual difficulties in Christianity, and while the study of Oriental 
thought was in its infancy in the West, it was important that some 
scholars took an apologetical stand on behalf of Asian religions in 
order to stimulate interest in the subject and in order to jolt some 
out of a Christo-centric complacency. But that time is past. Every 
year one is inundated with popular books on Asian thought which 
recapitulate well-worn doctrines in non-technical language with 
varying degrees of inaccuracy. There is a need for scholars to 
do for Buddhism and other religions what philosophers of religion 
have been doing for Christianity in presenting conceptual problems. 
What is needed is, on the one hand, sympathetic understanding of 
what is internally coherent and linguistically precise in the language 
of the Asian texts studied, and, on the other hand, attention to 
Asian thought from a critical philosophical point of view. The 
former alone leads to a relativistic ostrich attitude; the latter alone 
leads to arrogant misunderstanding. But it is not that philosophy 
0!! L 
11 
has only an external, critical function. here. It may function in 
this way (e. g., a difficulty- in reidentification of persons is shown), 
and yet also philosophy may be useful for internal under standing 
(e. g. , the endless life /eternal life distinction is shown applicable) 
in a way which does not distort but elucidates. 
It is important to distinguish the approach of the present work 
from comparative philosophy. Generally (but not, I think, neces- 
sarily), 
9 
comparative philos ophy tends toward either apologetics or 
condescension with reference to one of the things compared. 
While these attitudes do not in every case preclude understanding, 
if held at the outset , they can take the form of a one-sided select- 
ivity towards the facts which makes understanding difficult or 
impassible. Comparisons are useful when they enable one to see 
the subject in a fresh way, without distorting it. 
10 
Comparisons 
are occasionally made here, but there is no overall strategy of a 
comparative sort. 
11 
Chapter 1 takes up some methodological problems on the 
possibilities of internal and external criticism. The main thrust 
here is to show that the strong thesis (incorrectly attributed to 
Winch) that standards of rationality never coincide is mistaken. 
The importance of showing that it is mistaken is that if it were 
not, then an understanding of early Buddhism could not even 
begin from a Western viewpoint. 
Even with this general objection to the possibility of under- 
standing aside, some have thought that in the particular case of 
early Buddhism the four-fold logic that it sometimes employs is 
self-contradictory or else unintelligible. If this were so, it 
would be impossible to 'begin understanding early Buddhism at 
all from a Western viewpoint. Ch. Z examines the four-fold 
logic and concludes that it is not self-contradictory or senseless, 





but an heuristic one for debate. 
Ch. 3 answers the objection that early Buddhism is emotively 
flawed as Ch. 2 had done for the charge that it is logically 
flawed. It does so bar examining the concept of dukkha, which turns 
out-to be a descriptive -cum-evaluative concept and one which 
provides no support for a view of early Buddhism as 'pessimistic! 
Having argued against considerations of methodological, 
logical and emotive points (in Chs. I, 2 and 3 respectively) which 
seek to cut off further inquiry by asserting that early Buddhism 
is unintelligible or perversely pessimistic, the next three chapters 
discuss mind. In Ch. 4a discussion of the terms citta, mano 
and vi1'inäna is given in I, and in II the problem of the compatib- 
ility of 'no soul' (anatta) doctrine and rebirth, and the problem of 
reicdentification of persons is discussed. 
In Ch. 5 the concern is with talk about verification in relation 
to the early Buddhist rebirth doctrine. Part I discusses saddhä 
(confidence) and II sees abhinnä (special sorts of knowledge and 
powers) in the light of the i. nnportance of saddhä. On the basis of 
I and II the Buddhist empiricism thesis is rejected in III. 
In Ch. 6 the deathless (amata) is explained in such a way as 
not to conflict with anatta doctrine. Views of nihbäna are dis- 
cussed, the distinction between parinibbäna and nibbana defended, 
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Chapter 1: Rationality and Cultural Understanding 
I 
Alasdair Maclntyre, in an article highly critical of Peter 
Winch's views, observes that both Durkheim and Winch suppose 
an either/or dichotomy between the contextual study of another 
society and the external study of it: 
' 
That is, Durkheim supposes, just as Winch does, that an 
investigation of social reality which uses the concepts 
available to the members of the society being studied, and 
an investigation of social reality which utilizes concepts 
not so available and invokes causal explanations of which 
the agents themselves are not aware, are mutually ex- 
clusive alternatives. But Durkheim supposes, as Winch 
does not, that the latter alternative is the one to be pre- 
ferred. Yet his acceptance of the same dichotomy involves 
him in the same inability to understand the different ways 
in which social structure may be related to individual 
action. 
And in the following passage Winch does draw a sharp distinct- 
ion between 'another way of life' and our own, so that they are 
mutually exclusive: 
2 
Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek 
to extend our own - not simply to bring the other way with- 
in the already existing boundaries of our own, because the 
point about the latter in their present form is that they ex 
hypothesi exclude the other. 
It might seem that Winch wishes to make a sharp cleavage 
between conceptual schemes so that on this basis he could 
maintain that it cannot sensibly be asked whether the Azande 
belief that witches exist is true or false, since appealing to 
criteria in our scientific world-view would then be an illegitimate 
move, and since there are no critieria independent of all ways of 
life to which to appeal. The inadequacy of this caricature of 
Winch's intentions will be shown in II. 
First of all it is interesting to notice that Winch sometimes 
speaks, in the same paper, as though ways of life must exclude 




present form... ex hypothesi exclude the other', and sometimes 
rather differently as in: 'For we start from the position that 
standards of rationality in different societies do not always 
coincide... '. 
3 
And it is obvious that to say that they do not 
always coincide is to leave open the possibility that they might 
sometimes coincide. But if Maclntyre were right in interpreting 
Winch as intending to drive a wedge between cultures in such a 
way that the contextual study of another culture and the external 
study of it turn out to be mutually exclusive, then it is precisely 
this possibility which must be excluded. 
Now I would like to examine the basis given for the claim that 
one cannot sensibly say whether Azande belief in witches is true 
or false. Winch's argument apparently depends on his driving a 
wedge between cultures in such a way as to exclude overlap. It 
can be argued, however, that once driven, it becomes impossible 
to explain progress in sci ence, for example, nor is it possible to 
give any good reasons for changing from a given scientific con- 
ceptual scheme to a more efficient and economical one. For 
instance, on Winch's view Ptolemaic astronomy might be regarded 
as impervious to criticism, as the following transposition of 
Winch's parody of Evans-Pritchard shows: 
4 
Copernicans observe the rising of the sun just as Ptolemaics 
observe it, but Copernican observations are always sub- 
ordinated to their beliefs and are incorporated into their 
beliefs and made to explain them and justify them. Let a 
Ptolemaic consider any argument that would utterly refute 
all Copernican scepticism about the rising of the sun as it 
moves around the earth. If it were translated into Ptole- 
maic modes of thought it would serve to support their entire 
structure of belief. For their Ptolemaic notions are emin- 
ently coherent, being interrelated by a network of logical 
ties, and are so ordered that they never too crudely contra- 
dict Copernican experience but, instead, experience seems 
to justify them. The Copernican is immersed in a sea of 
Copernican notions, and if he speaks about the Ptolemaic 
rising sun he must speak in a Copernican idiom. 
OPTN 
16 
Concisely stated in Winch's vein, the context from which the 
objection is raised is not Ptolemy's, Ptolemaic astronomy is 
not quasi -Copernican, and to insist on the being a superfluity 
of epicycles is a category mistake. 
5 
On the view caricatured 
there can be no progress in science. But there is progress in 
science. Therefore the view caricatured is mistaken. 
Winch could point out, plausibly, that he intended a contrast 
between scientific and non-scientific ones, not between two scien- 
tific conceptual schemes. The difficulty is that he maintains that 
there is no universal set of norms of rationality, without giving 
any reason why Ptolemaic rationality, say, can be dismissed. 
Further, if it-turned out- that a remote tribe of geocentrically 
inclined Ptolemaic primitives were discovered tomorrow, then 
on MacInyre-'s interpretation of Winch their astronomy would be 
impervious to criticism. 
A question arises as to just what Winch had in mind about the 
relationship between two cultures with respect to standards of 
rationality. It seems that he needs to hold the strong thesis that 
standards of rationality in"t\y. o cultures never coincide, in order 
to drive a wedge between cultures in such a way as to support his 
other claim that contextual study of another culture and external 
study of it are mutually exclusive. However, if he consistently 
holds the strong thesis, then a problem arises in making sense of 
his talk about culture learning. For Winch, an important part 
of culture learning in the sense of learning from another culture 
consists in learning different ways of making sense of human life 
as a whole, as the following quotation bears out: 
What we may learn by studying other cultures are not merely 
possibilities of different ways of doing things, other tech- 
niques. More importantly we may learn different possibil- 
ities of making sense of human life, different ideas about the 
possible importance that the carrying out of certain activities 
may take on for a man, trying to contemplate the sense of 
his life as a whole. This dimension of the matter is precise- 
ly what Maclntyre misses in his treatment of Zande magic: 




Here Winch is on the right track, both in his characterization 
of the importance of learning from another culture, and in his 
criticism of Maclntyre insofar as the latter regards Azande 
magic as pseudo-science. 
Unfortunately, however, when one considers Winch's idea 
of culture learning in relation to the strong thesis outlined 
above, it is not at all clear whether and how it is possible to 
learn from another culture. For if person x in culture A tries 
to learn about culture B, and if the standards of rationality in 
A and B are entirely different admitting of no overlap (as the 
strong thesis states), then x in A cannot understand B at all. 
The most he could do, it seems, is to report the behavior of 
some members of B and re-state any views of member-informants 
of B. But if the standards of rationality were entirely different, 
then he could not see the 'logic' of B at all. It is rather like the 
case of visual perception in which one sees a sequence of marks 
but not the pattern. Winch, however, emphasizes that the con- 
cept of learning from another culture is closely linked to the 
7 
concept of wisdom. 
As a matter of fact one can learn to understand the rationality 
of another culture, and one can see a pattern rather than just a 
sequence of marks when shown by someone capable of tracing the 
pattern. But rationality is a fundamental concept in comparison 
to bits of data which are seen as rational, so that learning the 
former is unlike learning a particular bit of data. As Winch says 
8 
of rationality: 
It is a concept necessary to the existence of any language: 
to say of a society that it has a language is also to say that 
it has a concept of rationality. There need not perhaps be 
any word functioning in its language as 'rational' does in 
ours, but at least there must be features of its members' 
use of language analogous to those features of our use of 
language which are connected with our use of the word 
'rational'. Where there is language it must make a difference 
what is said and this is only possible where the saying of one 
thing rules out, on. pain of failure to communicate, the saying 




Just what sort of mistake is a mistake in rationality? Is it 
the same as making a mistake about the denotation of a word, 
say, thinking that 'chartreuse' means 'red' ? Clearly not. Since 
rationality is not something one might find or not find in a 
language but is essential for communication, a mistake at this 
level is fundamental. While many mistakes in denotation can be 
corrected by ostensive definition, as when one points to a chart- 
reuse drapery and says 'this is chartreuse' to someone who made 
the above-mentioned error, rationality cannot be taught osten- 
sively nor a mistake in it corrected ostensively. Like definition 
of words, it is learned in the process of socialization or accul- 
turation, yet not in precisely the same way as in learning the 
meanings of i :: iividual words. 
The following dilemma arises, however, in that if Winch 
were to hold the strong thesis that standards of rationality in two 
cultures never coincide as a basis for his claim that contextual 
study and external study are mutually exclusive, then learning 
from another culture would become inexplicable (see paraphrase, 
p. 16). On the other hand, if he were to adhere only to the weaker 
claim that standards of rationality in different cultures do not 
always coincide, leaving open the ppssibility that they might some- 
times do so, then there is no basis for the claim that contextual 
study and external study of another culture are mutually exclusive 
(see quotation, p. 14). 
The main point that I wish to emphasize as emerging from 
the foregoing discussion, and one which is germane to the entire 
project here, is this: that one has been given no reason to believe 
that standards of rationality in two different cultures must exclude 
one another, and that, even if this were demonstrated, it would 
have proven too much in that learning from another culture would 
consequently be inexplicable. 
I,, 
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Maclntyre raises these criticisms of Winch: 
The first is to the effect that in Winch's view certain actual 
historical transitions from one system of beliefs to another 
which are necessarily characterized by raising questions of 
the kind that" VWinch'rejects. 
_ 
In seventeenth-century Scotland, 
for example, the question could not but be raised, "But are 
there witches? " When Winch asks, from within what way of 
social life, under what system of belief was this question 
asked, the only answer is that it was asked by men who con- 
fronted alternative systems and were able to draw out of 
what confronted them independent criteria of judgment. Many 
Africans today are in the same situation. 
This may be misleading. Perhaps Maclntyre would agree that it 
is not a matter of drawing out criteria which are in some sense 
already there, a suggestion so vague as to be absurd, but his 
language suggests otherwise. Here one has, on the contrary, an 
evaluational decision process in which one first decides. what 
criteria are important, and then looks to see whether the desired 
criteria are better met in one case than in the other, or whether 
some sort of new system is required. In short, while MacIntyre 
complains that on Winch's view certain historical transitions 
from one conceptual scheme to another are made unintelligible, it 
is not clear that on his own account they are in fact intelligible. 
The basic problem is that of the meaning of 'independent' in 
Maclntyre's usage of 'independent criteria' here. He supposes that 
decidi: gig for or against a conceptual scheme in which witchcraft 
plays a role may be done with reference to independent criteria. 
But it may be asked: 'independent of what? '. Since Maclntyre 
holds that 'all interpretation has to begin with detecting the stand- 
ards of intelligibility established in a society', he could only see 
himself as speaking from his own point of view as a member of 
a society in which the twentieth-century scientific world-view pre- 
dominates. 
10 
And so, too, with the hypothetical Scotsman who, 
in seventeenth-century context, asks whether or not there are 
witches. The criteria appealed to cannot be of some curious 
ooý. 
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neutral context-f ee sort, as Maclntyre himself notes, so 
perhaps what he means is 'independent' in the sense of being 
derived on one's own, through reflection. In that case his 
thinking turns out to have a decidedly a priori slant, which is 
in fact the subject of Winch's attack. Maclntyre does not put 
much weight on this argument, adding that 'any historical 
counter-example to Winch's thesis will be open to questions of 
interpretation that will make it less than decisive. '11 
A second argument advanced by Maclntyre, based on con- 
side rations of meaning and the 
as follows: 
12 
possibility of translation, runs 
Consider the statement made by some Zande theorist or 
by King James VI and I, "There are witches" and the 
statement made by some modern skeptic, "There are no 
witches! ' Unless one of these statements denies what the 
other asserts, the negation of the sentence expressing the 
former could not be a correct translation of the sentence 
expressing the latter. Thus if we could not deny from our 
own standpoint and in our own language what the Azande or 
King James assert in theirs, we should be unable to trans- 
late their expression into our language. Cultural idiosyn- 
cracy would have entailed linguistic idiosyncrasy and 
cross-cultural comparison would have been rendered 
logically impossible. But of course translation is not im- 
possible. 
In order to probe this argument further, let us ask: if an 
Azande asserts something which is, translated as 'There are 
witches', and if King James VI asserts 'There are witches', are 
the Azande and King James VI making the same claim ? The 
answer to this depends on what amount of detail is taken to 
figure in the denotation of 'witch' and its counterpart in Azande 
language. If it is assumed that a characterization of these terms 
is possible in a minimal fashion which does not make idiosyn- 
cratic reference to features of the conceptual schemes in which 




that the fact of translation shows that conceptual schemes are 
not always mutually exclusive. Consequently, on this minimal 
characterization of the denotation, the Azande and King James 
VI could be said to be making the same claim. On the other 
hand, if the characterization is filled out in such a way as to 
refer to some related concept which is used in the one concep- 
tual scheme and not used in the other, then the two could not be 
said to be making the same claim. Thus, on one line of thinking, 
the conceptual similarity is stressed; on the other, their con- 
textual uniqueneSS - is emphasized. 
Yet insofar as Maclntyre's view requires a minimal charac- 
terisation of 'witch', e. g. , what count. s as the same claim on 
such a characterisation is likely to be rather different from what 
both the Azande and King James VI would take to be the issue if 
pressed to clarify their statements. Whereas the latter might 
say, for example, that a witch is the sort of being which can 
occasionally be seen riding a broomstick under a full moon at 
night, the notion of riding a broomstick might be entirely irrel- 
evant for the Azande's attempt to clarify what he means by 
saying that there are witches. 
The upshot of this is that although, on the sort of view re- 
quired by Maclntyre's argument, one could make a case for saying 
that the two are making 'the same claim', this would not be very 
interesting once one sees that neither of the two would agree that 
the lofty level of generality at which such a view must characterize 
the sameness is precisely the issue. And if the same claim is not 
under consideration, then it is just as impossible for the two to 
disagree in contradictory fashion as it is for them to agree. Mac- 
Intyre's second argument, therefore, does not turn out to be of 
much help in the way that he intended, although the above consid- 




delin ion of the same claim or of the same problem in compar- 
ative work. 
It is curious that he does not notice that the argument is of 
little help, for just after giving it he states, speaking of Gold- 
schmidt and Leach: 
13 
Both have also pointed out how, if we compare for example 
marital institutions in different cultures, our definition of 
"marriage" will either be drawn from one culture in terms 
of whose concepts other cultures will be described or rather 
misdescribed, or else will be so neutral, bare, and empty 
as to be valueless. That is, the understanding of a people 
in terms of their own concepts and beliefs does in fact tend 
to preclude understanding them in any other terms. To 
this extent Winch is vindicated. 
The first sentence quoted above is an apt statement of some 
consequences which follow from Maclntyre's own argument con- 
cerning translatability. For he holds that, of the two claims, 
't'here are witches' and 'there are no witches' (in the contexts 
specified), one must deny what the other asserts or else trans- 
lation would be impossible, which consequence is contrary to 
fact. Yet here above, usirg the example of 'marriage' rather 
than of 'witch', he implies the opposite, namely, that people in 
different cultures are not asserting or denying the same thing in 
talking about marr :.. ge. 
It is important to see that the example of the concept of 
marriage is not tantamount to the general point made after 'that 
is'; that acceptance of the former in no way entails acceptance 
of the latter. Indeed, the relationship between the former and 
the latter is entirely unclear. Since it cannot be an equivalence 
relationship, it might be thought to be an entailment relationship. 
But to arrive at this general view of tle mutual exclusivity of 
contextual and external types of cultural understanding on the 
basis of the example given requires a great leap, and one can 
only suspect that Maclntyre was convinced of the truth of the 
00>'\ 
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general claim by attending to many more examples of this sort. 
But the reader is not obliged to follow him in this, because an 
inductive argument of however many exam pies of the requisite 
sort can never ensure that, in the next instance, a specific 
concept cannot be understood both in its context and in relation 
to a concept of another system. 
The usage. of 'in fact' is also puzzling. Its inclusion seems 
to mean that as a matter of fact it turns out to be the case that 
the contextual understanding and external understanding are 
mutually exclusive. But insofar as this position is pressed into 
service as a recommendation for what should be done in future 
study of other conceptual schemes or cultures, it has no force 
whatsoever on account of the contingent status of the position. 
Of course he might mean 'in fact' in the sense of 'actually so' in 
reference to the general position rather than in the sense of 
'contingently so' in reference to the particular example, but in 
that case support is entirely lacking for the general position 
anyway. Thus, MacIntyre's claim as to how Winch is 'vindicated' 
is mistaken. 
In this study of early Buddhism I am trying to avoid the ex - 
tremes of: concepts from the outside are the only right vehicles 
for the analysis of another culture or conceptual scheme (Durk- 
heim), and concepts of another culture or conceptual scheme are 
the only right vehicles for their understanding (MacIntyre's 
interpretation of Winch). 
II 
As is often the case in philosophy, if cne now returns to 
-reconsider the starting point, some puzzlement vanishes. Recall 
that on Maclntyre's interpretation of Winch as holding that con- 
textual study and external study are mutually exclusive there 
turned out to be a dilemma for Winch (p. 18). 
i, 
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In The Idea of a Social Science Winch writes: 
14 
I do not wish to maintain that we must stop at the unre- 
flective kind of understanding of which I gave as an instance 
the engineer's understanding of the activities of his colleagues. 
But I do want to say that any more reflective understanding 
must necessarily presuppose, if it is to count as genuine 
understanding at all, the participant's unreflective understand- 
ing. And this in itself makes it misleading to compare it with 
the natural scientist's understanding of his scientific data. 
Similarly, although the reflective student of society, or of a 
particular mode of social life, may find it necessary to use 
concepts which are not taken from the forms of activity which 
he is investigating, but which are taken rather from the con- 
text of his own investigation, still these technical concepts of 
his will imply a previous understanding of those other concepts 
which belong to the activities under investigation. 
If one interprets Winch's position in the light of the above passage, 
rather than just focusing on his article 'Understanding a Primitive 
Society', it becomes clear that he has covered himself against 
Maclntyre's interpretation of the (subsequent) article. It is not 
necessary to stop at the contextual level, Winch holds, and con- 
textual understanding and external understanding are not mutually 
exclusive. 
That he does not intend to hold the strong thesis also comes 
15 
out in replies to criticism. In Ethics and Action Winch says: 
In view of various criticisms which have been made of this 
essay since it was first published, I ought perhaps to 
emphasize that its argument is not, absurdly, that ways in 
which men live together can never be characterized as in 
any sense 'irrational'; still less do I argue in it that men 
who belong to one culture can 'never understand' lives led 
in another culture. The argument is rather against certain 
kinds of account of the criticisms which are possible and of 
what is involved in such 'cross-cultural' attempts at under- 
standing. 
And in Reason and Religion, while admitting that he may not have 
always been careful enough in phrasing his view, it is not that 
there are 'practices and beliefs hermetically sealed off from any 
t^. 
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relation to life or to our understanding of the world', and not 
that there is (or should be) a 'sealing the door between the chapel 
and the laboratory to make sure there is no intermingling of the 
16 incense and the hydrogen sulphide', and that clearly: 
My point, however, is not that there cannot or should 
not be any confrontation between a man's religious con- 
victions and the understanding of the world which he has 
drawn from sources other than religion. I am saying rather 
that the form such a 'confrontation with reality' takes is 
very misleadingly represented in terms of 'evidence for 
God's existence and non-existence'. 
That he does not intend to hold the strong thesis also comes 
our in reply to I. C. Jarvie, who has said: 
17 
I therefore wish to argue that Winch yields too much to 
relativism, that there are language-games in which cross- 
cultural value judgments are legitimate moves, that these 
moves are played in all cultures as well as in the sociolo- 
gists' sub-culture. Indeed, such cross-cultural value- 
judgments, such use of one's own society as a measuring 
instrument or a sounding board, is the principal way socio- 
logical understanding of an alien society is reached. 
Winch thinks that the last statement is obvious and beside the 
point, that of course we use our society as a measuring rod, but 
that the question is not whether we can do this, but what sort of 
comparison is involved. He suggests that it is not cross-cultural 
comparison as such that is wrongheaded, but only such as would 
involve a category-mistake. An example of this sort of mistake 
would be to compare Azande magic with some sort of Western 
scientific framework and conclude that the Azande beliefs are 
false and those of science true. My concern is to argue against 
the strong thesis, and to eliminate the illusion that it has Winch 
as a supporter. 
Explicit denial of what I have called the strong thesis comes 
early on in Winch's rejoinder to Jarvie, where he points out that 




incomparable', does not at all paraphrase the author's view. 
18 
Instead, Winch was thinking that it is sometimes the case, but 
not always. For he does want to hold that it is possible to learn 
from another culture, and this would be impossible if there were 
no points of intersection of standards of rationality. 
Jarvie interprets Winch's overall enterprise as making a 
tacit distinction between the broad understanding of a culture and 
of primitive customs in general, on the one hand, and a narrow 
understanding of a culture and those customs involving ideas which 
conflict with our ideas, on the other hand. Having made this dis- 
tinction, while recognizing that Winch has not 'explicitly' done so, 
he then asserts that Winch holds implicitly that if we can under- 
stand the second way, then we can in the first way as well. Jarvie 
observes that this is not obviously true. I do not wish to argue 
that it is true, but merely to point out that he has offered no 
evidence for this interpretation of Winch, nor does it seem a 
plausible interpretation. Thus, one can only regard the broad/ 
narrow distinction here as a contrived one which fails to fit the 
case. It is significant that Jarvie does not try to push this line. 
It serves only as a red herring attempt to draw attention away from 
the real issue underlying Winch's discussion, which is the in - 
applicability of positivist ways of thinking to the description of 
religious and magical practices. In all fairness to Winch it 
should be recognized that he is not concerned to make some facile 
leap from the particular (narrow understanding) to the general 
(broad understanding) based on a consideration of Azande magic. 
On his view, understanding a primitive society does not consists 
in this sort of generalizing at all, but in part, at least, consists 
in seeing significant differences (between magic and science, say), 
and avoiding making certain kinds of mistakes (taking magic to be 




Point (i) which Jarvie makes against Winch is that he denies 
standards to societies which they in fact possess. In the dis- 
cussion of (i) he makes it clear that he means that Winch denies 
that the Azande have a standard of rationality recognizable in the 
West. That the Azande try to deal with contradictions via the 
introduction of ad hoc hypotheses makes it clear, Jarvie, argues, 
that they do have a standard of rationality recognizable in the 
West, one recognizable as poor. 
19 
Winch replies by criticizifl 
Jarvie for what he calls his "iscientific" preconceptions' as 
follows: 
20 
Against the background of such preconceptions Zande stand- 
ards might indeed seem 'rather poor', but whether they really 
are rather poor or not depends on the point of the activity 
within which the contradictions crop-up. My claim was that 
this point is in fact very different from the point of scientific 
inve stigat. ions. 
But what precisely is the point of the Azande activity? Winch 
has indicated that it is not scientific investigation, but his positive 
vision is not spelled out. And just how do we know when, in 
encountering a practice in another culture, the practice is scien- 
tific -- is there a ct- 
terion, and if so, what is it? Winch evinces 
no concern for these issues. Jarvie interprets the Azande as 
introducing ad hoc hypotheses, holding without argument that they 
are engaged in pseudo-scientific practices, while Winch says that 
the point of their activity is not this without being very specific 
as to what it is. 
21 
Of the other points raised by Jarvie, (ii) refers to a prob- 
lem of conceptual change, (iii) to essentialist metaphysics, (iv) 
to the 'seamless web' notion, and (v) to empirical content. On 
all these topics Jarvie thinks that Winch has gotten into deep 
waters. The only one of these that differs much from Jarvie's 
way of capsulizing his main points is (ii), where he initially phrases 




But in the discussion cf (ii) he makes it clear that his concern is 
with allowing for the possibility of conceptual change in a 
society's self-appraisal. 
Under the rubric of (ii) Jarvie argues: 'my claim is that 
overlap of standards is more important because in overlap may 
lie the seeds of appraisal and change. '22 Jarvie adds that Winch's 
model assumes that Zande beliefs are not hypotheses, with the 
assumption that a culture accepts its own appraisal of its beliefs. 
But this does not happen in all cases, since a culture can adapt 
itself to new ideas and implement them in its way of life. 
Winch, however, does not wish to deny the possibility of con- 
23 
ceptual change in a culture, and writes: 
... it is a mistake to say that the view I developed about the 
relation between forms of social life and the standards accord- 
ing to which people act within these forms rules out the pos s- 
bility of such standards being changed as a result of criticism. 
Indeed, one of my fundamental lines of argument was that the 
way in which characteristically human behaviour does involve 
the possibility cf discussion and criticism itself shows the 
intimate connection between men's actions and the social 
context of rules and standards within which they perform those 
actions. 
But on the other hand, what of Jarvie's point that Winch works 
with a model which assumes that the Azande beliefs are not 
hypotheses? I am not concerned to pursue Jarvie's argument in (ii) 
paraphrased above in precisely the direction he takes it, for it seems 
tor-that Winch's position at best does not require ruling out con- 
ceptual change, contrary to criticisms by Jarvie and by Maclntyre. 
The kernel of Winch's position is a humanistic critique of a mis- 
guided application of positivism to describe religious and magical 
beliefs. 
Has Winch provided any account of the status of Azande beliefs? 
Talking about Azande 'beliefs' presents a problem, he notes, for 





problem vanishes, he argues, when one sees that it is not always 
possible to say whether a particular belief is true or false. Here 
he is treading a tightrope. On the one side of this tightrope yawns 
the great abyss of relativism; on the other, the craggy pit of 
objectivism. His assertion, 'what I am suggesting is that the 
westerner who feels there is no reality in Zande magic. .. admits 
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by irr'plication that there is reality in Azande magic, but without' 
endorsing Azande beliefs about magic as true , or rejecting them 
as false. This becomes clear in his rejoinder to Jarvie. 
Winch sees the crux of the dispute between himself and Jarvie 
as turning upon 'the relation between such notions as languge, 
reality, truth and consistency', and states: 'I think probably the 
fundamental point of contention between Jarvie and myself concerns 
the relation between these methods of getting near the truth and the 
truth which we thus get nearer. '25 Doubtlessly. And Jarvie does 
betray a rather naive view of truth as tied to a monolithic core of 
Western rationality which is happily spreading everywhere. And 
yet, having avoided the fall into the objectivist pit, can Winch 
remain equally well-poised in the abys face of relativism ? 
Prima facie it looks as if Winch has two lines covering him- 
self against relativism. 
meaning can be given to 
magic, although truth ai 
Azande beliefs about it. 
reality in Azande magic 
their activity, that such 
The validity of one turns upon just what 
the claim that there is 'reality' in Azande 
id falsity cannot be predicated of the 
It may well be that in saying there is 
Winch means that there is a point to 
activity is not devoid of human significance. 
This view is supported by what Winch says about prayers 
26 
which: 
may be regarded from one point of view as freeing the 
believer from dependence on what he is supplicating for. 
Prayers cannot play this role if they are regarded as a 
means of influencing the outcome for in that case the one 
ý. 
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who prays is still dependent on the outcome. He frees 
himself from this by acknowledging his complete dependence 
on God; and this is totally unlike any dependence on the out- 
come precisely because God is eternal and the outcome 
contingent. 
I do not say that Azande magical rites are at all like 
Christian prayers of supplication in the positive attitude to 
contingencies which they express. What I do suggest is that 
they are alike in that they do, or may, express an attitude 
to contingencies; one, that is, which involves recognition 
that one's life is subject to contingencies, rather than an 
attempt to control these. To characterize this attitude more 
specifically one should note how Zande rites emphasize the 
importance of certain fundamental features of their life which 
Maclntyre ignores. Maclntyre concentrates implicitly on 
the relation of the rites to consumption, but of course they 
are also fundamental to social relations and this seems to be 
emphasized in Zande notions of witchcraft. 
According to this account, then, Azande magic is not at all pseudo- 
science but something quite different in kind: an acknowledgment. 
of one's depe ndency on the powers that be and renunciation in the 
face of adverse contingencies. It is essentially ritual symbolic, 
rather than scientific, activity, and it expresses an attitude. So 
that is why truth and falsity gare inapplicable here. It 
is clear that 
-according to this account, then, Azande magic is not at all pseudo- 
science but something quite different in kind: an acknowledgement 
of one's dependency on the powers that be and renunciation in the 
face of adverse contingencies. It is essentially ritual, symbolic, 
rather than scientific, activity, which expresses an attitude to- 
wards contingencies. So that is why truth and falsity are inapplic- 
able here. 
Why is the first line one covering Winch against a relativistic 
interpretation? Because he says that there is 'reality' in Azande 
magic, whereas he does not say this about Jarvie's position, for 
example. If he were a relativist, he would agree with Jarvie's 
view and with any other non-self contradictory one. 
It might be thought that Winch offers another line in the closing 
pages of the same article, avoiding what Jarvie calles the 
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'relativist precipice' by means of it. Winch writes: 
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I have wanted to indicate that forms of these limiting con- 
cepts will necessarily be an important feature of any human 
society and that conceptions of good and evil in human life 
will necessarily be connected with such concepts. In any 
attempt to understand the life of another society, therefore, 
an investigation of the forms taken by such concepts -- 
their role in the life of the society -- must always take a 
central place and provide a basis on which understanding 
may be built. 
I am not concerned to argue about whether the 'limiting concepts', 
birth, death, and sexual relations, are the three essential limiting 
concepts, nor about whether there must be such a trinity. But if 
one sees Winch's remark in context it is clear that he is not 
addressing the issue of relativism but rather the issue of cultural 
understanding. A culture's norrrative view of the importance of, 
and details concerning, birth, death, and sex are starting points 
for understanding other societies, and since all known cultures 
have views about these matters, to understand them is to gain 
fundamental understanding. Nowhere does Winch specifically 
say that these show why relativism is inadequate, and it is 
difficult to see how such an attempt could get off the ground, even 
if he did mean it as such. 
For ethical relativism is 'quite unaffected by whether any set 
of concepts you like turns up in any culture you like. 'Even barring 
problems of translatability and of how these terms may be changed 
by their relations to different terms in different contexts, the 
concepts may be used in judgments making opposite recommenda- 
tions for human action in two cultures. Thus, nothing about 
whether or not judgments of morality are possible which apply 
universally has been decided by pointing to putative universal con- 
cepts. Consequently, the first but not the second line covers 
Winch against a relativistic interpretation. 
Now it is time to conclude by giving my response to the con- 
troversy between Winch and some of his critics, and to explain 
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how my methodology for the study of early Buddhism is articu- 
lated in - relation to the controversy. Some of the controversy 
concerns magic, but in what follows the concern is specifically 
with religious belief. 
I want to say that some religious belief may involve belief 
in the causal efficacy of rituals to affect the environment, but 
that the meaning of the rituals need not consist in this. (The 
meaning, as Winch rightly sees, is embedded in social practice. 
A member of a ritual- practicing tribe (e. g. , in a rain dance 
may have no concept of efficient causation as this concept is -.:. sec- 
by Westerne. rs in connection with beliefs about natural events, 
and yet practice his rituals nevertheless. It would be mistaken 
to say that he must have the notion of efficient causation that 
Westerners have, and then say he has got it wrong, unless there 
is clear evidence that he does in fact have the Western concept 
of efficient causality in seeing the ritual. While a priori the 
possibility of a whole tribe being misguided cannot be ruled out, 
it would be equally gratuitous to assume a priori that the tribe 
must have the Western concept, and then to criticize them for 
applying it so stupidly. 
The critics are right in wishing to keep open the possibilities 
of criticism and of social change, although they are not very 
sensitive interpreters of Winch and take him, wrongly, to reject 
these values and to hold absurd positions. For his part, Winch 
has admittedly(on his own admission) not always been careful to 
avoid the language of 'hermetically sealed contexts', resulting in 
the dilemma pointed out earlier (p. 18). But his intended target, 
the misguided application of positivist ways of thinking to relig- 
ious belief, is well chosen. For one reason, because the possib- 




statements and tautologies. For there are also background pre- 
suppositions which, as such, require no verification, although 
when articulated as propositions they may in a different context 
be treated as empirical propositions. I shall say more about 
that here shortly, as well as later on in treating 'there is 
rebirth'. 
The positivist, however, sees only the first two categories 
and has a short way with religious belief. On this view religious 
beliefs (e. g. , 'rebirth occurs') are not tautologies and hence must 
be empirical statements, since all meaningful statements are one 
or the other. And since there is no good evidence to accept that 
rebirth occiirs, say, it can only be regarded as false, since all 
empirical statements are either true or false. 
I think that Winch is partly correct in en-phasizing that the 
way in which religious beliefs are held does not depend on empir- 
ical evidence. This is so when religious beliefs are treated as 
part of the background. When a religious belief begins to be 
doubted, however, it can change status and become treated as 
in need of experiential justification (and sometimes, as in the 
case of psychic researchers, empirical justification is sought). 
It does not matter much whether one wishes to reserve the term 
'religious belief' in a prescriptive-sense only for cases w7nere 
it is held unconditionally, as a background presupposition. What 
is more important is to see that in a descriptive sense of 'relig- 
ious belief' it covers cases where doubt and struggle are regard- 
ed as compatible with there being religious belief, so that in a 
descriptive sense 'religious belief' is sometimes questioned by 
one who holds it. Religious belief is not all of a piece and is not 
always unconditionally held. If it were, there would be very few 
religious believers indeed. 
00,11\ 
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From I and II it is clear that there is no good reason for 
believing that contextual study and external study are mutually 
exclusive; certainly. Winch is not a proponent of this view. While 
it would be a mistake to minimize the value of contextual study, 
it should also be recognized that absurd beliefs are sometimes 
held. Thus, there will be no a priori assumption made here to 
the effect that any difficulties must be explained away by appeal 
to a 'special logic' of early Buddhism. 
Although there is no evidence of interest in formal logic per 
se in early Buddhism, some have thought that early Buddhism 
violates the principle of noncontradiction. There is, for example, 
a passage in the Majjhima Nikäya in which Gotama Buddha is con- 
fronted with four possibilities: that the tathagata ('liberated one') 
exists after death, does not exist after death, both of these, and 
neither of these. And it might be thought that the third possibility 
was regarded as a well-formed proposition which denies the 
principle of noncontradiction. In early Buddhism this tetralemma 
occurs in the context of the 'unanswered questions' (abyakatä pa? 'hä ) 
which are schematized as follows: 28 
(1) sassato loko, 'the world is eternal' 
(2) asassato lolco, 'the world is not eternal' 
(3) antavä loko, 'the world is finite' 
(4) anantavä loko, 'the world is infinite' 
(5) tarn ja tam sariraT, 'the soul is identical with the body' 
(6) aýina m jiyam annarosarrram, 'the soul is different from 
the body' 
(7) hoti tathagato pararp marapä., 'the liberated one exists after 
death' 
(8) na hoti tathagato paraijz maralä., 'the liberated one does not 
exist after death' 
(9) hoti ca na ca hoti tathägato param maranä, 'the liberated 
one does and does not exist after death' 
(10) neva hoti na na hoti tathägato parar maranä, 'the libera- 
ted one neither exists nor does not exist after death' 
It is the task of the next chapter to examine the question of the 
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Chapter 2: Rationality in Early Buddhist Four Fold Logic 
The fundamental importance of the issue of whether or not 
Buddhist thinkers violate the principle of contradiction has been 
recognized by some Buddhist scholars, yet has been dealt with 
in detail commensurate with its importance by few, and very 
rarely in the context of early Buddhism. J. Fritz Staal reminds 
us of the basic importance of this issue as follows: 
' 
4 
We are often told that Indian philosophers do not accept 
the law of contradiction. This may well be one of the causes 
of the neglect of Indian thought by Western philosophers: for 
nobody desires to study a body of propositions when he is at 
the same time told that their contradictories may hold as 
well. Is it perhaps a new - and according to some superior 
- kind of logic to which we are invited to accustom ourselves? 
... If Indian philosophers are either unaware of contradiction 
or deny the validity of the principle of contradiction, the 
structure of Indian logic would seem to be so fundamentally 
different from the structure of Western logic, that the possib- 
ility of mutual understanding may become questionable. 
Indeed, the possibility of mutual understanding was a general 
concern of the last chapter, in which it was argued specificially 
that there is no reason to believe that contextual study of another 
culture and its external study in terms of some non-indigenous 
concepts are mutually exclusive possibilities. This is a ne ag tive 
argument which militates against the a priori exclusion of under- 
standing the thought of another culture, and one which attempts 
to safeguard the theoretical possibility of the present study in 
particular. The concern of the present chapter is to extend this 
line of thinking by developing a positive, factual argument to the 
effect that understanding early Buddhism is in fact possible, since 
what counts as 'rationality' is not so different as it might at first 
seem. 
Although there are many studies of the interpretation of, and 




ten questions previously cited, and although there are various 
studies of the development of Indian logic, there has been com- 
paratively little written on the logic of the early Buddhist four 
fold logic. Thus, the fundamental nature of the issue as well as 
the lack of interest in, or avoidance of, the issue on the part of 
many Indologists and philosophers who have not addressed it make 
it a particularly interesting and challenging one. 
Staäl offers some stimulating remarks on the four fold logic 
in Buddhism, but like many other scholars who deal with the 
topic, treats it after only a brief mention of the Pali formulation. 
Even within the scope which he delineates, however, there are 
some difficulties with his presentation, which is given in his recent 
book as well as in an earlier article. 
2 
His earlier discussion 
3 
concludes: 
From this point of view the provisory results of the 
present paper can perhaps be formulated as follows. It 
could be shown, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, that neither 
the linguistic structure of Sanskrit, nor that of Greek, leads 
to a particular logical structure. In a detailed investigation 
it makes no sense to speak of the structure of a language. It 
has been shown, however; that certain structures of language, 
which are available in Sanskrit, in Greek, and in other 
languages, are related to particular logical doctrines. The 
problem then becomes, to see which particular linguistic 
structure is related to which particular logical doctrine. ... 
We have seen that the grammarian and Advaitin doctrines of 
negation have a linguistic background in the structure of the 
indicative mood of the verb, while the MTmam sä doctrine has 
a linguistic background in the structure of the optative mood 
of the verb, which is reflected in the imperative. 
An important question here is: precisely what is Staal claim- 
ing to have shown in saying 'certain structures of language ... 
are related to particular logical doctrines' ? What sort of relation- 
ship is supposed to be uncovered? As he holds that it is not a 
'leads to' relationship, and since the examples given (after the 




grounds, the gist of the matter seems to be that certain logical 
doctrines just happen to have certain linguistic backgrounds. 
For there are only two possibilities here. Either 'structures 
of language' and 'logical doctrines' bear a necessary relation- 
ship to one another or a contingent one, and the author has 
denied that the former possibility obtains. Consequently it 
follows thatthe relationship is thought to be a contingent one. 
At this point it become s clear that the problem with which Staal 
is concerned is not a philosophical one at all. The really inter- 
esting philosophical issue about 'Indian thought' initially posed 
viz., 'is it perhaps a new - and according to some superior -- 
kind of logic to which we are invited to accustom ourselt'es ?' is 
left unanswered, and the conclusion is about a contingent matter 
of fact. 
In defense of Staal, however, it should be mentioned that he 
did not make such philosophical issues his primary concern, as 
is evident from his saying: 'the aim of the present study is to see 
how Indian thinkers treat contradictions and what explicit rules 
are given for the treatment of contradictions'. 
4 
It is not being 
suggested that he slides from a philosophical issue to one of con- 
tingent fact, but that he has posed more questions than he has 
addressed. It would have been helpful to have initially di stin - 
guished the kinds of questions involved. 
The importance of Staal's unanswered philosophical question 
5 
mentioned above may be seen in another of his conclusions: 
The doctrines which have been discussed in this paper 
belong to numerous systems of thought and it would require 
much more space to study them fully within their own con- 
texts. However, from the general logical viewpoint adopted 
here, the various interconnexions between the Indian systems 
on the one hand, and Aristotle on the other hand, have been 
more apparent than their divergent backgrounds. We have 





strictly adhered to in grammar, in Advaita Vedänta, and 
in logic. In Mimarnsä the law of contradiction is discarded. 
The footnote to this passage adds: 
Since only the doctrines mentioned are dealt with in this 
paper, these conclusions do not imply that there are not 
also other systems where the law of contradiction is 
denied. Such systems exist in Buddhism... . 
Several points are worth considering here. First, notice 
the claim that some Indian systems 'adhered to', while others 
'discarded', the 'law of contradiction'. Recalling the unanswered 
philosophical question cited above, it becomes clear that Staal 
presupposes an answer to that very interesting question, the 
presuppositions being that it is in principle possible to 'discard' 
the law or principle, and that this has in fact been done in 
Mimämsa and in some Buddhist writing. And regarding his usage 
of 'law', this is an old-fashioned conception of logic, one which 
has been replaced by a view of logic as a system of reason- 
ing. Thirdly, whether one takes it as a principle or a law, there 
is no evidence provided to show that in early Buddhism there is 
a rejection of this fundamental logical tenant. 
Of course if anyone refuses to observe the principle of contra- 
diction (or 'noncontradiction', as it is sometimes called), then 
one cannot communicate logically with him insofar as he does so. 
But are there any grounds for saying that one must not 'discard' 
it? Whatever grounds might be offered would not convince a 
person who is not troubled by self-contradiction. Some mystics 
may feel thus untroubled and indeed that self-contradiction is 
the only way of expressing (even if not communicating) mystical 
experiences. But from a philosophical point of view, any attempt 
to 'discard' the principle of contradiction would result -only 
in a 
Pyrrhic victory, in which freedom from criticism is secured at 
the price of having nothing to criticize. 
41 
Somewhat differently, however, Staal writes: 
The principle of noncontradiction prevents us from rejecting 
and accepting the same statement at the same time. One dis- 
concerting consequence is that one cannot reject the principle 
of noncontradiction without, in doing so, accepting it. In 
general, it is just as senseless to expect that the improper use 
of words establishes the invalidity of logical principles, as to 
reject screwdrivers because we cannot fry eggs with them. 
Staal seems uncertain as to whether it is a 'law' or a 'principle' 
he is discussing, and uses both terms. After noting that the four 
fold logic seems to violate the principle of noncontradiction, and 
that if it does so it is logically flawed, the argument continues with 
the charge that Raju, Robinson and Matilal fail to save the four 
fold logic (he uses the Sanskrit term catuýkoti here). It can be 
saved, Staal suggests, if it is assumed that Nagärjuna rejected 
all four possibilities represented by the four fold so that: 'in 
rejecting the third clause, the denial of the principle of noncontra- 
diction is rejected, not the principle of noncontradiction itself. 
But what, he asks, about the opponents of Mädhyamika who 
apparently accepted the third clause as a logical possibility? Div- 
iding these into philosophers and non-philosophers he dispenses 
with the latter and divides the former into Buddhist and non- 
Buddhist camps. And importantly for the study of early Buddhism 
8 
he writes: 
But confining ourselves in the present context to Buddhist 
philosophers of schools different from the Madhyamika, we 
find that some of these thinkers did not regard the apparent 
contradiction of the third clause as a real contradiction, but 
interpreted it instead in a rational manner which is quite con- 
sistent with Aristotle's principle. They achievedthis simply by 
observing that the predicate occurring in these alternatives 
should not in each case be taken as applicable to the same 
subject. This position implies, for example, that Mälunkyä- 
putta was wondering whether the sage in one sense can be 
said to exist after death, and in another not to exist after 
death. Such double questions are often expressed by means 
of an apparent contradiction, either for rhetorical effect or 





Staal sees rationalism and irrationalism as opposing views 
linked to the acceptance and rejection of the principle (or law) 
of noncontradiction respectively. In this conflict he takes the 
side of rationalism and stresses 'rational solution' and 'rational 
interpretation' as characteristics of Indian treatment of the third 
part of the four fold logic, rhetorically commenting: 
9 
In the case of apparent contradictions, which the Buddha 
mentioned, he does not even consider the irrationalist 
interpretation which would regard them as real contra- 
dictions. So why should we ? ... 
Whatever will turn out to be the correct interpretation 
of the Madhyamika position, an irrationalist interpretation 
of Buddhist doctrines by modern scholars is readily ex- 
plained by the prevailing Western prejudice that religion 
and oriental philosophy are basically irrational. If we 
approach Buddhist thought on its own terms, there appears 
to be little justification, if any, to speak of "Buddhist 
irrationalism". 
There are difficulties with Staal's exposition, however. He 
does not distinguish between emotive rejection and logical denial, 
and consequently makes a staterr_c: it which, on one important sense 
of 'reject' (the emotive), is false. For he holds 'one cannot reject 
the principle of noncontradiction without, in doing so, accepting 
it' (p. 41). And it is clear that a Ch'an or Zen master may indeed 
reject the standard conventions of speech which involve the use of 
the principle of noncontradiction in an attempt to jolt his disciple 
into enlightenment. Even if the koan uttered by the master admits 
of no logical explanation, being logically unintelligible when exam- 
ined simply as a proposition, it does not follow that there is no 
point or intention involved in the master's uttering it. The prin- 
ciple of noncontradiction is not a sort of invisible law, like grav- 
ity, which 'prevents us' from doing things; nor is it the case that 
'one cannot reject' it without accepting it. While it would be self- 
defeating to formulate a propositional denial of the principle of 





Further, one may accept Staal's view of all of Buddhism as 
rational in the sense of not rejecting the principle of noncontra- 
diction, and then show that it leads to absurdity. He recognizes 
the important historical links between South Asian Buddhism and 
East Asian Buddhism by dubbing Nägärjuna as 'the father of the 
Mädhyamika, the grandfather of Ch'an, and the great-grandfather 
of Zen', but fails to draw a damaging conclusion from the juxta- 
position of this statement of the historical reality with the over- 
arching view of Buddhist rationalism which he professes 
l0 
On that 
view some, if not all, of the Zen master's -koan method is radic- 
ally unintelligible. This consequence is hardly a happy one in 
view of the historical links which Staal stresses above. 
Of course Staal is quite right to insist that 'Buddhist irrat- 
ionalism' will not do as a label for Buddhism as a whole. The 
difficulty here, though, is that he swings to the opposite extreme 
thinking that 'Buddhist rationalism' will do for all sects and 
makes the sweeping claim, 'not only certain traditions in Buddhism, 
but Oriental mystical doctri. r_es in general are rational'. 
1 
This 
general point cannot be adequately argued with reference to South 
Asian texts alone as the author does in the 'Buddhist Irrationalism' 
section of his book. Nor is it obvious how his assertion of the 
opposite thesis of 'Buddhist rationalism' in terms of the principle 
of noncontradiction is supposed to square with his (footnoted) claim 
that some Buddhists 'discard' that very principle. 
Now I would like to return to the part of Staal' s argument 
which has particular significance for the interpretation of early 
Buddhism (p. 41). The example given is from sutta 63 of the 
Majjhima Nikäya, in which Buddha is depicted as disabusing 
Malunkyaputt a of the erroneous notion that the validity of the 
Buddhist path is contingent upon holding certain metaphysical 
n 
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positions of philos ophers from among the options in the famous 
ten questions cited earlier. Two things are important here in 
understanding the four fold logic: the language used in order to 
express the attitude which Buddha is said to have taken to these 
qucestions according to the Pali texts, and the Pali phraseology 
of the four fold pattern in particular. The context is one in 
which Mälui kyäputta expresses doubt about the validity of the 
Buddhist path as follows: 
12 
Atha kho ä. yasmato 1 1unkyäputtasa rahogatassa patisa- 
lrinassa evam cetaso parivitakko uda-padi: Yän imani 
ditthigatäni Bhagavatä abyäkatäni thapitTni patikkhittani: 
Sassato loko iti pi, asassato loko iti pi... No ce me 
Bhagavä by-Ekarissati: Sassato loko ti vä, asassato loko 
ti Vä, -- pe -- ne va hoti na na hoti tathägato param 
maranä ti vä, eväham sikkham paccakkhaya hinäy' 
ävattis sämiti. 
The Pali Text Society translation (in this case by I. B. Horner) 
renders the excerpt as follows: 
13* 
Then a reasoning of mind arose to the venerable Malunkya- 
putta as he was meditating in solitary seclusion, thus: 
"Those (speculative) . views that are not explained, set aside 
and ignored by the Lord: The world is eternal, the world is 
not eternal... But if the Lord will not explain to me either 
that the world is eternal or that the world is not eternal... 
or that the Tathagata neither is nor is not after dying, then 
will I, disavowing the training, revert to secular life. " 
This much is background, and the Pali phraseology of the four 
fold logic in this sutta runs as follows: 
14 
hoti tathägato paran maraVa iti pi, na hoti tathägato param- 
maranä iti pi, hoti ca na ca hoti tathägato param-marana iti 9 1- 
pi, n' eva hoti na na hoti tathägato pa ra. m -ma rann iti pi... 
This is translated by Horner as: 
1.5 
the Tathagata is after dying, the Tathagata is not after dying, 
the Tathagata both is and is not after dying, the Tathagata 
neither is nor is not after dying... 
The problem is how to interpret 'hoti ca na ca hoti tathagato 




straightforwardly, the third position violates the principle of 
contradiction (or noncontradiction) and does not delineate any 
possible state of affairs. Staal mentions a possible resolution 
to the puzzle as 'simply observing that the predicate occuring 
in these alternatives should not in each case be taken as applicable 
to the same subject' (quoted here on p. 41). And it needs to be 
added 'in the same sense', in order to cover the possibility that 
'hoti' might have been meant in two different senses, in addition 
to covering the possiblity that the subject (tathägata) might have 
been meant in two different senses. 
K. N. Jayatilleke who, in the context of early Buddhist thought, 
has struggled with the puzzle of the interpretation of the four. 
fold logic as well, has three published works which touch upon 
it (1950,1963, and posthumously in 1975). Perhaps more than 
any other Pali Buddhist scholar, he has recognized the fundamental 
importance of this issue. Like Staal, he believes that the third 
position can be correctly interpreted in a way which is 'rational' in 
the sense that it does not reject the principle of contradiction. Un- 
like hin, however, he does not suppose that the sphere of applica- 
tion of his solution extends to all of Buddhism. 
The point of departure for Jayatilleke's earliest work on the 
subject (1950) is his considering some difficulties in translation. 
He observes: 
15 
There would be psychological experiences denoted by words 
of the one language for which there would be no precise 
parallels in the other language and what is more important, 
there would be differences in the concepts due to varying 
ways in which the respective peoples would have noticed and 
classified the various empirical situations apparently found 
in the environments of both languages. This latter tendency 
may be so marked as to give rise to a different logic or 
different standards in the use of words in each language. 
And specifically on the four fold logic, he continues: 
16 




in which they appear when they are literally translated into 
English is such as to suggest to the reader of the English 
that they are contradictions or logically impossible prop- 
ositions which are necessarily false. We are thus faced 
with a situation in which a difference in the system of 
logical classification adopted in each language seriously 
interferes with literal translation which fails to do justice 
either to the language from which or in which the translation 
is done. 
While his interpretation of the four fold logic is, in general, 
clear and coherent enough, when he goes on to give an example, 
17 
difficulties arise. For he goes on to say: 
If we ignore the factors of time, location and causal 
changes with reference to a situation or thing it will be found 
that any predication made of it can be from a diversity of 
standpoints is true, false, both true and false and neither 
true nor false respectively. For instance we may consider 
the assertion "it rained in Colombo" to be true if it was the 
case that it rained in Colombo yesterday, false if we take 
into account the fact that it did not rain day before yesterday, 
both true and false if we take both yesterday and day 
before yesterday into consideration and neither true nor false 
if we do not view it in respect of any specific interval of past 
time. 
One difficulty here is that 'if we ignore the factors of time, 
location and causal changes with reference to a situation or thing', 
then we cannot formulate any proposition whatsoever. That these 
are ignored is a major problem with utterances like 'Being exists' 
when offered as propositions. Hence, it is in principle impossible 
that an example of a proposition can be provided which meets 
Jayatilleke's conditions. It is not surprising then that, secondly, 
Jayatilleke's example in practice fails to meet the conditions. It 
rained in Colombo' obviously does not ignore location, despite the 
fact that one might ask 'where in Colombo? '. Nor does it ignore 
time, since whenever it is asserted it refers to a span of time 
from that of its utterance indefinitely far back into the past and 




neither altogether spatially nor temporally indeterminate. 
Further, 'it rained in Colombo' asserted at time Tl is true 
if it has rained in Colombo on at least one occasion prior to Tl, 
and false if it has not. From this it follows that it could not be 
'both true and false if we take both yesterday and the day before 
yesterday into consideration'. And if, as Jayatilleke's example 
supposes, it rained in Colombo yesterday but not the day before 
yesterday, then 'it rained in Colombo' would be true, rather than 
both true and false. Thus, the author's treatment of the last 
quoted passage is both flawed in principle and false in detail. 
A strong point of Jayatilleke's account of the four fold pattern, 
however, is that he does not confuse Jaina with Buddhist logic 
(the four fold being included within the Jaina seven fold logic) and 
18 
note s: 
For while truth or falsity was relative according to the Jaina 
theory owing to the diversity of standpoints (anekäntaväda) 
the Buddhists held at least certain propositions to be absol- 
utely true (ekamsika, D. N. I, 191). 
Jayatilleke continues his consideration of the logic of early Bud- 
dhism, focusing on the last two positions of the four fold pattern, 
and produces two examples which he believes are better accounted 
for by, and lend some credence to, the early Buddhist four fold 
as opposed to a standard system of two-valued logic. The pro- 
posed anomzlous examples are: 'is this milk or not milk? ' 
(asked about a substance which is 20% milk and 80% water), and 
'is Mr. Braithwaite bald or not bald? ' (asked about Braithwaite 
at a time when he has only a few hairs on his head). In view of 
19 
such cases Jayatilleke distinguishes four alternative reactions: 
The first is to see which of the two propositions is likely to 
be more true than false in the situation and classify it as 
such without violating the logical principles. But this is not 
feasible if both appear to be equally true or equally false as 
appears to be the case in the context discussed above. If 
we again want to preserve the validity of the logical prin - 
e\ 
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ciples which state that every proposition must be either true 
or false and can't be both, we can only do this by ceasing to 
treat an assertion in such a situation as a genuine proposition, 
which is the solution that Prof. Lewy offers and to which we 
raised the objections mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
The two other alternatives left are either to regard the logical 
principles as being invalid or as needing amendment. The 
former is too drastic a course to adopt... . 
Prof. Lewy here speaks of adopting a different system 
of logic for a different world in which all the situations were 
such that they could not be aptly described by assertions of 
the form 'S is P' and 'S is not P'. But our present world is 
one in which only some of the situations were of this sort, so 
that the system of logic that we need is one which could cope 
with these situations as well as with what we regard as the 
normal ones. 
The author then suggests that the best course is to adopt an amend- 
ed logic of the following structure: 
20 
(I) S is P. 
(2) S is-and-is not-P (To be distinguished from 'It is both the 
case that S is P and also that S is not P').. 
(3) S is not P. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not so simple, and a careful 
examination of the way in which he disposes of the various possib- 
ilities reveals that there are. many loopholes. It can be objected, 
for example, that a mixture of 20% milk and 80% water obviously 
contains more water than milk, so that the first alternative of 
determining what is 'more true than false' cannot be dismissed 
with the suggestion that 'it is water' is 'equally true or false'. 
The language of 'more true than false' is problematic, however, 
and rather than admitting such a logically ambiguous category, it 
is preferable to hold, on alternative two, that the proposition- 
candidate must be formulated more precisely before it can be 
dealt with. But baldness is not a good example. For 'being 
bald' just means 'having no hair', so that if a person has yet a 
single hair, then it would be false to say of him 'he is bald', 
true to say 'he is not bald', and more precise but no more true 
to say 'he is almost bald'. As long as one understands bald/not 
n 
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bald as a distinction of kind rather than as a matter of degree, 
there is no difficulty in assigning truth values to the propositions 
in question. Indeed, this is the common understanding, as when 
one says of a person with a few remaining hairs that he is 'getting 
bald' or 'is balding', rather than that he 'is bald'. 
The difficulty is that Jayatilleke has not providied cogent 
reasons for rejecting the second alternative altogether. For the 
above line could be offered as I have suggested, and it seems to 
me that Jayatilleke moves rather quickly over the second alterna- 
tive, dismissing the third as well, in the rush to conclude that 
the fourth is correct: an amended logic is needed. In particular 
it is not a consequence of Lewy's defense of the second alternative, 
contrary to what Jayatilleke alleges, that 'we cannot say on his 
theory that a particular combination of words, which may be 
grammatically correct and semantically significant (i. e. does not 
violate the formation rules), expresses a proposition until we 
have examined the ostensible facts to which it refers'. 
In this first of his three published attempts to grapple with 
a difficult problem, Jayatilleke concludes by considering the fourth 
position (neither/nor) as exemplified this time by 'conscious' 
(sannt rather than by 'liberated one' (tathagata): 
21 
(1) sanni - he is conscious 
(2) asanni -- he is unconscious 
(3) sanni ca asanT ca a-- he is semiconscious 
(4) nevasann nasanni - he is superconscious or conscious in 
a way radically different from (1), (2) or (3). 
The exact use of paradigms (3) and. -(4) car} only 
be discovered 
by an exhaustive analysis of the several usages of this 
sort found in the Canon. In this article we are content to 
raise the problem rather than to offer any solution which has 
for the present to be very tentative in character. Our conten- 
tion is that assertions of the type (3) and (4) are contingent 
propositions which should be translated as such by examining 
what they mean instead of merely repeating in the 'English the 
00\ 
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word form of the Pali, which would be meaningless owing to 
the difference in the systems of logical classification adopted. 
And the Fourfold Schema of the classification of propositions 
seems to be as follows with the Laws of Contradiction and 
Exclusion as redefined above. 
(I) 'Xis A' is true where the full or standard criteria are 
present. 
(2) 'X is not A' is true where no criteria are present. 
(3) 'X is-and-is-not At is true where insufficient criteria 
are present. 
(4) 'X is-neither-A-nor-not At is true where criteria are 
present but of a different sort from (I), (2) or (3). 
Two things are important here: 'f irst, that any solid interpreta- 
tion requires textual. exegesis at length, ideally an 'exhaustive 
analysis' as he puts it; secondly, that a literal translation (such 
as the one Horner gives) of the third position is meaningless, 
however faithful it may be to dictionary meanings. These are 
more like reasons for undertaking the investigation in the first 
place, however, rather than startling or even interesting points on 
which to conclude. Further, there is no talk of criteria in the Pali 
versions of the four fold logic, and in section II of this chapter I 
offer an alternative account to (1) through (4) above. 
Jayatilleke's next attempt to deal with the enigmatic third and 
fourth positions of the four fold logic occurs in his major published 
work of 1963. He gives here an account of which schools of 
thought flourishing at the time may be associated with each of the 
ten questions, an historical treatment which is a landmark in 
Buddhist scholarship. In what follows the concern is with only 
certain of his remarks in that work which bear on the philosophical 
and interpretive issue at hand. 
22 
Jayatilleke takes Poussin to task for saying: 
Indians do not make a clear distinction between facts and 
ideas, between ideas and words; they have never clearly 
recognized the principle of contradiction. Buddhist dia- 




or non-existence or both existence and non-existence or 
neither existence nor non-existence. We are helpless. 
Four reasons are given for rejecting Poussin's account, the first 
reason applying to Poussin's claim about what Indians in general 
fail to do, and the remainder applying specifically to Buddhists. 
23 
1). 'We find as early as Uddälaka an awareness in Indian thought 
of the importance of consistency and the principle of Contra- 
diction, when it was held that it could not both be true that Being 
came out of Being and Non-Being'. 2) 'In the Nikayas, consistency 
is regarded as a criterion of truth and it is stated that 'truth is 
one and not two', ekaxn hi sacc, - n na dutiyam atthi, Sn. 884'. 
3) 'The dilemmas- present two alternatives one of which is the con- 
tradiction of the other'. 4) 'In: fact, in one place in the Samyutta 
Nikäya, we come very close to a formal statement of the principle 
of Non-Contradiction. Nigantha Nätaputta converses with Citta 
and in the course of the discussion... Citta is anxious to show that 
Nigantha Nätaputta is contradicting himself and says, sace purimam 
% 
saccam pacchimam to micchä, sace pacchimam saccam purimam "®er" 
to micchä, i. e. if your former statement (p) is true, your latter 
statement (cv p) is false and if your latter statement (cv p) is true, 
' 
your former statement (p) is false. ' 24 
On 3) as further elaborated by Jayatilleke elsewhere, it turns 
out on his view that the passage under consideration (cited as M. I. 
392) is evidence for the Buddhist position presupposing the principle 
of the excluded middle. As A. S. Hanson has shown, these prin- 
ciples have some times been confused (e. g. by Conze), and the 
25 
case at hand is another one which Hanson might have added. Yet 
2) and 4) remain powerful considerations in favor of the view that, 
contra Poussin, there is no denial of the principle of contradiction. 
But it is important to keep in mind (as is discussed in II) that early 
Buddhism does not set out a formal logical principle of contradiction, 
a 
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nor do they use symbolic notation where Jayatilleke has supplied 
it. 
Another difficulty with Poussin's account concerns his des- 
cription of the four fold as 'a four-branched dilemma'. The 
Buddha is not depicted as issuing a denial of each of the four 
positions, for 'mä h'evam' means 'do not say so' rather than 
'it is not the case that' and this was his reported response. The 
point is just that the validity of the Buddhist path is not contingent 
upon the acceptance of any of these four positions, since in any 
case there is suffering or unsatisfactoriness and a path for the 
elimination of it. The point is not that none of the four positions 
is logically free from difficulty and hence that one is in a philos- 
ophical dilemma, for that would be to deny each of the four pos- 
itions. Thus I think that 'a four branched dilemma' is misleading, 
if it is taken to imply that the Buddha did deny these four. 
Yet another misleading interpretation of the four fold logic 
is to regard them as articulating 'laws of thought', as Mrs. C. A. F. 
Rhys Davids and Barua have held, and here Jayatilleke's criticism 
of them is right on target. 
6 
Indeed, twisting the text to find in 
it the 'laws' of identity, contradiction, excluded middle and 
double negation as formal logical principles is, I believe, such 
an embarrassment to Buddhist scholarship as to me rit going 
unmentioned, except perhaps as a reminder of how it is just pos- 
sible that Buddha may have said something sensible without being 
a logician. 
What sense can in fact be made of the four fold pattern, now 
that it is clearly neither a gratuitious breach of logic (Poussin) 
nor a formulation of logical laws (C. AF. Rhys Davids, Barua), is 
a question Jayatilleke takes up as follows in his 1963 account: 
(565) Now what do these propositions really mean? We have 




titled 'Some Problems Of Translation 3ý TntýrrT vxdomt 
propose to repeat this here. We intend merely to sum- 
marize briefly the gist of what we have said and make 
some added observations. 
(566) Since then there have been a few articles written 
around this subject but in none of them is there a serious 
attempt to clarify the problems involved. 
It is curious that Jayatilleke's article, previously found to 
be full of difficulties, had conclusions which the author himself 
characterized as 'very tentative', and yet are characterized in 
his later book as if they require no further examination but only 
additional remarks. Curious, too, is his rather condescending 
remark at (566) directed against P. T. Raju, Archie J. Bahm, 
and Shosun Miyamoto. Whatever difficulties may be found in the 
work of these scholars, the indiscriminate claim, 'in none of 
them is there a serious attempt to clarify the problems involved' 
seems rather harsh. 
27 
And there are difficulties. Raju, for example, describes 
the skeptics of ancient India (e. g. , Sanjaya) as 'those philosophers 
who gave a negative answer to. all four questions, and yet compares 
Sanjay to Pyrrho in reasoning: 'for he would not only not say a 
definite "yes" ' to any question, but also not give a definite "No"'. 
28 
Although Jayatilleke gives not this, but another example of self- 
contradiction in Raju's article, it is the sort of thing which has 
prompted the former to complain: where he has tried to throw 
some light, in passing, on the four-fold formula of the Pali 
Nikayas, it is either not backed up with good evidence or it is 
plainly self-contradictory. ' 
Raju suggests that the distinction between contrary and con- 
tradictory opposition may help elucidate the four fold pattern 
without, however, there being any terms translatable as 'con-- 
trary' and 'contradictory' in the Indian material. This is, on 
54 
the author's own admission, speculative in not being terminolog- 
ically grounded in early Buddhist texts, but as is argued in Ch. 1 
of this work, the application of a non-indigenous concept to eluci- 
date a given positition cannot be ruled out a priori. Accordingly, 
this suggestion of Raju's is wokrth examining. 
While not mentioning trat Raju considers this suggestion, 
Jayatilleke credits Archie Bahm with making 
29 ' 
a significant contribution towards solving the riddle (logical) 
of the four -fold assertions. ... According to this theory 
we do not fall into logical difficulties if we treat not-P in the 
four assertions) as the contrary and not the contradictory of 
P. This is in principle the solution that we had offered in our 
own treatment of the subject and we shall further examine 
this solution below. 
The irony of the situation consists in the fact that, having 
given the reader the impression that Raju's article is an irredeem- 
able mass of confusion, and having criticized Bahm for admittedly 
gleaning some information from reading Raju's article, he then 
credits Bahm with a point very similar to Ra ju' s point. This point, 
that the four-fold logic might be interpreted in a manner which is 
not self-contradictory, is explained differently however, for Raju 
uses contrary/contradictory as the operative distinction while 
30 
Bahm uses opposite/contradictory. According to Raju: 
In the four-cornered negation, the negation of both B and 
not-B may appear to be a little puzzling. But it can be ex- 
plained with the help of the difference between contrary and 
contradictory opposition of western logic. Two contraries 
can both be negated, but not the contradictories. 
In the last quoted sentence the phrase 'and the resulting statement 
be true' is not found as it (or a semantically equivalent phrase) 
should be found just before the comma. For Raju's intention seems 
to be to say that 'All S is P' may be denied as well as its contrary, 
'No S is P', and yet it may still be the case that 'Some S is P'; on 
the other hand, if 'All S is P and its contradictory, 'Some S is 
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not P', are both denied, then there is no middle ground (cp. 'Some 
S is P') which may be affirmed as true. 
Bahm offers the following explanation: 
31 
But if on the other hand, "is" and "is not" (or "a" and "non-a") 
are interpreted as opposites rather than as contradictories and 
"neither is nor is not" (or "neither a nor non-A's) is interpreted 
not as involving an excluded middle but as presupposing that 
there is something which is neither the one nor the other (its 
opposite), then no contradiction is involved'. 
Now I want to reply, first to the suggestion of Jayatilleke and 
Raju (in terms of contrary/contradictory) and then to the suggestion 
of Bahm (in terms of opposites). The difficulty is that if one follows 
Jayatilleke's advice and treats 'not-p (in the four assertions) as the 
contrary and not the contradictory of p', then they might possibly 
all be false, for 'two propositions are said to be contraries if they 
cannot both be true, though they might both be false'. 
32 But if it 
was thought possible that they might all be false, then noone would 
have been surprised that the Buddha set them all aside. 
Further, if one takes 'not p' in each occurrence of the four 
fold logic as subcontraries, an unacceptable consequence follows 
here as well. For 'two propositions are said to be subcontraries 
if they cannot both be false, though they might both be true'. 
And it is the intention of Jaina logic in its theory of syädväda to 
admit the possibility that all the positions might be true, some- 
how or in some respect, but such a view is quite foreign to early 
Buddhism wherein truth i one and not two. 
Miyamoto's approach and that of Robinson are mentioned by 
Jayatilleke, and it is worthwhile to notice an underlying similarity 
in the two approaches'. 
3 
Both try to assimilate Buddhism to other 
systems of thought. In Miyamoto's case this assimilation is an 
historical, Eastern contextual one, in which the four fold logic 
turns out to fit neatly both into Sanjaya's system and into that of 
the Jaina as well, while in the case of Robinson the attempt is 
a 
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made to assimilate it to a Western (specifically Aristotelian) 
context. As might be expected, neither of these attempts are 
successful. Robinson conveniently supplies 'all' and 'some', 
which are not found in the original, in order to squeeze the text 
into the logical AEIC form. 
33 
In this perhaps he supposes that 
he is doing Buddhism a favor. And Miyamcto tends to ignore the 
'somehow' qualification on each of the Jaina seven propositions, 
in view of which it is quite different in orientation from the 
Buddhist four fold logic. 
Turning to Jayatilleke's positive remarks for interpreting the 
four fold pattern, it is clear that he wants to maintain two things 
which turn out to be an impossible combination: that occurrences 
of 'na' (not) be interpreted as contraries rather than as contra- 
dictories; that the four fold logic is nevertheless exhaustive . of 




He does not see that this is an im po s- 
sible marriage, yet the difficulty remains that if 'na' is i. lzter- 
preted not as having its usual denying function but as stating 
contraries in its occurrences in the four fold pattern, then the 
four fold cannot be set up 'in truth table fashion, as Jayatilleke 
does, and cannot be interpreted as exhausting the logical possib- 
ilities. For the contradictories would have been left out of 
account. This is a fundamental inconsistency in Jayatilleke's 
account viewed internally, leaving aside the point that there is 
no direct textual support for inserting '(contrary)' below at II. 
Comparing his published work of 1963 with his posthumously 
published account of 1975, it is evident that he changed the inter- 
pretation so as not to leave the contradictories out of account. 
The 1963 account runs (leaving aside the truth-tables): 
35 
I. p 
II. notp (contrary) 
III. both p and notp 




Using the notation ' notp' (rather than 'not p') to indicate contrary 
opposition (rather than denial of ac )n. r tdictory), the above account 
entirely leaves contradictories out of the picture. But in a later 
account (1975) a contradictory relation obtains between I and 2 
below: 36 
I. The universe is finite (in all dimensions). 
2. The universe is infinite (in all dimensions). 
3. The universe is finite (in some dimensions) and 
infinite (in other dimensions). 
4. The universe is neither finite nor infinite (in any dimen- 
sion). This last alternative would be the case if space 
or the universe was unreal. In such an eventuality, the 
universe cannot properly be described as either 'finite' 
or 'infinite'. 
But no explanation is given for the change of interpreting 2 as a 
contradictory rather than as a contrary statement as at U. If 
this is not to be sheerly a matter of caprice, some justification 
is in order. 
Thus, it has been shown that even scholars most con- 
cerned with early Buddhism in particular have failed to give an 
adequate, consistent treatment of the four fold logic in early 
Buddhism, let alone those who presuppose that it must mean the 
same thing in all of Buddhism and those who are more concerned 
with Mahayana tradition. In the section which follows I propose to 
see if a coherent account of the early Buddhist four fold pattern 
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Chapter 2 II 
It is clear from the preceeding discussion that Jayatilleke 
sometimes uses formal logical notation to explain early Buddhist 
logic. Along the same line it might be thought that there i's 
explicit recognition of the formal logical principle of contra- 
diction in early Buddhism. For example, at Majjhima Nikäya 
I 232 the Pali reads: 
' 
Manasikarohi Aggivessana, manasikaritvä. kho Aggivessana 
byäkarohi, na kho to sandhiyati purimena vä pacchimam 
pacchirnena vä purimam. 
I. B. Horner translates this passage as: 
Pay attention, Aggivessana. When you have paid attention, 
Aggivessana, answer. For your last speech does not agree 
with your first, nor your first with your last. 
The word 'speech' has been supplied by the translator, presumably 
because the appropriate verb 'vadesi' occurs previously as the 
likely referent of the elliptical construction. The non-agreement 
in question is thus a non-agreement of utterances. While two 
psychological states, utterances, sentences, or propositions may 
in one way or another 'fail to agree', the logical principle of 
contradiction is formulated by logicians as applying specifically 
to propositions, rather than to utterances, for example. 
Further, the sort of lack of agreement meant in the Pali 
assume, claim, consider')' plus 'sam' ('with'), 'sar_dhiyati' could 
above is not specifically formal logical agreement. The verb 
sandhi ati' (='sandahati') means 'to put together', 'to connect', 
or 'to arrange'. However, it might be argued that since its ety- 
mology reveals a combination of 'dahati' (='to put, place; take for, 
thus be rendered as 'to claim with'. Even so, in order to have 
a specifically formal logical point to the effect that there is a 
formal logical principle of noncontradiction, there would have to 
a 
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be some word comparable to 'proposition' referred to here. 
Instead one finds that the referent is 'speech. ' Thus I would 
translate 'na kho to sandhiyati purimena vä pacchimam 
pacchimena vä purimam' as 'you do not indeed connect the latter 
(utterance) with the former (utterance), nor the former with the 
latter. ' 
Seeing the Pali passage in its context may be helpful. Aggi- 
vessana states that the five aggregates (usually translated 'form, 
feeling, sensations, dispositions, and consciousness') comprise 
the self, but also admits that they are impermanent. Gotama 
Buddha points out that these utterances do not agree with one 
another. 'But is it fitting', he is depicted as saying, 'to regard 
that which is impermanent, anguish, liable to change as "This is 
mine, this am I, this is my self? "' And the story continues with 
Aggivessana's response: 'This is not so, good Gotama. ' Since it 
is included in the meaning of the term 'self' ('attar'; Skt. ätman 
that it is permanent, for one thing, anything proposed as a 'self' 
was definitionally disqualified without this characteristic. Hence 
Aggivessana's former characterization of what the self is does 
not cohere with his latter admission of what the term 'attan' means. 
At Majjhima NNikäya I 378, there occurs another interesting 
3 
case, in which one finds: 
Gahapati gahapati, manasikaritvü kho gahapati byäkarohi, 
na kho to sandhiyati purimena vä pacchimam pacchimena 
vä purimam. Bhä. sita kho pana to gahapati esä vgc-d: sacce 
aham bhante patittthäya mantessämi, hoti no ettha kathä- 
salläpo ti. 
4 
Horner translates this as: 
Householder, householder! Take care how you explain, 
householder. Your earlier (remarks) do not tally with your 
later, nor your later with your earlier. And yet these words 
were spoken by you, householder: 'I revered sir, will speak 




Again 'sandhiyati' occurs, and this time is translated as 
'tally' rather tsan as 'agree', but unlike in the preced3*rg ex- 
ample, the relationsMdp between consistency and truth is noted: 
one cannot be speaking in accord with the truth if what one says 
is inconsistent. Yet it is noteworthy that 'sacca' (translated as 
'truth' above) can mean both 'real' as well as 'true', truth of 
being or authenticity on the one hand being indicated by the same 
word as truth of utterance on the other. The last quoted Pali 
selection contains an example of the latter usage, and the former 
is'exemplified in such terms as 'saccanäma', doing justice to one's 
name, bearing a true name', as said of Gotama Buddha, for ex- 
ample. 
5 
The idea is plainly one of being true to one's name in 
the sense of living as one's name implies. For instance, since 
`Buldha' means 'enlightened one', the appropriate behavior is 
required in order to be saccanäma 
6 
Another example of 'sacca' 
in the sense of 'truth of utterance', this time from Samyutta 
Nikäya4XLI 8,10, runs as follows: 
Sace to bhante purimaro. saccam pacchimarpý to miccliä sace 
pana to bhante pacchimäm saccam purimam to micchä. 
7 
As rendered by C. A. F. Rhys Davids this means: 
If, sir, your first assertion was true, your last was false. 
And if your last was true, your first was false. 
Translations of the assertions are: 'I would have you look, sirs, 
how straight is this housefather Citta, how guileless is this house- 
father Citta, how ingenuous is this housefather Citta', and 'I would 
have you look, sirs, how crooked is this housefather Citta, how 
crafty, how dishonest is this housefather Citta'. In this context 
the former is uttered by Nigantha after Citta states that he does 
not have faith (saddhä) in Gotama's teachings; the latter after 
Citta clarifies that instead of faith he has knowledge and vision 
n 
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('äna+nto passan%o) of Gotama Buddha's teachings. Nigantha is 
evidently not pleased with these teachings. 
There is a problem in interpreting 'sacca' and 'micchä' if 
one goes only by the textual references provided for these terms 
in the Pali Text Society's dictionary. For while this work list 
meanings of 'sacca' supported by textual references which 
exemplify the dual meanings of truth of being or authenticity as 
well as truth of utterance, its account of 'micchä' cites no 
textual references in which falsity of utterance is meant, despite 
the fact that 'false' is listed as a possible meaning. Aside from 
compounds (in which it typically has an ethical slant) the diction- 
ary lists these meanings: 'separate'. 'opposite', 'contrary', 
'wrongly', 'in a wrong way', 'false'. After 'false' references 
to Sutta Nipäta verses 438 and 815 are given, but these in fact 
have to do with living wrongly from the early Buddhist viewpoint 
('micchäladdho' and 'micchä. ' being use to condemn pride and 
lechery respectively), rather than with falsehood as a property 
of utterances 
8 The last passage quoted above (in fn. 7) might 
well have been cited as a usage of 'micchä' as a property of 
utterances. 
In addition to its application to speech or utterances, 'miccl-tal 
is also applied to dilrhi (views or speculative views, depending 
on context) and to sankappa (intenti-onal thoughts), for example. 
9 
Of course right and wrong are opposites just as true and false are. 
And a justification for holding that 'miccha-' means 'wrong some- 
times and not'false'always (contra PTS dictionary) consists in 
the fact that, e. g. , 'sammavaca' is used as right view 
in contrast 
to wrong view. 
It is also important to notice that there are terms to mark a 
distinction between 'intentional thoughts' and 'utterances' ('san- 
kappa' and 'väcä'). Hence it is not plausible to argue that there 
is no rough linguistic basis for a distinction between propositions 
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and speech and that if there had been one, the early Buddhist 
view would have been a view about propositions. If there had 
been any interest to state a formal logical principle and use a 
notion of proposition, this could have been done. In fact ,I 
find no occurrences in early Buddhism of the terms for prop- 
osition listed in A. P. Buddhadatta's English-Pali Dictionary 
viz. , kattukamyatänäpana, pakäsana, and m-Madhamma. 
Utterances, unlike propositions or thoughts, may be soft 
or loud, said in haste or in a. drawl, made in a cubicle or in a 
theater at a certain time, etc. whereas none of these are true 
of propositions or of thoughts in the same sense. But in saying 
this it is not being suggested that propositions or thoughts inhabit 
a ghostly realm somewhere, nor that early Buddhism offers a 
theory or a technical distinction between thoughts and utterances. 
But the concepts available in early Buddhism could have been 
used as a basis for such a distinction had it been important. In 
fact, this and many other theoretical concerns are unimportant 
in early Buddhism, and instead the main focus is on liberation. 
Articulating the distinction between propositions and thoughts, 
on the one hand, and utterances, on the other, may well hide a 
dualist snare, and rather than risking a fall into it, the above way 
of stating the matter is preferable: different things may be truly 
said of the one which are not true of the other. 
K. N. Jayatilleke was not very clear about whether early 
Buddhism in fact contains a 'formal statement of the principle of 
Contradiction', or just that here 'we come very close to a formal 
statement of the principle', and at one point states: 
'° 
Citta is anxious to show that Nigantha Nataputta is contra- 
dicting himself and says, sace purimam saccam pacchimam 
to miccha, sace pacchimarr, saccam purimam to miccha, 
i. e. if your former statement (p) is true, your latter state- 
" 
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ment (Np) is false and if your latter statement (N p) is 
true, your former statement (p) is false. In other words, 
in the above situation when the statements are of the form 
p and co p, it cannot be the case that both p and cv p are 
true (N (PA v., p)), which is the formal statement of the 
principle of Contradiction. 
In order for Jayatilleke's interpretation above to work, 
however, his word 'statement' must be const rued as 'proposition' 
(rather than as 'utterance') , but in that sense there is no referent 
in the Pali passage. The text makes it clear that it is utterances 
which are the foci of attention (not thoughts or propositions one 
may emphasize), and by using p and p as signs for propositions, 
Jayatilleke is led to the mistaken conclusion that the text gives a 
'formal statement of the principle of Contradiction'. By using the 
words 'bhäsitar; ' ('saying' and 'etad avoca' ('this said'), the text 
makes it perfectly clear that the former and latter, the purimarp 
and pacchirra x, which contradict one another are utterances. 
Other examples bear this out as well, and I have found no counter- 
evidence in the five Nikäyas.. Thus I conclude that Jayatilleke's 
interpretation above is mistaken. 
In early Buddhism views, thoughts, and utterances may or 
may not be false as distinct from whether or not they are wrong, 
and when the early exclusion of self-contradiction is formulated, 
it is clear that i, it is not formulated as a formal logical point but 
one about utterances. Perhaps if there had been a concern to 
make a point about propositions, the word 'väda' could have been 
used, yet it is often translated as 'speech' and only in its usage 
as 'view', 'doctrine', or 'belief' is there any approximation to 
. proposition', 
and even here it is not close. For in this sense it 
means 'emphatic or formulated speech' in the sense of 'doctrine'. 
The fact is that there is no early Buddhist term which might be 
(7 
translated as 'proposition' without a good deal of extrapolation. 
There is a term for 'wrong speech' and 'lie' , however, ('musä- 
väda') so that 'false speech' ('micchävada') is distinguishable 
from 'wrong speech' ('musäväda' in the first of two meanings 
just mentioned. 
'Micchä' is applied to views (ditthi , thoughts (sankappo), 
and utterances (yäcä), meaning 'false view, false conception, 
false speech' respectively, according to a translation by Horner 
1 
Thus, in early Buddhism a distinction is evident between false 
utterances or speech, on the one hand, and wrong utterances or 
speech and lies, on the other hand, so that it is clear in the 
passage cited (fn. 7) where the principle of contradiction is form- 
ulated that the focus of the principle is on truth and falsity rather 
than on rightness or wrongness. When applied to utterances, 
'sacca' and 'micchä' mean 'true' and 'false' respectively, unlike 
'samma' and 'musä' which in this application mean 'right' and 
'wrong' respectively. 
But if, as is argued here, the principle of contradiction is not 
a formal logical principle, what sort of principle is it? The inter- 
pretation which I would like to suggest is that, in keeping with the 
long tradition of debate which has flourished in India since pre- 
Buddhistic times, the status of the principle of contradiction can 
be accounted for by construing it as a rule for discussion. 
It is of course obvious that any system of linguistic symbols 
that communicate information will, qua system, have an informal 
logic. Only, it cannot be concluded that the early Buddhist texts 
put forth the principle of contradiction as a rule in informal logic, 
since they recognized no distinction between formal and informal 
logic , and since to see oneself as putting 
forth the latter one must 





point of view one may describe the concern as 'informal logic'. 
I would prefer to say that they had, and saw themselves as having, 
an heuristic principle for debate. It is an heuristic principle in 
the sense of being a principle of method on the basis of which one 
can discover things: without it, 
establish anything at all. 
12 
one cannot find out, discover, or 
When the householder, Upali, violates this rule (in the example 
previously qucted), Gotama Buddha perceptively points out the 
inconsistency of his doing so with his claim to be speaking in 
accordance with the truth, thus illustrating the considerable im- 
portance to be attached to this rule. The consequence of violating 
the heuristic principle of noncontradiction is that one thereby 
relinquishes any claim to be saying something that is true. 
A different sort of consequence (or putative consequence), one 
which is mythologically articulated, obtains when the rule is 
violated that in discussion a legitimate question should be answered 
at least on its third repetition, The penalty mentioned for this 
violation is having a thunder-bolt bearing yakkha (identified with 
Indra) shatter one's skull into seven pieces! 
13 
We are told that 
the same Aggivessana who violated the rule of contradiction 
almost violates the latter rule about answering as well, barely 
averting his doom by answering after the second repetition while 
the fiery thunder-bolt is overhead. In early Buddhism these rules 
were powerful weapons against ignorance masquerading as know- 
ledge. 
Aside from the exegetical line of argument already given for 
the thesis, contra Jayatilleke, that the early Buddhist principle 
of contradiction is an heuristic rather than a formal logical one, 
another line of argument is possible on historical grounds. The 
exegetical argument shows that in early Buddhism noncontradiction 





for propositions and formal logic. The historical point can also 
be made that there is no evidence of a concern for formal logic 
and propositions in any school of thought in India at the time of 
the Buddha. 
In his chart on the development of Indian logic, Staal lists 
the work of Kanada in the first century A. D. as the first to be 
done on logic in a narrow sense. Staal himself opts for such a 
broad sense of 'logic', however, (congruent with his sweeping 
claim: 'the history of Indian logic covers at least 23 centuries... ' 
that the distinctions between logic, grammar, and ritual become 
blurred. 
14 
In order that early Buddhism is not seen as having cur 
concerns, it is important to insist that formal logic plays no role 
in early Buddhism. It may be thL_t what began as an heuristic 
principle was transformed into a formal logical one with the later 
developments of Indian thought, but that is outside the scope of 
this work. 
At this point it is appropriate to return to the problem of 
interpreting the ' both X and not X' part of the four fold logic. In 
view of the clear occurrence of the heuristic principle of contra- 
diction that I have shown to pertain to utterances, it would be in- 
consistent if the third part of the often-used four fold formula 
should turn out to violate that very principle. (It is beside the 
point that Gotama doesnot urge acceptance of the third lemma in 
particular, for if early Buddhism considers a self-contradiction 
as a possibility, then it is fundamentally mistaken. 
Since it was shown in part I how the literal translation of the 
four fold logic is senseless, the question arises: is there any 
non-literal interpretation of the third position that makes sense 
in the early context? One item of internal evidence supporting the 
contention that either the third or the fourth position does not 
0001\ 
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mean what a literal translation conveys is that on a literal render- 
ing they are semantically equivalent. Although the early Buddhist 
viewpoint does not include a formal logic, the following formal 
parallel may be constructed in order to demonstrate semantic 
equivalence. Taking p and cv p as parallel to the third position 
and Qj (pAw p) as parallel to the fourth position, perhaps: 
N (PANP)=-0Pnca NP=w-PANP 
But if this is the case, then both the third position and the fourth 
are self-contradictory, and the two self contradictions are seman- 
tically equivalent as nugatory. Yet since the early Buddhist per- 
spective. recognizes the two as distinct views, the formal symbdksm 
above cannot be an accurate rendering. Hence, my strategy is to 
offer an alternative model for understanding the four fold pattern. 
To begin with there are some points about the Pali which need 
to be kept in mind for a clearer view of the matter. There are pas- 
sages which indicate that the fourth, 'neither... nor', is literally 
meant as in the Sarpyutta 1\? ik a lines: 
15 
7 Kim nu kho bho Gotama sayamkatam dukkhanti 
MT hevam Kassapäti Bhagavä avoca 
8 Kim pana bho Gotama pa ramkatam dukkhanti 
Aßä hevam Kassapä. ti Bhagavä avoca 
9 Kim nukho bho Gotama sayamkatanca paramkatanca 
dukkhanti 
Mä hevam Kassapäti Bhagavä avoca 
10 Kim pana bho Gotama asayai -käram apararm -käram 
adhicca samuppannam dukkhanti 
Mä hevam Kassapäti Bhagavä avoca 
The Pali Text Society translation of the passage is: 
16 
7 'Now then, Master Gotama, is suffering wrought by 
one's self ?' 
Not so verily, Ka s sapa', said the Exalted One. 
8 'What then, Master Gotama, is one's suffering wrought 
by another? ' 
'Not so verily, Kassapa, ' said the Exalted One. 
9 'What then, Master Gotama, is suffering wrought both 




'Not so verily, Ka s sapa, ' said the Exalted One. 
10 'What then, Master Gotama, has [thej suffering [which 
is] wrought neither by myself nor by another, befallen 
me by chance? ' 
'Not so verily, Kassapa, ' said the Exalted One. 
As an aside it should be noted that the phrase 'kim nu kho' 
in line 9 has been translated in the same way as 'kim papa bho' 
in lines 8 and 10 due to an oversight. It should be translated as 
in line 7 to convey the parallelism of the Pali verse. Also, the 
term 'bho' has a familiar tone (vocative of the formal 'bhavant' 
meaning 'sir' or 'lord'), and was much used by the brahmans as 
a form of address for equals or inferiors. Hence they are called 
17 'bhovadins'. The term 'bho' is rendered by the translator as 
'Master' in an attempt to approximate the mild condescension or 
familiarity of 'bho' in this context, and should not be thought of 
as 'Master' in the sense of teacher. Thirdly, the words 'mä 
hevam' which report the Buddha's attitude to each part of the four 
fold above do not indicate a simple denial, but rather a prohibition. 
'Do. not say so' is thus an appropriate translation, as Kalupahana 
points out. 
18 
'Adhicca samuppanam' means 'uncaused, sprung into existence 
without a cause', so that in the above passage the fourth position 
represents a rejection of the self-caused/other-caused dichotomy 
altogether, as the phraseology of 'asayarj-käram' (not self- 
caused) and 'aparari-käram' (not other -caused indicates. Thus, 
if the fourth position is literally interpreted (e. g. , 10 above as 
referrring to 7 and 8), it makes sense as a rejection of the first 
and second as offering an overly-simple dichotomy. But as 
previously shown, the third and fourth cannot both be interpreted 
literally unless the unpalatable consequence of their equivalence 






how the third position can be given a non-literal interpretation. 
As a starting point recall Jayatilleke's interpretations of 
two Pali phrases as 'he is semiconscious' and 'the universe is 
finite (in some dimensions) and infinite (in other dimensions)' 
presented previously on pages 49 and 57 herein respectively. 
On this view the third position is a qualified assertion, inter- 
mediate between the first and the second, and a tacit convention 
operates such that statements in the four fold logic of the form 
'both X and not X' are elliptical, leaving out 'in part' after each 
X. On the basis of the preceeding considerations the following 
scheme may be constructed: 
1) there exists an X such that characteristic y applies; 
2) there exists an X such that y does not, but z does, apply; 
3) there exists an X such that both y and z apply in part 
4) fhere exists an X such that neither y nor z apply. 
In 10) already mentioned it is 'chance' which is the reason 
given why a position of type 4) applies. The Buddha is depicted 
as rejecting attempts to involve him in speculative philosophical 
arguments, saying that he'dbes not hold any alternative fourth 
position. 
19 
And the fourth is explained with reference to one who 
is 'addicted to logic and reasoning'. 
20 
Since a wide variety of four fold examples occur in Pali, it 
may not always be easy to see how a given example could admit 
of the third alternative, which requires distinguishable parts. 
Some of the examples used are: X understands, X exists, X is 
pleasing, X expects, in cases where each X has a four fold pattern 
of possibilities. 
21 
Understanding is the sort of thing that one 
might have in part, and if X is pleasing it need not be completely 
$o. Yet it may be more difficult to see whether and how one can 
have a 'partial expectation'. (Perhaps one can, as in: 'I rather 
thought he would come home on time, but was not very surprised 
when he did not'. ) But what of the possibility that X may exist 
n 
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in part? In context the X is the tathägata, and it is not absurd 
to suppose that some non-Buddhist theoreticians thought that 
perhaps the Buddhist view is that in the case of the tathä gata 
part of what might generally be called mind (mano) continues 
to exist, and part does not. Gotama Buddha clearly is shown 
to reject this view in chastizing Sati for holding that Buddha 
teaches that vinnana (consciousness) continues after death. I 
suggest that 3) as applied to the tathägata may be understood as 
the view that part of the tathagata survives death and part does 
not. If the part which was thought to survive (e. g. , vinnana) 
is taken as a sort of permanent ätman surrogate, then it is 
obvious why the Buddha would not hold such a view, since the 
anätmaväda clearly precludes it. 
The muddle of regarding the third and fourth positions as 
self-contradictory and equally meaningless results from taking 
them as formally symbolized: p, c,, p, pA "p, 3 
(p nip) . Instead 
I think they can be understood properly as existential statements 
viz. , there exists an X such that y obtains, there exists an X such 
that y does not obtain but z obtains, there exists an X such that y 
obtains (in part) and z obtains (in part), there exists an X such 
that y neither obtains nor does z obtain. 
Although this general schema is not stated in Pali, the in- 
stances of the four fold pattern fit this model. For example, 
dukkha is self-caused, dukkha is not self-cau§ed but other- 
caused, dukkha is both self caused (in part) and other caused 
(in 
part), dukkha is neither self-caused nor other caused 
(but arises 
by chance). 
Is there any evidence that the four fold pattern is regarded 
as exhaustive of the possibilities on the questions to which it is 
22 




Ime kho te, bhikkhave, samana-brähmanä amarä-vikkhepil 
tatha tatha panham putthä samänä vacä. -vikkhepam apajjanti 
amarä-vikkhepam catul-ii vatthühi. Ye he keci, bhikkave, 
saman7a vä brahmana vä amarä -vikkhepika- tatha tatha panham 
putthä saris . nä vaca-vikkhepam, apajjanti amara-vikkhepam, 
sabbe to imeh' eva catuhi vatthühi etesam vä annatarena, 
n'aatthi ito bahiddhä,. 
T. W. Rhys Davids translates this as: 
23 
These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who 
wriggle like eels; and who, when a question is put to them 
on this or that, resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling; and 
that in four ways, or in one or other of the same; there is no 
other way in which they do so. 
Here a special concern is the force of 'they do so in these 
four ways... there is no other way in which they do so'. Is this 
a contingent, historical fact that there happened to be four pos- 
itions, or is it more than that -- a rule for discussion to the 
effect that no more than the four possibilities were admissable ? 
If interpreted in the latter way, the passage above is evidence 
in favor of Jayatilleke's view that the four fold pattern was taken 
as exhaustive of the possibilities. 
It is interesting to notice "that the four fold pattern is not 
always applied to debates in early Buddhism, and it might be 
thought that this is something odd or perhaps even inconsistent 
about early Buddhism. I do not think so, for understood as it is 
recommended above, something quite similar happens in contexts 
quite ordinary in which there is no suggestion of an inscrutable 
Asian logic' at work. A notable example occurs in Hume's 
Dialogues, in which Philo lists four hypotheses on the nature 
24 
of first causes: 
that they are endowed with perfect goodness, that they have 
perfect malice, that they are opposite and have both goodness 
and malice, that they have neither goodness. nor malice. 
Of course noone would suggest that Hume ought always to use this 
"ý 
75 
four fold pattern. Whether it is required depends on the issues 
under consideration, as in early Buddhism as well. 
Whereas Jayatilleke thought the four fold pattern to be a 
kind of logic superior to Aristotelian logic, I do not think that 
this comparison is adequate 
5 
There is nothing in the four fold 
logic, properly understood, which is either in conflict with, or 
in advance of, Aristotelian logic. 
The main tasks completed are those of clarifying the status 
of the early Buddhist principle of contradiction, and explaining 
how it is compatible with the third and fourth positions of the four 
fold logic. In section I of this chapter the need to undertake these 
tasks became obvious after discovering various inadequacies in 
sev¬ral accounts of the four fold pattern. And now it is approp- 
riate to summarize the main findings of section II: 
(1) in early Buddhism there is a distinction between 'truth of 
bye i n9' and etrgth off'' tagte ran Ce'y 
(2) 'micchä' is used in the latter sense in the formulation of 
the principle of noncontradiction; 
(3) there is no word for 'proposition' in early Buddhism, and 
hence no conern with formal logic as such; 
(4) thus, contra Jayatilleke, there is no formal logical principle 
of contradiction in early Buddhism, but ratheran heuristic 
principle or rule for conducting discussions which makes self-- 
contradictory utterances illicit. If one calls it informal logic, 
that is only from an external point of view. 
(5) the four fold logic is best understood as having the genera). 
form: 1) there exists an X such that characteristic y applies to 
it, 2) there exists an X such that y does not apply bt't z applies, ' 
3) there exists an X such that y applies (in part) and z applies 
in part), 4) there exists an X such that neither y nor z apply. 
(6) on this account the third position of the four fold logic does 
not violate the heuristic principle of contradiction, and thus 
there is no internal inconsistency here; 1 
(7) finally, the two views that Buddhism has an entirely differ- 
ent kind of logic from Western logic and that Buddhism is funda- 
mentally confused in admitting self-contradictions as valid are 
both exposed as inapplicable to early Buddhism. Thus, the 




Throughout I have been concerned to look at early Buddhism 
in its own terms. When looked at in its own terms, one sees 
neither fundamental confusion and cause for despair (Poussin: 
'We are helpless'), nor a modern system of logic constructed 
in antiquity (Jayatilleke: 'the early Buddhist conception of logic 
was far in advance of its time'). 
26 
In general a moral to be drawn 
is that in understanding an ancient world-view, as in understanding 
a primitive society, it is not necessary that the others be seen as 





Notes: Chapter 2, II 
II. 
B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings vol. I, Pali Text Soc- 
iety (London, Luzac & Co. , 1967), p. 285. 
z T. W. Rhys Davids and Wm. Stede, The Pali Text Society's 
Pali - English Dictionary (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 197Z), 
pp. 677-678. 
3 
Ibid. , p. 317. 
4 
Horner, op. cit. vol. II, p. 43. 
5Rhys 
Davids and Stede, op. cit. , p. 
668. 
6The 
claim is that behavior is the criterion for identifying the 
states of consciousness of others, not that states of consciousness 
are identical with behavior. 
7C. 
A. F. Rhys Davids, The Book of the Kindred Sayings Sam- 
yutta Nikaya), (London, Pali Text Society), p. 270. 
Lord Chalmers, Buddha's Teachings being the Sutta-Nipatä 
or Discourse-Collection (Cambridge, Mass. & London, 1932), 
Harvard Oriental Series, C. R. Lanman (ed. ), pp. 102-103; 196 -197 . 
9V. 
Trenckner (ed. ), Majjhima Nikäya vol. I, Pali Text Soc - 
iety (London, Luzac & Co. , 1964), p. 402. 
10K. 
N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 334. 
11Cf. 
Trenckner, op. cit., p. 402 for the Pali with the transla- 
tion in Horner, op. cit. vol. II, p. 71. 
12 
Vide: A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary vol. II, 
H-N (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976). A relevant sense of 'heur- 
istic' here is B1b as 'a rule or item of information used in such a 




Horner, off, cit. vol. I, p. 285. 
14 
J. F. Staal, 'Indian Logic' section of 'Logic, History of' 
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, Macmillan, 1967) 
vol. 4, pp. 520-523. 
15 
C. A. F. Rhys Davids, op. cit. vol. I I, pp. 19-20. 
161bid. 
, vol. I I, p. 15. 
17Rhys 
Davids & Stede, op. cit. , p. 509. 
18Vide 
David J. Kalupahana, Causality: the Central Philos- 
ophy of Buddhism (Honolulu, University Press of Hawaii, 1975), 
p. 143. 
19E. 
g., consider Horner, op. cit. vol. I I, p. 177. 
20T. 
W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha in F. Max 
Mueller (ed. ), Sacred Books of tiie Buddhists series, vol. II 
part I DTgha Nikäya trans. ), Oxford University Press, p. 36. 
21Horner, 
op. cit. vol.. I, p. 246; vol. II, p. 97; vol. II, 
pp. 177-178; vol. III, pp. 184=185. 
22T. 
W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter, Digha Nikä. ya 
(London, Pali Text Society, 1890), vol. I, p. 126. 
23 
, T,. W. Rhys Davids in Mueller, op. cit. vol. II, p: 4G. 
24 
Norman Kemp Smith, Hume'sDialogue s Concerning Natuxal 
Religion (London, Nelson & Sons, 2nd ed. , 1947 , p. 
212. 
25K. 
N. Jayatilleke, The Me s sage of the Buddha ed. by Ninian 
Smart (London, Allen & Unwin, 1975), pp. 49 and 51. 
26 
Ibid. , p. 51; Poussin cited in Jayatilleke, op. cit. , p. 333. 
i. 
79 
Chapter 3: Rationality and Pessimism -- Fact, Value, and Dukkha 
Aside from the challenge to early Buddhism on the grounds of 
fundamental unintelliZibility which was examined in Chapter 2, 
another sort of objection comes from those who regard it as 
wholly pessimistic and in that way 'irrational'. Commenting on 
this sort of objection E. J. Thomas writes: 
I 
It is not more pessimistic than other religions that have called 
life a vale of tears, and it is definitely optimistic in teaching 
that the cause of pain can be known, and that there is a way by 
which it can be removed. But in being pessimistic it is con- 
sistently so, and it requires that one who really knows' that 
existence is pain shall devote all his efforts to stopping it, 
that is, to understand what the cause is, and then to remove 
himself from all contact with it. The ordinary man does not 
believe that existence is pain. Even when he despairs about 
ever attaining pleasurable ends, he is still under the impulse, 
the thirst for pleasure. Evidently such a one is incapable of 
admitting or understanding even the first Truth. He can only 
come to realize the Truths by a course of moral and intel- 
lectual training. 
The answer to the charge of pessimism can only be given after 
some account of the meaning of dukkha and of the claim 'all is 
dukkha' have been presented. Then after dealing with the problem 
of whether or not early Buddhism is 'pessimistic', I propose to 
examine the issue of whether in this context there is some sort of 
illicit shift from the descriptive claim 'all is dukkha' to the (ex- 
plicit or implicit) claim 'one should eliminate dukkha by following 
the early Buddhist path'. This resolves into: (a) is there such a 
shift at all in early Buddhism`; (b) is making the fact /value shift 
mistaken from a philosophical point of view? 
The texts say that, unlike the ten questions (containing the 
four fold logic as applied to the tathagata) which have not been 
'determined' ('abyä. kata' or 'avydkata') by Buddha, dukkha has 
op" 
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been determined by him? What is dukkha ? 
To begin, it is noteworthy that the five aggregates which con- 
stitute personality are impermanent, and that whatever is imper- 
manent is dukkha. 
3 
And one finds statements like 'formerly as 
well as now all these material shapes are impermanent, painful, 
liable to alteration. '4 While not being synonomous with 'imper- 
manence' ('anicca'), dukkha thus has descriptive import (a) by 
virtue of the fact of change in the world. And as the following 
passage bears out, it also has descriptive import (b) in reference 
to a range of experience which is minimally that of deprivation, 
and which may be that of mental and/or physical pain of various 
5 
sorts: 
Kataman c' avuso, dukkharh ariyasaccam? - Jäti pi 
dukkhä, jars pi dukkha, maranam pi dukkharl-i, sokaparideva- 
dukkhadomanassupäyäsä pi dukkhä. Yam p' icchain na labha- 
ti, tam pi dukkham samkhittena pancupadänakkhandhä dukkhä. 
A translation by I. B. Horner goes: 
6 
And what, your reverences, is the ariyan truth of anguish? 
Birth is anguish and ageing is anguish and dying is anguish; and 
grief, sorrow, suffering, misery and despair are anguish. And 
not. getting what one desires, that too is anguish. In brief, the 
five groups of grasping are anguish. 
Here 'dukkha' is translated by Horner as 'suffering' in its 
occurrence in the long and much used phrase beginning with 'soka' 
('grief'), while it is translated as 'anguish' in the other occurren- 
ces here. The passage characterizes dukkha in the primary sense 
in which it functions in the first noble truth in terms of several 
other concepts, among which dukkha occurs again (consider the 
primary sense as dukkha1 and the other as dukkha2). Apparently 
dukkha1 is not semantically equivalent to dukkha2 , for otherwise 
the characterization would be at that point tautologous. Although 
it is disputable whether the former should be rendered as 'anguish' 
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and the latter as 'suffering' , Horner has seen the importance of 
assigning different meanings to them. T. W. Rhys Davids and 
Wm. Stede think that dukkha is 'to be understood as physical pain' 
in the combination of this term and domanassa, and render the 
'soka phrase' as 'grief and sorrow, afflictions of pain & misery, 
i. e. all kinds of misery'. 
7 
However one interprets the precise 
meaning of dukkha2, the important point to note is that the above 
passage shows that dukkhaI has the much wider meaning indicated 
at (b) above. 
One of the 'eighteen mental ranges' that a monk might achieve 
concerns dukkha. In achieving this mental range a monk, 'ranges 
over the mental state that gives rise to sorrow. '8 The mental 
state which gives rise to sorrow is described elsewhere as the 
'root of dukkha' which, when uprooted, rebirth ceases. 
9 
From 
the early Buddhist point of view this root is craving (tanhä), a 
phenomenon which is, in theory at least, checkable not only for 
one's self but for others as well, by anyone who , through medita- 
tion, masters the abhinnä which enables him to know the mind of 
another (telepathy, cetopariyanana) and 'see' the other's rebirth 
cycle thro igh dibbacakkhu ('divine eye'). And in one's own case 
the abhi i of 'retrocognition' (pubbeniväsänussatinäna) of one's 
past lives is relevant. 
Since in early Buddhism it is a principle of the way things 
are, that beings 'yearn for happiness and recoil from pain' 
(dukkha2), it is appropriate to ask: where, if at all, does evalua- 
tion come into the picture? Is dukkha in any way an evaluative 
concept? Consider how, in its more inclusive sense (dukkhal), 
it is a characteristic of the profane sarpsära in contrast to the 
'no arising' and 'no falling' characteristics of the sacred nibbäna. 
I 
For dukkha is so by virtue of impermanence, and the cessation 
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of dukkha (nibbana) is not characterized by impermanence: 
" 
atthi bhikkhave tad äyatanarp yattha n' eva pathavi 
na apo na tejo na väyo na a kä. sätareyatanam na vi ih n-- 
nancaayatanam na Aakincaeý'iayatanam na nevasann'än`äsannä- 
yatanarp n' dyam loko na paraloko ubho candimasüriyä, tad 
amham bhikkhave n' eva ägatim vad*ämi na gatim na thitim 
na cutim na upapattim appatittham appavattam anärammanam 
eva tam, es' eV anto dukkhass'. 'ti. ... 
atth. i bhikkhave ajatam abhütam akatam asamkhatam, no 
ce tam bhikkhave abhavissa ajätam abhutam akatam asan- 0 f-, 0 10 `e khatam, na yidha jatassa bhutassa katassa sankhatassa nis- 
saranam pa'nnäyetha. yasmý, ca kho bhikkhave atthi ajätam 
abhütarp akatam asankhatarp tosm' jý. tassa bh4tassa katassa 
sarnkhata s sa ni s sa ranam pan iäyati 'ti. 
F. L. Woodward translates these Udäna passages as: 
2 
Monks, there exists that condition wherein is neither 
earth nor water nor fire nor air: wherein is neither the 
sphere of infinite space nor of infinite consciousness nor of 
nothingness nor of neithe r-consciousness -nor unconscious- 
ness; where there is neither this world nor a world beyond 
nor both together nor moon and sun. Thence, monks, I 
declare is no coming to birth; thither is no going (from life ; 
therein is no duration; thence is no falling; there is no 
arising. It is not something fixed, it moves not on, it is not 
based on anything. That indeed is the end of Ill. ... 
Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, 
a not-compounded. Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not- 
made, not-compounded were not, there would be apparent 
no escape from this here that is born, become, made, com- 
pounded. 
The second Pali passage here (after the elipsis) shows well 
the contrast between the sacred and the profane in the early 
Buddhist texts. 
13 
And it is interesting to notice that in the pre - 
ceeding Pali passage quoted just now the end of Ill' (dukkha1) is 
characterized as neither arising nor falling, yet it is not charac- 
terized as 'something fixed' ('thita'), nor alternatively as moving 
(above: 'na gatirp na this tire'). Nibbäna eludes conventional cate- 
gories of experience and cannot, for example, be characterized 
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as permanent by way of simple contrast with sarpsära which is 
impermanent. This same point holds if one adopts the trans- 
lation of 'thita' as 'eternal'. The view Of early Buddhism is not 
that nibbana is permanent, but that duration does not apply to it. 
Nibbäna is sometimes characterized in positive terms as 'the high- 
est bliss' ('pararriar sukham'), and if it were characterized only 
by a via negativa, then it would be questionable whether the word 
14 
marks a concept 
T. W. Rhys Davids translates 'dukkhassa pari' as 'the com - 
plete understanding of sorrow', which brings out the fact that this 
is no ordinary garden variety of knowledge, as do phrases like 
'he knows as it really is: "this is pain"'. 
15 
Yathä bhütam , 'as it 
really is, functions as an important qualifying phrase in that it 
brings into focus the descriptive -cum -evaluative aspect of the 
'knowledge' of dukkha. There is an implicit contrast in any such 
talk of 'what is' with 'what seems to be', and in this context the 
implicit contrast is between the Buddhist (who knows dukkha as 
it really is) and the non-Buddhist (who does not understand dukkha 
in its more inclusive sense as dukkhaI to apply to everything). E. J. 
Thomas says: 'the ordinary man does not believe that existence 
is pain', perhaps referring to dukkha1 . 
16 
The generalized ordinary 
view is that there are painful feelings of various sorts but not that 
'all is dukkhaL . 
'Agha' (as in 'aghamülam' or 'root of pain' at Samyutta Nikäya IL- 
III, 32,10) means 'sin, error; evil, misery, distress, pain, 
adversity' according to Trenckner, who notes that 'agha' is some- 
times equivalent to 'dukkha' and sometimes not. 
17 
And on 'agha' 
the Pali Text Society dictionary says: 'the primary meaning is 
darkness'. Congruently it is also said that 'agha' means 'the 
18 




not have this latter meaning, and when the two terms are used 
synon mously this meaning of void or sky thus drops out. For 
example, at Sar yutta N'ikaya vol. 3, XXII, sec. 31, agha is used 
sy n onymously with dukkha , which had just occurred in sec. 12. 
There in sec. 12 it is said that the five aggregates are dukkha 
and in sec. 31 that the five aggregates are agha. As Childers 
has observed, the terms mean the same here, and I suspect that 
both were purposely used in orderto eliminate any loophole by 
means of which the Buddha might be incorrectly interpreted as 
having left open the possibility that in some sense or other suffer- 
ing is not to be ascribed to the five aggregates. 
It is also said that suffering is causally associated with saddl &. 
On the best interpretation this means that suffering is a necessary 
condition for confidence in the doctrine to arise. In this sense 
suffering gives rise to confidence: if it meant something stronger 
to the effect that every being who suffered would consequently have 
confidence in the dhamma, then it would be false. For there are 
of course a wide variety of responses to suffering, of which the 
Buddhist response is one. It should be noted that 'confidence' is 
used as a translation of 'saddhä' rather than 'faith' above, but the 
complex issue of the uses of saddhä requires treatment in a separ- 
ate chapter. 
It is clear that dukkha can be physical or mental pain as well 
as a more inclusive sort of 'unease' (asin the first ariyasacca or 
'noble truth'). The PTS dictionary distinguishes fine gradations 
in the meaning of the term, and on the relationship between sukha 
and dukkha says: 
20 
Sukha & dukkha are ease and dis-ease (but we use disease in 
another sense); or wealth and ilth from well & ill (but we 
have now lost 1lth); or well-being and ill-ness (but illness 




in translation to use half synonyms, no one of which is 
exact. Dukkha is equally mental & physical. Pain is too 
predominately physical, sorrow too exclusively mental, 
but in some connections they have to be used in default of 
any more exact rendering. Discomfort, suffering, ill, and 
trouble can occasionally be used in certain connections. 
Misery, distress, agony, 'affliction and woe are never right. 
They are much too strong & are only mental... 1. 
Sukha and dukkha occur, for instance, in the set of the 'six 
21 
elements': 
Cha-y-imä, Ananda, db7tuyo: 
_ 
Sukhadhätu, dukkhadhätu, 
somana s sadhätu, domana s sadhätu, upekhadhätu, avij jä dhätu. 
Imä kho, Änanda, cha dhätuyo yato jänä, ti passati, ettävat7 
pi kho, Ananda, dhätukusalo bhiklcü. ti alam vacanayäti. 
This is translated by Horner as: 
22 
There are six elements, Ananda: the element of happiness, 
the element of anguish, the element of gladness, the element 
of sorrowing, the element of equanimity, the element of ignor- 
ance. When, Ananda, he knows and sees these six elements, 
it is at this stage that it suffices to say, 'The monk is skilled 
in the elements'. 
T. W. Rhys Davids and Wm. Stede, in making their above 
quoted comment that certain words are 'too strong' to render 
dukkha when it occurs in combination with sukha, have made a 
point which also applies to 'anguish' in Horner's translation. But 
another of their points, that 'agony' is 'only mental' is dubious. 
Now I want to cla rify how one might arrive at 'all is dukkhai 
in early Buddhism. The five aggregates mentioned previously as 




constitutive of the universe. The Sabbasutta points this 
Monks, I will teach you 'everything'. Listen to it. What, 
monks, is 'everything' ? Eye and material form, ear and 
sound, nose and odor, tongue and taste, body and tangible 
objects, mind and mental objects. These are called 'every- 
thing'. Monks, he who would say: "I will reject this every- 
thing and proclaim another everything, " he may certainly 
t, 
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have a theory rof his owr. But when questioned, he would C 
not be able to answer and would, moreover, be subject to 
vexation. Why? Because it would not be within the range 
of experience (avisaya). 
Since on the early Buddhist view the five aggregates and the 
corresponding faculties are all thkkhal, and since the Sabbasutta 
shows the five aggregates and the respective faculties as com- 
prising the universe, it follows that 'all is dukkha' on the early 
Buddhist view. The premises and conclusion of this argument 
are all from early Buddhism of course, but the way of organizing 
the material as a concise argument is a philosophical reconstruct- 
ion of a helpful sort. It enables one to see what the logical rela- 
tionship between these ideas may be taken as, without distorting 
them, from a Western perspective. And from the pre-ceding 
determination that dukkhaI is a descriptive -cum -evaluative concept, 
it is clear that the claim 'all is dukkhaI is partly an evaluative 
claim. This isa significant conclusion, because it might be 
thought that the concept and the claim are entirely descriptive in 
view of the linkage between dukkha and impermanence in the early 
texts. This, however, would be to overlook the role of the concept 
of dukkha in the evaluational contrast between the sacred and the 
profane. Few concepts are more fitting candidates to support 
Ninian Smart's claim that 'worldviews' have 'existential force' 
and make 'descriptive claims'. 
24 
By contrast, many other relig- 
ious concepts (e. g. , 
ätman taken as unperceivable entity) are so 
far from possible experiential check that it does not make sense 
to regard them as -descriptive concepts at all. 
From the vantage point of the present discussion, then, what 
can be said about 'Buddhist pessimism'? Buddhism might be 
charged with being pessimistic either because it suggests a con- 




to exist in parinibbana (to be discussed is Chapter 6), or because 
it asserts that 'all is dukkha'. On the first point, there is no 
need to value 'endless life' in itself and without further qualifica- 
tion as particularly valuable, and on the other hand to'value ex- 
tinction' is not necessarily to look on the dark side of things, as 
recent writing on the tedium of immortality suggests. 
25 
What it 
means to 'value extinction' differs in different contexts, and in 
early Buddhism it would not mean advocating suicide, for that 
action based on desire result's in rebirth (kamma based on tanha 
produces pun ava). And as for the second point, seen in the 
context the claim 'all is dukkha' is such that liberation is never- 
theless possible for those who aspire to it, so that in the final 
analysis there is no pessimism. 
But neither of these replies will allay all doubts about the 
matter, and an inquiry into what is meant by 'pessimism' is nec- 
essary. It is important to distinguish between descriptive and 
evaluative senses of the term without, however, supposing that 
the usages of it must in practice fall into one or the other category. 
In early Buddhism there are descriptive and evaluative features 
of the concept of dukkha , but not mutually exclusive 
descriptive 
and evaluative types of usage. 
One attempt at a descriptive definition of 'pessimism', neither 
honorific nor perjorative, is given by W. D. Niven along the lines 
that: 
26 
In brief, Pessimism holds that existence itself is evil, that 
non-existence is preferable to existence, that the root of all 
evil is the desire for existence. 
But this way of characterizing the matter is unfortunately open 
to two fatal objections. First of all, in making 'pessimism' 
simply a matter of holding certain propositions rather than in 




cases of pessimism are ruled out. Individuals do not need to 
entertain general views of the sort which Niven puts forth in 
order to react to life in ways which make us justified in describ- 
ing them as 'pessimistic'. Similarly Stewart R. Sutherland 
points out that atheism is not necessarily a matter of denying 
the proposition 'God exists', contrary to what some text-book 
definitions would have one believe, and that it may be expressed 
in much more subtle and interesting ways. 
27 
Secondly, in tying the concept of pessimism to that of evil 
the variety of the phenomena of pessimism, already restricted 
by a strictly propositional treatment, becomes further restricted 
in that many of those who would ordinarily be described as pes- 
simists do not use theological-sounding talk about 'evil'. at all. 
And in early Buddhism the world is not, nor is existence, evil 
-- but it is dukkha . In early Buddhist mythology, Mä ra, the 
personification of evil, tempts one to craving and grasping and 
hence to experience rebirth, and yet it is Mara who is evil rather 
than the world or existence as such. 
According to another definition 'pessimism' is a 'dissatis- 
faction with life' which is embodied in various philosophical form- 
ulationsX28 It would, however, be too loose to speak of early 
Buddhism as being in this sense pessimistic. For the mature 
view of the Buddhist disciple after reaching the meditative stage 
of the fourth jhäna is not at all to be dissatisfied but, on the con- 
trary, to have attained a state of equanimity, incompatible with a 
grasping attitude of dissatisfaction. Thus experiences which 
usually cause dissatisfaction in worldly people do not disturb the 
meditating Buddhist. It is of course necessary for one to become 
dissatisfied with ordinary life in order to be. in a position to 
appreciate the attraction of the Buddhist path, but this 'dissatis- 
OR 
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faction' is with ordinary life, not with life per se (both suicide 
and asceticism being 'condemned), and holds only in the lower 
stages of the path. 
It is interesting to see what company the word 'pessimism' 
keeps. As an instance of this 'ism' Schopenhauer's views are 
29 
explained in the following way: 
The ultimate reality of the universe appears only in will 
-- in any blind force of nature and in all organic existence 
- an endless striving without intelligence or aim. The 
radical evil of life - the will to live - is to be eradicated 
by the denial of the "principle of individuation" and by the 
perfect denial of the will to live by means of asceticism, by 
destroying illusions of pleasure, by charity, by absolute 
refusal of the sexual impulse, and by total abstinence from 
food. 
Notice that although early Buddhism and this account of Schopen- 
hauer's thought (the correctness of which in detail it is beyond 
our scope to examine) both share a 'dissatisfaction with life', 
they employ very different ways of stating the dissatisfaction and 
offer different ways of reacting to it. In the one case it is dukkha 
-- not evil -- that is taken to be the basic problem, and no such 
extreme of 'total abstinence from food' is regarded as a profitable 
(kusala) reaction to the unsatisfactorine ss of things. 
Consider another case: 
30 
The most thorough and uncompromising of the advocates of 
pessimism is Julius Friedrich August Bahnsen (d. 1881). He 
maintains that the world and life are not only essentially ir- 
rational and wretched, but will be eternally so; that his 
fellow pessimists have no right to promise that the agony of 
creation will ever terminate; that the hope of the extinction 
of evil in a world essentially evil is an unreasonable hope, 
and can be based only on blind faith... . 
Here again, although both the early Buddhist in the lower 
stages of training and Bahnsen have a 'dissatisfaction with life' 





would be to conceal a great deal. For the early Buddhist view 
emphatically would reject several points which fill out in what 
ways Bahansen regards life as unsatisfactory. The world is 
not 'essentially irrational' on the early Buddhist view, but a 
flux of causally related events, the pattern of which is intellig- 
ible. And while unwilling to speak of the world as a creation of 
Issara (Skt. Isvara) , the early Buddhist perspective does take 
it that there is an end possible for a person's unease, by follow- 
ing the path. Finally this ray of hope is not just 'blind faith' 
that dukkha will cease, but is to some extent based on . medit- 
ational achievements. 
What attention to cases such as these showsis that the attempt 
to link up various views as being ' pessimistic' may easily conceal 
important differences. For in filling out the reasons for, and 
emotive reactions to, what is regarded as unsatisfactory, signif- 
icant differences are to be found. And in early Buddhism the 
world is ordered causally (in terms of patic ca samuppä da) , not 
the chaotic mess many pessimists take it to be, and liberation 
(nibbana) is possible in one's own lifetime. 'Pessimism' is a 
loose term, but insofar as it involves belief that the world is chaos 
and that the best one can do is suicide, it is clearly inapplicable to 
early Buddhism. In general, it is at the very least misleading in 
this application. Nevertheless, some religionists and Buddhist 
scholars apparently cannot restrain themselves from lapsing into 
vague mention of 'Buddhist pessimism'. 
An important philosophical question is one about fact/value 
here. Is there an illicit shift from a descriptive claim to the 
effect that 'all is dukkha' to an evaluative claim (whether explicit 
or implicit) that 'one should eliminate dukkhal in achieving nibbäna 
through the path'? In his well-known two-volume historical work, 
r 
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Indian Philosophy, Radhakrishnan says: 'The aim of Buddhism is 
not philosophical explanation but scientific description. ' 
31 
If 
Radhakrishnana is right here, how do values enter into the picture? 
It is commonly accepted that science, qua science, articulates how 
the world is rather than how it ought to be. Is one to say, then, 
that the statement 'all is dukkhai is on the same level as a state- 
ment like 'everything is composed of atoms' 9 
It might be argued that the answer is 'yes', for dukkha is ex- 
plained by reference to the idea that everything is impermanent 
(anicca), which may be viewed as a descriptive claim. The diffi- 
culty is that it plays more roles than a merely descriptive claim 
could, and hence cannot be rightly regarded as on the same level 
as 'everything is composed of atoms'. For it also has a religious 
sense: everything is impermanent applies to sankhära, compound- 
ed things, but not of course to nibbäna which is highly evaluated by 
contrast. The religious implication to be drawn from the descrip- 
tion is to avoid attachment to things in view of thiir fluctuating 
nature of composition and dissolution. 
There is a noteworthy controversy over whether an 'ought 
claim' can be derived from a set of 'is claims'. The impossibility 
of this exercise has been a dogma of modern philosophy, one based 
on a_ famous passage by Hume. 
32 
In recent literature, Max Black 
and D, Z. Phillips counters Black. I challenges this dogma, 
33 34 
have suggested, however, that the claim 'all is dukkhai is des- 
criptive -cum -evaluative. And on ti_is view, the question of a 
fact - value shift cannot arise concerning the early Buddhist 
claim. 
Yet it might nevertheless be objected that there being no 
is - ought shift makes it all the worse for early Buddhism, since 





inately combining factual and evaluational elements. It might be 
argued that the very concept of dukkha is confused. 
In reply examples can be given of concepts in other religous 
systems or in 'ordinary language' in which a similar combination 
of factual and evaluative elements obtains. For instance, in 
Christianity life is sometimes described as a 'vale of tears', a 
conception which contains both elements. The implicit contrast 
with heaven indicates description-c>>rn -evaluation. As in early 
Buddhism the sacred and the profane are delineated, with nibbäna 
receiving the positive evaluation in contrast to the dukkha that is 
sarp sara . 
To say of a man: 'he is the king's loyal servant' is , to take 
anotner example, not just to make a descriptive point about a 
state of affairs, but is in some contexts to evaluate positively his 
being so. But saying this might make the man an object of deris- 
ion in other contexts, calling forth a negative evaluation, but in 
either sort of case the concept of 'loyal servant' is both descriptive 
and evaluative. The above examples function as a reductio ad 
absurdum against the view that dukkha is a conceptual confusion: 
if the concept of dukkha is confused because of combining fact and 
value, then so are many other useful concepts. 
Overall it may be asked: has early Buddhism dealt well with 
the problem of suffering? The suffering of those who are in this 
life innocent is difficult for many religions to explain. Consider 
for a moment Job, who questions the suffering befallen him, 
blameless, and is answered: 
35 
Dost thou know the order of heaven, and canst thou set down 
reason thereof on the earth? 
36 
and challenged: 
Wilt thou make void my judgment: and condemn me, that 





but not intellectually satisfied, as Widengren observes: 
37 
The problem thus gets no theoretical solution, only a prac- 
tical: man is commended resignation to the inscrutable will 
and majesty of God. 
The early Buddhist position, on the other hand, has at least 
this much in its favor: it offers an explanation of suffering (but 
not a scientific one), how it arises and how it can be eliminated. 
Immediately after Radhakrishnan's statement that Buddhism 
does not attempt 'philosophical explanation but scientific de sc ript - 
ion' he continues: 
38 
So Buddha answers the question of the cause of any given 
state of a thing by describing to us the conditions of its coming 
about, even in the spirit of modern science. 
But just because the Buddha gives a causal explanation it does not 
follow that he is eo ipso engaged in a scientific enterprise. The 
difficulty with Radhakrishnan's account here is that it falls heir 
to the erroneous notion that all causal explanation is scientific 
explanation. Science explains by working with hypothesis and test, 
and proceeds toward the construction of general theories. Like the 
Buddhist causal formulas, scientific hypotheses attempt to explain 
rather than simply to describe. 
39 
But early Buddhism, unlike 
science, does not modify its views by taking into account the results 
of a test. Nor does it offer an hypothesis as a first step toward a 
theory which gives a rationally more comprehensive and better 
grounded explanation. Seeing the early Buddhist way is regarded 
as seeing 'yatha bhütari', or 'as it really is', and not in some 
provisional way. 
Thus, 'all is dukkhaI is not on the same level as 'everything 
is composed of atoms', say; neither is it a philosophical 'specula- 
tion' ('di thi) which is up for argument and counter-argument, 
'wordy warfare' being condemned in early Buddhism. Here, as in 
oo-,, 
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many philosophical confusions, the problem consists in seeing 
too few alternatives: because early Buddhism is not a religion 
like many others in that it does not accept the concept of God or 
of the soul, it is tempting to say that it must be either science or 
philosophy. But if we just 'look and see' without this precon- 
ceived 'must' (as Wittgenstein for one urged), early Buddhism 
presents itself as a very interesting case which widens our con- 
40 
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Chapter 4, I: Mind and Rebirth 
When mind is seen, as it often is in pre -twentieth century 
philosophy, as a 'something', it is ordinarily viewed either as 
entity or as process. In reacting against the Hinduistic sub- 
stantive view of self as a kind of entity characterized for one 
thing as permanent, the early Buddhist view opts for the latter, 
process conception of mind. There is rebirth (punabbhava, lit. 
re-becoming), for which the three conditions of union, timing, 
and the presence of a gandhabba are essential, but this is not to 
say that there is a permanent blissful center of consciousness 
(atta, Skt. ä, tman) which transmigrates. Much confusion may 
result from the failure to distinguish between 'rebirth' (as an 
early Buddhist concept) and 'transmigration' (as a Hindu concept), 
and I shall use these terms to mark the distinction. This is very 
important, for the idea of ätman is inconsistent with the first two 
of the three marks of existence, 
2 
is baseless from the point of 
view of Buddhist meditational experience, and, in short, plays 
no role in the world view of early Buddhism. 
One misconception about early Buddhism is that it can (logic- 
ally) make no sense if it is taken as saying what it really does say 
about rebirth. Since there can be no rebirth without a thing that 
is reborn, it is sometimes argued, rebirth (ptu-ebbhava) and no- 
soul (anatta) are logically inconsistent. The assumption here is 
problematic, for there is a 'rebirth link' in early Buddhism, a 
topic explored in section II of this chapter. 
To begin, consider the relationship between vin1iäna and 
mano as treated at Mäjjhima Nikäya 1 53: 
cha-y-ime avuso vinnacakayä: cakkhuvinnanam sotavinnanam 
NN- 
i a ha a 
a e 
a i-vha i n 
Nn7. ý re ka a i 
ý1n'ý. 1- 
o inana v nn g n n m j v n anam yav nnanam m n v m. 
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This has been translated by Horner at Middle Length Sayings 1 67: 
Your reversences there are six classes of consciousness: 
visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, olfactory 
consciousness, gustatory consciousness, bodily conscious- 
ness, mental consciousness. 
Here the relationship between via and mano is one of genus 
to species. Mano is a type of vinnäsia, the part of a person's 
awareness which has to do with thinking. Elsewhere at MN 1 181 
it is pointed out that the monk guards the manindriyam, the faculty 
of mano which, if not guarded, will ensnare him. 
Since mann is a type of vinna a, and since it is clear from MN 
I 256 that vinnäga is not a permanent thing independent of conditions 
for its existence, it follows that mano is not either. Of course 
this is not to deny continuity among a number of successive lives, 
for as the condemnation of speculation about one's lives in past, 
future, and present shows, 
3 
and as K. N. Jayatilleke has pointed 
out, continuity was not denied. It is tempting to as-k: continuity 
of what? --. to which the early Buddhist reply is: continuity of the 
stream of consciousness. The continuity of life depends not only 
on the physical factors of union and season, but also on the pres- 
e nc e of the gandhabba 
4 
Mahathera D. Piyananda says in his dissertation (unpublished, 
Catholic University of America): 
5 
If vinnär}a is unavailable to the fertilized ovum, the ovum dies. 
The vine is which is ready to enter the ovum is called gand- 
habba (Skt. gantavya), or one who is ready to go. 
He further points out in a footnote that there are two usages of 
gandhabba, the one just given and another. (derived from gandharva) 
which means 'celestial musician' ox 'divine physician'. 
But the claim that if vinnaVa is unavailable to the fertilized 
ovum, then the ovum dies, is objectionable on two counts. First, 
0>ý 
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the Buddha is not depicted as making this claim, but rather differ- 
ently as claiming that the presence of the gandhabba is one of the 
three conditions which are necessary for conception. 
6 Presum- 
ably, then, if there is a fertilized ovum, then the gandhabba was 
already present and thus the question of its unavailability does 
not arise. On, textual grounds, therefore, Piyananda's inter- 
pretation here is unsound. Secondly, ex hypothesi , it is not clear 
why the being would die rather than be born mindless. 
As for the condemnation of speculation concerning past, future, 
and present (the Pali order) just mentioned, it should not be sup- 
posed that knowledge of at least the past states is impossible. For 
at MN I 182 (trans. MLS I 228-9) it is noted that one characteristic 
mark or 'footprint' of the t. -athägata is that 'he remembers divers 
former habitations in all their modes and detail'. 
It is interesting to note that knowledge of the future is not 
claimed here as a mark of the tathägata . It is true that the Buddha 
is reported to have once made such a prediction, however, in the 
case of Devadatta -- that he would be reborn in niraya , the low 
rebirth state of torment. The Devadatta case might be an inter- 
polation, since it does not square with the usual avoidance of 
claiming knowledge of the future. This, obviously, is speculative. 
? 
As far as the relationship between mano and vinnana is con- 
cerned, there is also a distinction between the elements of mind 
(manodhatu) or ideas, and consciousness of ideas (manovinnana- 
dhätu , e. at MN III 
62. In between these two dhätu is listed 
dhammadhätu, which is translated as 'the element of mental states' 
(MLS I 105). Thus one has: 'the element of mind, the element of 
mental states, the element of mental consciousness', according to 
Horner. This translation leaves open the problem of how the 





most straightforward translation of dhammadhätu makes the most 
sense here -- 'element of things' -- so that one has: 'the element 
of mind, the element of things, the element of intellect'. Put a 
bit more broadly this means: subject, object, and cognitive con- 
sciousness as the relation between them. 
It is noteworthy that if one follows Horner's translation on 
this point, then mind, if different from ; mental states, would have 
to be some sort of organ or substance. Differently, too, at MN 
III 265-6 Horner translates manam manovinnä nam manovinnä a 
vinnätabbe dhamme' or 'the mind, mental consciousness', trans- 
lating 'dhamme' as 'things', in line with the above suggestion. 
There are passages which seem to support a view of mind as 
distinct from mental states, however. For example, it is said 
that the union of mind (mano , things 
(dhamma), and cognitive 
consciousness (manovinMna) is contact: tinnarn sangati phasso 
(MN 1 112). Cognitive consciousness is seen not as a by-product 
of the union of the three, apparently presupposing that mind and 
mental consciousness are distinguishable. 
Sometimes, too, vinna. is is spoken of as if it is spatially 
locatable, e. g. at Digha Nikäya II xv 21-2, where it is said to 
'descend' (okkamati) into the mother's womb according to one 
translation. The Pali Text Society dictionary has this to say 
about okkamati: 
8. 
Lit. to enter, go down into, fall into, fig. to come on, to 
develop, to appear in (of a subjective state). It is strange 
that this important word has been so much misunderstood, 
for the English idiom is the same. We say 'he went to sleep, 
without meaning that he went anywhere. So we may twist it 
around and say that 'sleep overcame him', without meaning 
any struggle. The two phrases mean exactly the same -- an 
internal change, or development, culminating in sleep. 
Among the examples cited afterwards in the PTS dictionary, 
the very same phrase which Piyananda translates differently viz. , 
001, 
102 
vinnänam na okkamissatha (but taken from D II 63), is rendered 
'if consciousness were not to develop in the womb'. And in 
another place the PTS dictionary stresses the idea of entering 
rather than of developing, as in 'a god, on his rebirth, entered 
his new mother's womb (kucchim okkami)' (MN III 119). Whether 
one stresses on the one hand the idea of development (or of 'enter- 
ing' in the sense of developing, as in 'he went to sleep'), or on the 
other hand the idea of descending bringing with it the difficulty of 
spatializing the mental, one thing is clear. Continuity of a cycle of 
lives in early Buddhism does not imply a permanent substance as 
a substratum (such as ätman or svabhava which is supposed to be 
independent of causal conditions. 
Does it make any sense to say that there can be continuity in 
early Buddhism without atmaväda? The reply is that 'continuity' 
plays different roles in language and that the objection misleads 
one by assuming a single picture of what counts as continuity. As 
Wittgenstein points out in Philosophical Investigations, the strength 
of a cord does not always depend on there being a single strand 
which runs from end to end, but sometimes depends on the inter- 
relationship between overlapping and criss-crossing fibers, none 
of which runs the entire length of the cord. The early Buddhist 
doctrine of rebirth may be viewed like this: there is no permanent 
unchanging ätman linking up successive lives with its continuous 
psychic fiber, but there is nevertheless continuity which is assured 
by over-lapping and criss-crossing fibres. Buddhists sometimes 
use the metaphor of a flame in order to make this sort of point, 
since the flame is ever=changing yet continuous. 
But what Pali concept is applicable for the 'fibres' ? And does 
this sort of view make sense philosophically? To take the first 
question first: the cognitive consciousness of a newly reborn 
i 
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individual depends for its development on dispositions (vinnäna 
depends on sankhär7). As Kalupahana observes, 'when it is said 
that dispositions condition consciousness, it means that the dis- 
positions (sarrkhärä,, hsin , by conditioning consciousness, or 
more correctly the unconscious process, determine the nature 
of the psychic personality of the newly born individual'9 In this 
way saikhärä might be understood as the formative psychic strands 
of the rebirth process which condition the vinnär a of the subsequent 
person. But in fact there is. no one term which provides the rebirth 
link in early Buddhism, and it has been suggested that citta pro - 
vides the link (Johansson), and that gandhabba does so (0. H. de A. 
Wijesekera). Vinn"'apa as a stream of consciousness might be taken 
as the link (Piyananda), as long as one does not take it 'as identiaal 
and permanent in past, future, and present in view of Buddha's re- 
jection of 'this same one, not another... fares on' in the reply to 
Sati. Mano, however, never occurs in this connection. Thus, 
there are several candidates for the rebirth link (sai. kharä., citta, 
gandhabba, vinnaiia), and nog, consistent, technical view about this 
matter in early Buddhism. But this should not obscure the fact 
that there is a clear view to the effect that whatever term is used, 
continuity and moral responsibility across lives is affirmed. 
In the remainder of this section, support for the view just 
outlined will be mustered by criticizing alternative accounts, and 
later in section II the philosophical question just mentioned above 
will be dealt with in detail. 
Piyananda writes: 
10 
According to the Upanisads, atman is imperishable, eternal, 
has the shape of a manikin living in the heart, and is the 
perceiver, conceiver, and knower. In Buddhist thought, 
vinnana is passive perishable, evanescent, formless, neither 
a perceiver, conceiver, nor a knower, and functions only as 
a passive force of the life-continuum, the major part of mind 
i 
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which continues throughout life and hereafter. 
Piyananda suggests that atrrman is 'analogous to the Buddhist con- 
cept of vinnana', but in the above respects which he mentions is 
different. Of course he does not identify the Buddhist view with 
ätmaväda, but I think that the comparison might tempt one to 
adopt a mistaken picture. Comparisons are useful when they 
elucidate something, but it is not clear what could be elucidated 
by comparing the early Buddhist position with one it explicitly 
rejects. 
Recall, for example, the Mahatarghasankhayasutta. 
1 l 
Here 
the monk Säti is rebuked by Buddha for holding the erroneous 
view: 
Tathä 'ham Bhagavata dhammam de sitam äjä nami yathä tad " 
'N + C, 3 -%) 
ev' idam vinnanam sandhävati samsarati, anannan "ti. 
Or: 
Insofar as I understand dhamma taught by the Lord it is 
that this consciousness itself runs on, fares on, not another. 
The Pali has the force of: the same one, not a different one. The 
identity ascribed to vinnana across lives by Sati is repudiated by 
Buddha, who emphasizes that consciousness is dependent on con- 
ditions and that if there are no conditions, then there is no con- 
sciousness. 
Another passage which shows that on the early Buddhist view 
it is misleading to compare vinnäiia with ätman is MN I 139 (MLS 
I 178) where it is stated" that whatever sort of consciousness 
(vinnana) is in question, all should be seen as it really is: not 
the self (atta). Since the Buddha is thus reputed to have made 
it a special point to disallow thinking of vinnai. a as the self, a 
comparison of these two terms seems wrongheaded. 
It should be noted that the early Buddhist position is not 
/'k, 
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ambiguous about the notion of self. It is not just that there is no 
evidence fo the existenc of self considered as a permanent, un- 
chaninging substance or soul, but that there is nothing of the kind. 
For at MN 1 136 (MLS 1 175 it is said of atta: 'So evam samanu- 
pa s santo a sati na pa rita s satiti' (or, 'he regarding thus that which 
does not exist, will not be anxious'). The term 'asati' means 
'that which does not exist', and so the meaning is very clear. 
Denial of a. self in the sense of soul which is always the same 
is not tantamount to denial of continuity, however, for continuity 
and sameness are obviously different concepts. K. N. Jayatilleke's 
12 
phrase 'continuity without identity' may be useful to recall. 
Suppose, for example, a string with different colors along 
different segments such that there is continuity but not identity, 
in the sense that although the string is continuous, its parts have 
different colors. Now in the case of the multi-colored string, one 
can ask the question 'what is it that continues? ' and answer it with 
reference to the string. But can one ask, let alone answer, the 
question in the early Buddhist context? If one does, is this like: 
'what feeds on consciousness -sustenance? ', the very question 
which the Buddha is depicted as rejecting? I do not think so, for 
the answer to the latter question is ätman, while the answer to the 
former is in terra s of sxr of the Pali terms in the group mentioned 
above (so long as one is careful not to say it stays the same). 
Two attempts to answer 'what is it that continues? ' in rebirth 
follow. Johansson, psychologist and Pali scholar, thinks that 
citta 'includes all the layers of consciousness, even the uncon- 
scious: by it the continuity and identity are safeguarded. '1 .3 But 
he offers no textual support for this particular claim, and con- 
tinues by citing passages to show that 'the whole gamut of 
Buddhist methods therefore aims at purifying the citta. ' Doing so 
00%, 
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does not support the other claim, however. And as previously 
mentioned, Piyananda, on the other hand, employs vinnäga as 
an ätman-surrogate. 
If it is asked why there is no one technical term supplied for 
the rebirth link in early Buddhism, the answer can only be specu- 
lative. It might be that this is intentional, in order to avoid artic- 
ulating a technical philsophical view which might be a source of 
attachment, or it might be due to diverse terminology being used 
by reporters of the Buddhas doctrine. But in any case it is clear 
that early Buddhism does not offer a substitute for the concept of 
ätman, as the passage decläring it not to exist (asat') and the 
doctrine of impermanence (anicca) show. 
As an historical noteit is worth mentioning that the puggalo 
(person) theory which developed in the Sämmitiya wing of the Abhi- rý- 
dharma school14 would not have been a likely development had it 
not been for a certain indeterminacy in the early position. These 
proponents of pudgalaväda supported their doctrine that 'individuals 
(puggalo) exist as such in the truest sense' with reference to the 
'Burden and the Burden bearer sutta' of the Samyutta Nikaya (XXII, 
221.. 15 
It is evident that in early Buddhism, as in Zen, there is little 
or no theoretical interest in rebirth. Punabbhava(lit. ,' re -bec om - 
ing') occurs several times, yet the focus of attention is much more 
on ending attachment and achieving liberation than it is on dis- 
cussing rebirth. Perhaps it remained a 'conceptual grey area' 
in early Buddhism in order to avoid what is regarded as inconse- 
quential speculation which takes attention from the Buddhist path. 
I do not think that the concept of rebirth in early Buddhism is 
muddled on the (mistaken) ground that an ätman or something like 
it in point of permanence is logically required. And some concepts 
107 
do have 'blurry edges' and are nevertheless functional. Indeed, 
their usefulness in the conceptual system as concepts (I am not 
speaking of expediency here) may require that their edges are 
blurry. Sometimes a slightly out of focus photograph could not 
be replaced with a sharper one and still achieve the desired 
effect. Thus, it is not a criticism of early Buddhism to say that 
there is no one term for the rebirth link (in contrast to what Frau- 
wallner would have one believe). 
There does not have to be some one term for the rebirth link 
as a precondition for its making sense. Kalupahana, although 
emphasizing the importance of vinnäna, points out that 'this stream 
tiN, 
of consciousness '(vinnaiasota) is the same as the stream of be- 
coming (bhavasota) mentioned often in the early discourses'. 
16 
One may refer to the same process or thing by making use of differ- 
ent referring expressions, and thus the problem is not the lack of 
a single term being applied but rather the problem is the philosoph- 
ical one of whether what is said with different expressions for the 
rebirth link makes sense. 
There are two problems which can be raised here, the prob- 
lem of the unity of consciousness, and that of the meaning of 
seeing things 'as they really are'. The problem of the unity of 
consciousness is really two problems. The first might be put: 
what keeps the personality separate from others while alive, 
what binds the aggregates?; the second, what insures continuity 
between lives? 
In order to throw a little light on the first of the two sub- 
divisions, consider what the problem is not. Hume ends the 
treatment 'Of Personal Identity' in the Treatise admitting his in- 
'ability, for the moment at least, to reconcile the two principles 





never recognizes any necessary connection between them. That 
this is not the early Buddhist problem, however, becomes clear 
when 'one sees that the position does not divide perceptions into 
'distinct existences'. It is precisely this fact that makes possible 
an East-West philosophers' conference on Whitehead and Buddhism, 
since the process philosophy differs from Humes on the point of 
'distinct existences'. In early Buddhism there is no theory of 
momentary impressions, as Kalupahana rightly emphasizes. 
18 
Specifically, the conception of the pancakhandha (or five 
aggregates consisting of rupa, vedana, sann ä, sankhärä, vinnaga 
does not commit early Buddhism to a Humean view of perceptions 
as discrete entities. It is true that sannä is often translated as 
'perceptions', but it is at least equally justifiable to render it in 
the singular in the context of the pancakhandha as the PTS diction- 
ary does: 'sense, consciousness, perception, being the third 
19 
kha ndha' . 
In order to support this claim it is important to consider the 
meaning of khandha, which. the PTS dictionary divides into a 'crude 
meaning' and an 'applied meaning'. The former (IA) is 'bulk, mas- 
siveness (gross) substance', e. g. , in reference to an elephant's 
back, a person's shoulder or back, a tree trunk, and as a section 
of literature considered as a unity. As a'more general' meaning 
of this type (IB) it also denotes e. g. , fire, water, a heap of merit, 
20 
or an abundance of wealth. 
As for the 'applied meaning' (II), part of this (A) refers to 
'all that is comprised under a rubric 'in a collective sense' as 
either a mass, or and very differently, as parts. IIB, however, 
specifically means 'constituent element' really 'in an individual 
sense', and it is here that Rhys Davids and Stede note that 
Buddhaghosa, the commentator, paraphrases khandha as räsi 
00%k 
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or heap. Of course this gives it a particular slant: a heap is a 
heap of certain things, it is not a mass taken as a unit. 
But Buddhaghosa's interpretation here need not be taken as 
definitive of the early position in view of the alternative possib- 
ility of construing khandha as 'mass'. Certainly there are pas- 
sages in which the khandha themselves are said to comprise a 
being in a way comparable to the way that a chariot's parts com- 
prise the chariot, but this does not mean that each of them is in 
turn thought of as a collection of individual parts. Hence, the 
early Buddhist problem is not Hume's problem. Since there is 
no supposition that all perceptions are distinct existences, there 
is no problem of reconciling this with any other principle. And 
if one asks 'what keeps the perceptions of a person together in 
early Buddhism? ', this is to assume without evidence the distinct 
existence of perceptions in early Buddhism. 
If one now returns to the problem of the unity of consciousness 
earlier posed, which soul-substance theoreticians may be inclined 
to stress, it can be argued-. that the so-called problem is irresolv- 
able because it presupposes precisely what is inadmissible. For 
to ask: 'what keeps the aggregates of person A separate from those 
of person B in this life', presupposes that something must, when 
it is not clear what that would be like. It presupposes that this 
unity is an unlikely structure which requires an 'underpinning'. 
What would this underpinning be like? What precisely have we 
not got, that we might have? I submit that no philosophically de- 
fensible answer is forthcoming, because of the unclarity of what 
is being asked. As Strawson observes about 'the problem of the 
principle of unity, of identity, of the particular consciousness': 
21 
If there were such a principle, then each of us would have 




experience of his were his own or someone else's; and there 
is no sense in this suggestion. 
The claim that there is a need for a mysterious sort of meta- 
physical rubber band to keep the five aggregates together rests on 
a misunderstanding of the framework of early Buddhism. For an 
analysis in terms of the five aggregates is not the same as an 
explanatory account as to why thilxgs are one way rather than 
another. And unless one presupposes the need for such a logically 
odd sort of rubber band, it is not clear that a descriptive analysis 
is inadequate. 
In one way, perhaps, the early position is more sophisticated 
than Abhidharma attempts to systematize and 'rationalize' it, since 
it does not fall into the pud galaväda error of thinking that a.. pudgala 
very like-the ätman is logically required in order for rebirth to 
make sense. The anatta doctrine in early Buddhism is not a logical 
blunder, but it is an attempt to avoid a metaphysical one. 
It remains to be seen what can be said of the second question 
posed, 'what insures contint. tity between lives? ', in relation to 
philosophical issues of personal identity and reidentification. 
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II 
In this section I shall first present the background on the 
no soul view and rebirth by focusing on what is denied in denying 
- the soul as existing (asat) the meaning of atta, the three 
marks of existence, the S, abbasutta and the rebirth process (punab- 
bhava). Afterwards a series of philosophical problems will be 
posed, one of which will be addressed here and the rest in the 
following chapter. 
If one wants to get clear as -to what is being denied when the 
early Buddhist no soul view is set forth, then it is important to 
understand the characteristics of the pre-Buddhist ätman view 
against which it reacts. As the Hindu view of atman is preser. ted, 
it is agent and controller. The PTS dictionary observes: 
1 
It is described in the Upanisads as a small creature, in shape 
like a man, dwelling in ordinary times in the heart. It es- 
capes from the body in sleep or trance; when it returns to the 
body life and motion reappear. It escapes from the body at 
death, then continues to carry on an everlasting life of its own. 
This is a convenient summary of one strand of ätman belief, but as 
Malalasekera points out, while in the B-hadärai. yaka Upaniad the 
atman is regarded as unknowable, in the Chändogya Upaniýad it is 
is regarded as not only knowable but as perceivable. Thus one 
2 
can distinguish two strands of Upanisadic talk about ätman, an 
agnostic mention and a more positive account. (Whether it is 
'empirically' see, as M. thinks, is another matter. 
T. W. Rhys Davids observes that in the pre-Buddhist Upani- 
pads the ätman has size, at first being characterized as about 
the size of a grain of barley or rice, and later as the size of the 
thumb (thus called 'the dwarf'). Rhys Davids reasons that since it 
is sometimes described as containing the elements of earth, water, 





Malalasekera distinguishes three senses of attä: one's own 
as opposed to others', person as a mind/body complex, self as 
a metaphysical entity or soul. 
4 
Clearly the early Buddhist view 
does not deny the existence of attä in the second sense, as the 
five khandha (Skt. skandha) classification shows. 
Applying the point that there are two strands of talk about 
ätman to Malalasekera's three categories, it is evident. that his 
third category needs to be widened. He does not see that his 
earlier mentioned point abot there being two versions of ätman 
belief (B; hadäranyaka vs. Chändogya) needs to be applied to the 
triadic classification. Otherwise one gets an importantly mis- 
leading characterization of what the early Buddhist no soul view 
rejects. It rejects the notion that there is a permanent menta, 
entity called ätman, regardless of whether this is thought of as 
unknowable or as perceivable (through meditation). It stresses 
that consciousness (vinnaria) depends on conditions, so that when 
there are no conditions, then there is no consciousness. 
5 
Else- 
where it observes that there is no reason to be vexed about that 
which does not exist. Briefly, we can say that the third sense 
6 
of attä, the one that the no soul view is directed against, is the 
sense in which atta denotes neither ownership nor observable per- 
son, but a theoretical entity whether conceived of as 'partly 
physical (dehätmaväda)' or as 'the life-breath (pr in7atmavä. da) 
animating the body, though different from it. 17 
In early Buddhism it is thought that there are three character- 
istics or marks of existence: anicca (impermanence), anatta (non- 
substantiality), and dukkha (variously: mental or physical discom- 
fort, unsatisfactoriness). The anatta doctrine has implications 
for the existence of any sort of metaphysical or physical substance. 
One might, for example, discuss the notion of Is Sara or Creator 
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God in this context, but in what follows here I wish to focus the 
discussion on the no soul view. And although early Buddhism 
disputes both that belief in soul is psychologically conducive to 
spiritual growth, and that there are adequate grounds for belief 
in the soul's existence, we are here concerned with the more 
philosophically interesting latter point. 
Neither ordinary experience nor meditational experience, it 
is claimed, shows the existence of a permanent soul. Agency is 
thought of as one of the possible attributes of the soul, and at M. N. 
1231233, there is a dialogue between Buddha and Aggivessana on 
this point. What emerges is that none of the five aggregates taken 
to constitute personality can be identified singly or conjointly as 
a soul or self, because like a king it would have control over what 
falls under itS domain, yet there is no such controller of the five 
aggregates. Aggivessana is asked whether he has control over the 
five, whether, say, he can make his form change at will. It is in 
each case made plain that there is no such controller of the five 
aggregates. Perhaps Aggivessana suffers from the 'leading question' 
treatment so often dealt out by Socrates, for the argument seems 
to proceed with the implicit assumption that if there is an ätman 
who controls, then ätman must have 'complete' control --- with no 
consideration to the possibility that a limited degree of control 
might be the most that ätman could muster. 
Another sutta which takes a strong line against the idea of 
8 
ätman is the Sabbasutta of the Sarpyutta Nikäya" In delimiting 
what counts as 'everything' viz. , the five senses plus the mind 
and the objects of each, no room is left for the existence of soul. 
How, then, is rebirth thought to occur? 
The rebirth process (puna} hava, re-becoming) is said to occur 
according to a person's past actions (kamma). It is thought to be 
0%1 
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checkable that this is so by developing abhinna, the psychic powers, 
and in some sense 'seeing' that it is so. The rebirth process is 
distinguished from the Hindu transmigration, and here I use these 
terms to mark the distinction between the sorts of view which hold 
that a permanent soul (ätman, whether taken as entirely non- 
physical, partly physical, or unknowable) transmigrates, and the 
view which holds that a stream of consciousness survives death in 
the case of an unliberated being and is reborn. 
Prima facie there may seem to be a problem in reconciling 
the anätta or non-substantiality view with rebirth. It might be 
thought that a soul is logically required in order that moral res- 
ponsibility ac ros st ves-6eintelligible in early Buddhism. If it is not 
the same soul substance across lives at Tl and T2, then in what 
way is one justified in regarding the consciousness at T2 as that 
of the same person? And if it is not the same person, then what 
sense does it make to ascribe moral responsibility for actions per- 
formed by another ? 
As is sometimes the case in philosophy, the problem is with 
the question itself rather than, with there being no answer. It would 
be a mistake to suggest, as the question does, that one needs to 
believe in the existence of soul in order to justifiably hold a person 
responsible for his actions. In a court of law, e. g. , it would be 
regarded as a peculiar and inadmissäble argument to say that a 
thief is really not responsible for his crime done last year on the 
grounds that there is no soul substance making him the same 
person now as then. (If it could be shown that he was a schizo- 
phrenic, say, this would be determined on the basis of behavioral 
evidence and not on debate about 'soul substance'. ) 
With this as background, some important philosophical ques- 
tions can be raised: (i) is rebirth an empirical hypothesis? (ii) If 
so, would evidence for rebirth be also evidence for transmig a- 
04%, 
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tion? (iii) If there is no evidence which would specifically show 
that rebirth (and not transmigration) occurs, is there at least 
evidence which shows that something of the kind occurs: that 
either rebirth or transmigration holds? (iv) Does early Buddhism 
provide any way of reidentifying a person in a subsequent life? 
Beginning with the last question first, the others will be examined 
in Ch. 5, I. 
As De Silva notes in Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, there 
are three analogies used in early Buddhism to present the idea of 
continuity in the rebirth process: 
9 
The mind is a dynamic continuum which is described by the 
Buddha by means of a number of analogies. Sometimes, it is 
compared to a flame, whose existence depends upon a number 
of factors: i. e. the wick, oil, etc. - sometimes it-is com- 
pared to a stream (sota) , and again to the movements of a 
monkey jumping from branch to branch, letting go of one 
branch only after it clings to another, etc. , are used. 
Although it is questionable whether the idea of a 'continuum' 
adequately describes cyclic sarisära, a very important point is 
made in emphasizing the uninterrupted nature of the continuity, 
that e. g. on the monkey analogy, the monkey does not let go of 
one branch until he grasps another. As Kalupahana points out, 
there is no theory of antarýibhäva or intermediate existence in 
early Buddhism, this being a later development. 
10 
Scholars disagree about whether there is a belief in disem- 
bodied consciousness in early Buddhism. Jayatilleke thinks that 
there is a notion of disembodied consciousness at work, as is 
evident in his taking nämarüpa (lit. , name-form) to be a psycho- 
physical unity composed of sperm, ovum, and 'discarnate spirit' 
(gandhabba) or what is called the re-linking consciousness (pati- 
sandhi-vinnä pa) . 
I1l On the other hand Kalupahana regards it as 
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'quite incorrect to postulate a mind-made body existing after 
death, independent of the material body, until it gains a foothold 
12 
on a new body in rebirth. ' 
Although these are not the only twentieth-century writers to 
comment on this issue in early Buddhism, their difference here 
is representative of a divergence in interpretation. The relation- 
ship between each general view and each corresponding particular 
For example, either okkarnati interpretation of a text is crucial13 
is translated as 'develop' or as 'descend' in passages where it is 
said that rebirth does not occur unless vinnä a develops in or 
descends into the womb. If 'descend' is favored, then it is accepted 
that early Buddhism has a notion of disembodied consciousness. 
And if 'develop' is favored, then no commitment to a disembodied 
consciousness view is made for early Buddhism. 
In the sutta where Säti is chided for holding' that consciousness 
fares on, what is rejected is the idea that this same consciousness, 
not another, continues, suggesting that Sati took vinnäna as atmari4 
Thus it is not that the sutta rejects the continuance of a psychic 
element as such, but that it * re ject s ätmaväda. Consequently an 
appeal to this sutta will not eliminate the question of what the 
rebirth link is, as a basis for the ascription of moral responsibility. 
Whatever the words of the Buddha in fact were, and whatever his 
disciples and hearers thought he meant concerning rebirth, it is 
not an historical point but a logical one -- and one which any account 
of early Buddhist thought must face -- that the ascription of moral 
responsibility here requires the supposition of a rebirth link, re- 
gardless of whether an account of it is given in the texts. 
There are three main sources of a reluctance to admit the 
supposition of a transfer of a psychic element in rebirth which have 
their root in early. Buddhism. There may be others, but these 
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seem to be the main ones; at this point considerations cri the intel- 
ligibility of such talk are not presented. First, there is a misin- 
terpretation of the dialogue with Säti, which arises by not noticing 
that the view rejected is that the same consciousness continues. 
15 
In effect this sutta is a rejection of soul theory and not of the pos- 
sibility that vinriäna might provide a rebirth link. Secondly, there 
is an often-cited text which reports that the Buddha refused to 
answer the question as to whether the soul (and here the word used 
is jiva is identical with the body or is different from the body, and 
this might seem evidence that he held no view of disembodied con- 
sciousness. 
6 
But because the point of his refusal may have been 
to show the irrelevance of 'wordy warfare' to the path, because the 
word jiva is used by the Jainas sect, and because no argument from 
silence can establish what the Buddha did or did not believe, the 
text yields no firm basis for the view that early Buddhism denied 
the disembodied consciousness view. And the continuity required 
in early Buddhism is neither that of the permanent ätman, nor that 
involving an intermediate state (antaräbhava) wherein a psychic 
component exists without any physical basis. Thirdly, there is the 
apparent difficulty of accounting for contiguity as a characteristic 
of the causal relation if the supposition of disembodied conscious- 
ness is made. Kalupahana and Koyu write: 
17 
According to early Buddhist philosophy life is a stream (sota , 
an unbroken (abbhocchinna) succession (pa ipäti of aggregates 
(khandha). There cannot be any temporal or spatial break or 
pause in this life continuity (bhava-santati), for the affirmation 
of it would be to deny the validity of the relations of contiguity 
(samanantara - and anantara-paccaya) of the doctrine of rela- 
tions (paccaya) which is the cornerstone of Buddhist philosophy. 
The difficulty thus arising from the concept of gandhabba 
" could be overcome and the problem of rebirth could be ex- 
plained quite consistently with the philosophy of life as given 
above, only if gandhabba is taken to mean the death-conscious - 
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ness ( cuticitta) of the dying person. Then gandhabba would 
serve as the object of rebirth consciousness (patisandhicitta) 
so that the character of the new-born child would be deter- 
mined or influenced by the consciousness of the dying person. 
Thus is the continuity of life set up without a break until the 
attainment of Parinibbä. na. 
About the reluctance to countenance disembodied consciousness 
as an early Buddhist view which this passage engenders, three 
points need to be made. First, there is no reference given here 
or elsewhere in Kalupahana'. s Causality to show that the Pali terms 
for contiguity are used in early Buddhism. 
18 
In fact, one finds, both 
in this article and in the book just mentioned, that this is a Sarvästi- 
" vädin position. Hence there is no probldm of reconciling it with 
the early Buddhist concept of gandhabba. Secondly., the- idea of 
'death-consciousness' ( eciticitta) is also a Sarvästivädin one, and 
is likewise a later addition. Thirdly, just how the 'character of 
the new-born child would be determined or influenced by the con- 
sciousness of the dying person' at all, but especially without the 
supposition of disembodied consciousness, is unclear. 
So the sources of reluctance to admit the possibility of there 
being a view of disembodied consciousness in early Buddhism are 
not insurmountable. Since both the permanent ätman and the free- 
floating antaräbhava without physical basis are not in the early 
Buddhist picture, the view suggested (but not stated as a theory) 
seems to be one of psychic parallelism in some passages at least. 
For instance, it is said that if the human eye is destroyed, the 
divine eye (dibbacakkhu) is destroyed also. 
Some translations may mislead the casual reader into thinking 
that there is a technical term for the rebirth link, for instance, 
'the cord of rebirth'. 
19 
It would be easy to be misled by this into 
thinking that there is an early Buddhist term for 'cord' which 
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designates the rebirth linking process. 
19 
In all fairness it should 
be said that this translation. does somewhat convey the sense of 
bhavanetti (lit. 
, 'leading to becoming'). Yet there is no term in the 
text here which means 'cord', and without checking it might go un- 
noticed that the basis for the introduction of the word lies elsewhere 
in a commentary. 
The problem of of whether and how the re identification of 
persons across lives can occur remains ((iv), p. 117). Are there 
any criteria for such reidentification ? 
Before addressing the question it is worthwhile to emphasize 
that a followe r' of the Buddhist path would not ordinarily be con- 
erned with such theoretical niceties. Although early Buddhism does 
not appeal to faith as a justification for doctrines, the path-foilower 
would say that such speculation on things unrelated to the elimination 
of craving (taihä), and the destruction of räga, dosa, and moha or 
passion, hatred, and confusion, is counter-productive. The decis- 
ion not to pursue certain questions is not tantamount to faith as a 
positive virtue in the way that Christians, e. g. , sometimes hold it, 
but the net result of staying 'within the fold', on the one hand, or 
'on the path', on the other, is of the same sort. The anti-specula- 
tion of the Buddha is to a religious purpose, not to a positivistic 
philosophical one. 
Padmasiri DeSilva cites Strawson on reidentification in 
20 
saying: 
Attempts have been made to present logically adequate crit- 
eria for re-identifying persons in terms of consciousness, 
memory, and body. Strawson's position on this is very 
instructive: persons are distinct from material bodies, though 
this does not imply that they are therefore immaterial bodies. 
A person has states of consciousness as well as physical 
attributes and it is not merely to be identified with one or the 
other. This concept of the human person as a psycho-physical 
being fits in well with the Buddhist analysis. 
I& 
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To an extent it does fit , since in the five aggregate schema 
of analyzing personality, one finds neither a physcial reduction- 
ism of person to matter nor a view of disembodied consciousness 
constituting the person. Form, feeling, sensation, disposition, 
and consciousness are together said to constitute the person, and 
there is no talk of some of these being more basic in the sense of 
being able to exist without the other. So taken in isolation from 
talk about the rebirth process, it might seem obvious that there is 
no possibility of disembodied consciousness in early Buddhism. 
But the situation is not so simple. 
And it is not clear that Strawson's view provides any solution 
to the problem of reidentification of the person as far as early 
Buddhism is concerned, for he takes bodies as 'basic particulars' 
and observes: 
21 
These considerations taken together suggest that, if material 
bodies are basic from the point of view of referential identif- 
ication, they must also be basic. from the point of view of re- 
identification. That is to say, the reidentification criteria for 
material bodies should not be found to turn on the identities of 
other particulars except Such as themselves are or have mat- 
erial bodies, whereas the reidentification criteria for particu- 
lars of other categories should be found to turn in part on the 
identity of material bodies. This expectation is amply fulfilled. 
If, for example, we take any familiar process-name, such as 
'thaw' or 'battle', we shall find it impossible to give a detailed 
account of identifying a particular process of the kind concerned 
as the same again, which do not involve any reference to some 
material bodies or other ... 
A monk may claim to remember 'his divers former habitations' 
or those of others, 
22 
but whenever he compares a meditational 
image " seen at T1 to a body seen at T2, or compares a meditational 
image seen at T1 to a meditational image seen at T2, or a body at 
T1 to an image at T2, Strawson's view of reidentification will not 
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rescue the monks's claim to be seeing the same person. For on 
his view material bodies are basic from the points of view of both 
identification and reidentification, and in all three cases just men- 
tioned the criteria fail to apply. In the first sort of case what is 
identified initially is not a body and hence it cannot be re -identified 
by an image. In the second sort of case a body is neither identified 
nor reidentified. And in the third sort of case no bodily reidentif- 
ication takes place at T2. Seeing a body at T1 and a body at T2 is 
not in question, for it is meditational vision rather than ordinary 
vision which is supposed operative. Therefore, since these cases 
are exhaustive, it follows that Strawson's criteria are not instruc- 
tive, contrary to De Silva's suggestion, as supporting the monk's 
claim to be seeing the same person. 
Strawson and Pene{}rn are both willing to give 'disembodied 
consciousness' just enough rope to show that there is nothing which 
can be hanged. Strawson does it by specifying the conditions (no 
perceptions of a body of one's own; no power to cause physical 
change) in such a way that the possibility of continuing self-aware- 
ness of one's self as an individual hinges on thinking of one's self 
as a former person, so that otr might have only a vicarious interest 
23 
in human affairs. Consequently: 
In proportion as the memories fade, and this vicarious living 
palls, to that degree his concept of himself as an individual 
becomes attenuated. At the limit of attenuation there is,. from 
the point of view of his survival as an individual, no difference 
between the continuance of experience and its cessation. 
This criticism, while perhaps a healthy antidote against 'spiritual- 
ist' views of the afterlife, does not touch rebirth or reincarnation, 
however, on which views the rarefied atmosphere of only thinking 




Penelhum argues that although one can understand suggestions 
like 'Ruth is Bridey' in certain contexts, this amounts to : nothing 
solar as the disembodied consciousness thesis is concerned, be- 
cause: 'to say that Ruth is Bridey is not to say that Ruth-Bridey 
continues in between, and it gives that suggestion no sense of its 
own. ' 
24 
Memory, he argues, is not an infallible criterion of per- 
sonal identity, but one parasitic upon the body criterion. Thus, 
the notion of disembodied consciousness is considered unintelligible. 
The force of Penelhum's'conclusion that the notion of dis- 
embodied consciousness is unintelligible depends on the assumption 
that the body criteri on is basic to reidentifying a person. In any 
dialogue with a Buddhist, though, this assumption would be question- 
begging, since it is fundamentally what is in question. Thus, the 
issue becomes one of whether or not the Buddhist can give any 
critleria for reidentifying a person which are feasible. 
This problem is related to the problem about whether and how 
a rebirth link may be found in early Buddhism. 0. H. de A. 
Wijesekera, for example, argues that Amarakosa's gloss on 
gandharva (Pali: gandhabba) as antaräbhava (intermediate exis- 
tense) gives an accurate understanding of the early scholastic 
interpretation, if not of the early Buddhist one. Amarakosa,, he 
25 
argues, 'must have naturally been conversant with the traditional 
exegesis of the term, at least in the early Buddhist schools'. Yet 
as Kalupahana mentions, antaräbhava is not itself an early Buddhist 
term. 
In focusing on Jayatilleke's phrase 'continuity without identity' 
some distinction between 'exact identity' and 'sameness' is re- 
quired. For it is a necessary condition for ascribing moral respon- 
sibility for action x done by P1 at T1 to P2 at T2, that P1 be the 
a 
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same person as P2. P1 may not be exactly identical to P2 but 
must be the same person if moral responsibility is to be ascribed. 
Barring odd cases like multiple personality, Pl and P2 are clearly 
the same, and are judged so on criteria such as bodily continuity 
and/or memory. But if the task of reidentification is supposed to 
span various lives, then: 1) the bodily continuity criterion fails 
to apply; 2) memory, for all but an exceptional minority at the 
very least, does not even seem to indicate a history of previous 
live s. 
But could there be, from a rather cel tist epistemological 
stance, a view of the meditating adept who can verify previous 
lives of himself and others by making use of the reidentifying 
criterion of memory? Such a vi -ýw is congruent with the Buddhist 
empiricism thesis to be examined shortly. At this stage I shall 
just comment on the philosophical worth of this stance, leaving 
aside the question of whether the early position takes this stance. 
My claim is that this stance is not consistent with the early Bud- 
dhist view of the world and time, so that if it were taken in fact, 
this would be a mistake. For there is a view of time and world on 
which these extend into an infinite cyclical past with no beginning. 
And unless there were a view'to the effect that the universe came 
into being at a particular time, there would be an infinite regress 
of lives such that all the data would never be in as to whether the 
law of kamma applied in all cases and all the time. It might apply 
to some individuals and not to others; it might apply to a given 
individual through several lives but not very far back, and these 
possibilities cannot logically be excluded unless all the dataar'r in. 
Since this is impossible here, the most the data could generate 
taken as empirical evidence would be a weakly quantified law and 
not the certainty of a world view about ethics and action. And the 
ýy 
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early Buddhist position does not present a weakly quantified law, 
but a view of what inevitably happens given the conditions (of 
craving or tai hä). 
Thus far it has been shown that Strawson's view of reidentif- 
ication as requiring reference to body will not rescue the monk's 
meditation -based claim to be seeing the same person, contra 
De Silva. Thus in answering (iv) -- the question of whether early 
Buddhism provides any way of reidentification -- it will not do to 
accept DeSilva's view that Strawson's position on 'logically adequate 
criteria for re-identifying persons' is 'very instructive' for early 
Buddhism (pp. 117 and 121 herein). Care must be taken to distin- 
guish the issue of what the person is from that of what criteria 
can reidentify the person, and DeSilva does not do so in the passage 
quoted in which the appeal to Strawson's position is made. 
Next I want to take up the question of whether the body c rite r 
ion must be accepted for reidentification so that consequently it 
would not be logically possible to supply a mode of reidentification 
which would work in early Buddhism. Is $trawson's body criter- 
ion to be accepted? 
The issue of conceivability of an afterlife is separate from the 
issue of whether it is (in some sense, and this is problematic) 
factually the case that there is an afterlife. If one uses the term 
'reincarnation' as a generic term to cover both Hindu transmigra- 
tion and Buddhist rebirth, one can say that to believe in reincarna- 
tion is to take a stand on the second sort of issue. And about such 
a belief that something continues which spans various lives, it can 
be asked: what criterion or criteria can be used-to reidentify 
a person in a different life? Discussion of this issue below shows, 
I think, that the crucial is s sue is not this one but whether there are 




A criterion is distinct from a condition. A criterion is the 
sign one uses or the evidence produced for making a deter- 
mination. Unlike a criterion, a condition gives part (at least) of 
the meaning of a term, and the set of all necessary and sufficient 
conditions comprises the meaning of a term. What it means to be 
Lord Mayor of London, for example, requires a whole list of con- 
ditions, whereas a criterion would not give all that is required for 
meaning. 4 
Memory, for example, might be thought to give a criterion 
for personal identity, but as a criterion it would not give the mean- 
ing of personal identity. In the section entitled 'Personal Identity' 
in t: 1e Essay , Locke maintains that memory is both a criterion and 
a condition. There are problems here, as Flew points out in 'Locke 
on Personal Identity', given this schema: 
JJJ 
sss 
T1 T2 T3 
For if what it means to say that Js at T2 is the same as Js at Tl 
is that Js at T2 remembers himself as Js at Tl, then meaning is 
dependent on the frailties of human memory. This obviously will 
not do, and needs to be reformulated as: Js at T2 is at least in 
principle capable of remembering. In. the reformulation, however, 
one has only a condition for meaningful use of the term 'person'. 
Bernard Williams tries to rule this reformulation out of court. 
He argues that memory is a necessary, but not a sufficient, con- 
dition, since memory alone will not guarantee a way to identify 
persons in view of the possibility of two who claim to have the same 




a notion of personal identity as we have it, the body criterion is 
required for identification. But how different would things have 
to be for us such that this would not hold? Hick argues that there 
are cases in which we would not deny that X is the same person 
even if X disappeared and then reappeared. If this is right (and 
it seems to me so), then he has shown that the body criterion advo- 
cated by Strawson and by Williams need not apply in all contexts. 
It also follows that Penelhum's conclusion that disembodied con- 
sciousness is unintelligible-(p. 124) is undermined, because it 
requires that it is necessarily the case that the body criterion is 
basic to reidentification when that turns out to be a contingent 
matter. 
But if one rejects the body criterion here in addition to mem- 
ory (earlier disposed of on p. 125) as applicable to early Buddhism, 
is one left in a position similar to that of H. D. Lewis in The Self 
and Immortality ? In a review of that work in Mind Stewart R. 
Sutherland notes: 
26 
One possibility which is considered and rejected is that of 
bodily continuity. In his discussion of this Lewis considers 
the case outlined by Bernard Williams, of two of our contem- 
poraries, each claiming to be Guy Fawkes and to have the 
memories appropriate to 'being the continuing self who was Guy 
Fawkes. Lewis deals with this case by asserting that we should 
retain our belief that there can only be one continuing Guy 
Fawkes and that thus in the case of only one of the contenders 
can the 'alleged memories of a life as Guy Fawkes' be genuine 
(p. 103). Granted his rejection of this possibility and the fact 
that he does not believe memory to constitute, or to be a con- 
dition of there being, continuing identity, it is difficult to see 
what other alternative is offered, as an account of the nature 
of continuing personal identity. 
Since Lewis is trying to give a philosophical account, it is fair to 
ask what sort of account he has in mind. But it would be a mis- 
} 
understanding to insist that there is a similar onus on the early 
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Buddhist position, since the latter is not intended t-D provide a 
philosophical account as one possibility among others to be argued 
pro and con as Lewis is. This can be said in view of the type of 
texts being examined (religious ones), but is not a philosophical 
defense. 
A brief summary is in order. My task is not to 'read into' 
early Buddhism things which are incompatible with its doctrines 
and orientation, but rather to distinguish points within the para- 
meters of what is does say, might consistently say, or what one 
might say about it philosophically. I think that it has already been 
shown here that memory will not supply a necessary condition in 
an account of necessary and sufficient conditions for the ascription 
of 'the same person' across lives in early Buddhism. What is in 
question is not whether there is a criterion, for marks or signs 
might be necessary and sufficient and might not. What is in ques- 
tion is whether one can have necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the ascription of sameness. And it is clear that the only other 
candidates, self-awareness or bodily continuity are irrelevant to 
reidentification of a person reborn. Hence it follows that what 
the early Buddhist position does or might consistently offer amounts 
to nought. Now I would like to suggest what might be said about 
this 'nought' from a philosophical point of view. 
One way of distinguishing, in part, knowledge from opinion is 
to insist that a necessary condition of the former but not of the 
latter is that one must be prepared to give 'reasonable grounds' 
for the claim to knowledge. That this distinction is possible is 
sometimes taken as flowing from an analysis of knowledge, accord- 
ing to which the three necessary and sufficient conditions are: 1) 




the belief that p. If andonly if these three conditions are met, 
some (notably Ayer) have argued, is there a legitimate claim to 
knowledge. Each of the three crucial notions in this account 
(i. e. , 'true', 'believes', 'has reasonable grounds') may be subject 
to philosophical scrutiny, but I am not concerned about that here. 
Instead the intent is to call attention to the possibility that knowing 
something on this analysis may be not at all like the early Buddhist 
orientation to rebirth, particularly with respect to the third con- 
dition in the standard analysis. In doing so it is instructive to con- 
sider some of Wittgenstein's criticisms of G. E. Moore when the 
latter claimed to know certain things in 'A Defense of Common 
Sense'. The interesting point is that Moore has confused things 
which figure in the 'background' with things which can legitimately 
be regarded as knowledge claims, and hence it Sc eat' Thaf the 
term 'knowledge' is misapplied by Moore. (Wittgenstein has other 
criticisms of Moore, such as that his use of 'I know' is philosoph- 
ically irrelevant, but I am not concerned to list them all here. ) 
Speaking of Moore's truisms Wittgenstein writes in On Certainty: 
Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction 
that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my 
picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite. 
94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying my- 
self of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied 
of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false. 
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be 
part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules 
of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, 
without learning any explicit rules. 
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form 
of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as 
channels for such empirical propositions as were not harden- 
ed but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that 




97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the 
river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between 
the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of 
the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one 
from the other. 
98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical 
science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same prop- 
osition may get treated at one time as something to test by 
experience, at another time as a rule for testing. 
I want to suggest that rebirth may be viewed as part of the 
'background' against which other beliefs in early Buddhism are 
seen as true by believers. In support of this it can be pointed out 
that 'there is rebirth' does not occur as a claim in any of the stand- 
ard Buddhist schemas such as the four noble truths or the eight- 
fold noble path. (This is not to say that it never occurs as a remin- 
der. One may be reminded that something is part of the background 
when someone expresses doubts, ) Rather, the first claim of the 
four noble truths, 'there is du`kha' presupposes impermanence. 
This impermanence is understood to obtain both on the ordinarily 
observed level as well as on the not ordinarily observed level of 
the cycle of rebirth. Thus, the first noble truth presupposes 
rebirth as a part of the background in early Buddhism. 
Belief in 'reincarnation' (used here as a generic term to in- 
elude both transmigration and rebirth) as a belief in a cyclic flow 
of lives through different states is an abstraction broad enough to 
include both Buddhist and Hindu views of the afterlife. It is inter- 
esting to see how differently the Greeks thought of the consequences 
of one's actions -- that they followed one's children rather than 
one's self in a different life -- but that here too there is a view of 
the human perso'n's responsibility vastly different from the more 




errors or for a future of 'individuals' linked to the person one now 
is. What I am suggesting is that these beliefs need not be seen 
as a peculiar set of empirical propositions on the one hand, or 
disguised tautologies on the other, in order to make sense. Alter- 
natively they may be viewed as part of the 'background' against 
which other beliefs may fit or fail to fit, since the tests are de- 
vised in terms of the background. Treated as part of the background 
a belief is a presupposition rather than an assumption in an argu- 
ment or a rule for calculating. To take one sort of example, the 
base ten arithmetical system is part of the background of many 
people, so that the system is presupposed in making and in check- 
ing calculations. Questions about the comparative usefulness of 
the system itself do not arise in making calculations in everyday 
situations, although. students of theoretical mathematics might raise 
them. If they do, the base ten system is no longer treated as part 
of the background. 
As section 96 quoted above suggests, a belief may be at one 
time treated as part of the background and at a later time be treated 
as an empirical proposition. Questions of truth or falsity do not 
arise insofar as a belief is treated as part of the background. The 
application of this insight for my treatment of rebirth is that 'there 
is rebirth' is, in early Buddhism, part of the background, but 
researchers like Ian Stevenson have taken it (he uses the word 
'reincarnation') to be an empirical theory and try to test it by gath- 
ering data, published in Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation. 
On a strong notion of verifiability, however, which requires that 
the in principle possibility of falsification be allowed by specifying 
conditions for falsification, this study does not show that early 
Buddhist rebirth is a verifiable theory. 
To sum up briefly, the rebirth link in early Buddhism is not 
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denoted by a single term, but this itself is not a problem. The 
fact that what early Buddhism does or might consistently say 
about the problem of reidentification across lives amounts to 
nought is understandable in terms of the. texts treating 'there is 
rebirth' as part of the conceptual background of early Buddhism. 
This does not, however, make it a philosophically justifiable 
view. While treated internally as a background belief 'there is 
rebirth' does not stand in need of justification, viewed externally 
there is no good reason to accept 'there is rebirth', for the con- 
ceptual problem of reidentification of the person across lives is 
insurmountable. 
Nevertheless, since the Buddhist empiricism thesis has been 
very influential in twentieth century Pali scholarship, and since 
there is a claim in early Buddhism to 'know and see' rebirth, it is 
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Chapter 5: Mind and Verification 
The structure of this chapter is, in section I to discuss the 
roles of saddhä ('confidence', 'faith'), in II abhinna ('higher kinds 
of knowledge and psychic powers') and evidence, and in III the 
Buddhist empiricism thesis. It is informed by the conviction that 
the understanding of these topics is interrelated and that this 
sequence facilitates understanding better than, say, reversing 
sections I and II would. For if one begins with a view of early 
Buddhism as epistemological philosophy, then certain uses of 
saddhä may be ignored as anomalous data which do not fit the pre- 
conceived view. In section III some questions posed earlier ((i), 
(ii), and (iii), p. 117) concerning the status of rebirth are consid- 
ered in the light of the results of this chapter. 
I 
In discussing the roles of saddh7a the issues of the relation 
between confidence and learning the doctrine, between confidence 
and practical results, and the interpretation of amülikä saddhä 
and äkäravaf saddhä are crucial. 
To begin with the relation between confidence and learning the 
doctrine, consider MN III, 33 (MLS III, 85): 
When I heard the doctrine I gained faith in the Tathägata 
and MN 11 176 (MLS II 365): 
If faith is born, then he approaches. 
The first might be viewed (mistakenly) as support for the notion 
that saddhä is only consequent to checking. Not only is it confidence 
in the Tathägata (rather than in the doctrine specifically) which 
results, but this quotation is balanced by others like the second 
in which saddhä is prior to investigation. From an epistemological 
perspective, therefore, saddhä sometimes precedes and is not 
oeý 
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always consequent to checking the doctrine. 
It is also illuminating to see saddha from a pragmatic per- 
spective, in terms of whether it follows or precedes practical 
realization on the path. On the one hand, considering learning 
elephant riding and handling the goad (which are compared with 
becoming a Buddhist adept) it is said (MN. II 94, MLS II 281): 
Had he no faith he could not attain whatever is to be won 
by faith. 
In this context saddha is one of the five qualities (panca vasani) 
for making progress on the path, and is prior to achieving results. 
In the same vein is the Samyutta Nikäya passage where develop- 
ment of abhinnä depends on saddh i. 
On the other hand, saddha comes after getting results, after 
hearing the doctrine. 'Be a dTpa (lamp, island) for yourself, ' the 
trainee is urged, and do not accept anything on report, tradition, 
or hearsay, but because you have known and seen it yourself. 
3 
Saddha is one of the five powers which taken together define 
the Arahant when they are fully developed. Having a proper degree 
of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight is to have 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for becoming an Arahant. 
4 
But in addition to this sort of usage of saddha as an indriya (faculty) 
as in the phrase 'the moral sense of faith', it also occurs in ex- 
pressions like 'walking according to faith' and 'living in faith'. 
5 
A very different usage is exemplified in the story of the wander- 
er, Mägandiya, proud of his health, who is told by the Buddha that 
such pride is like being taken in by a confidence man. Being proud 
of one's health is compared to 'confidence in the man with vision' 
(i. e. , the trickster) who offers a greasy, grimy, coarse robe as 
if it were a lovely, unstained, pure, white cloth. 
6 
The word used 
is saddhä, and thus one finds that saddha is not always regarded 
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as a good thing. 
Elsewhere in the Majjhima Nikäya , however, there is a clear 
contrast between: 'a good man has faith' and 'a bad man is lacking 
7 
in faith'. Saddhä is here used with a pro-attitude, as in the five 
qualities usage. There are degrees of saddha, as the difference 
between those 'with only a little faith, with only a little regard' and 
those 'who have gone forth from home into homelessness without 
faith, who are crafty' shows.. The latter is contrasted with the 
phrase, those who have 'gone forth from home into homelessness 
through faith in me'. 
9 
When saddhä is used as a virtue it is linked 
to moral habits involving certain attitudes as in the 'young men of 
family who havefaith and are of great enthusiasm, of great joyous - 
ness and who, having heard this, focus their minds on suchne: -s. ' 
10 
That moral habit is seen as an important way of developing saddha 
as a virtue is clear in the emphasis given to family backgroiInd, 'he 
who comes from a family that has no faith' being at an initial, though 
11 
not necessarily final, disadvantage. 
The 'object' or focus of saddhä may be the Buddha, the doctrine, 
or the Crder of monks. Sometimes these are mentioned singly, and 
sometimes in combination, although there is no one of them which 
is always present in descriptions of the object of faith. 
12 
There is no evidence of a division among the uses of saddhä 
such that confidence in the doctrine is a primary use and the others 
of lesser importance. For there are affective rather than cognitive 
uses like 'if faith is born, then he approaches' in order to hear the 
doctrine. Although it would be a mistake to over-emphasize a 
single strand of the complex concept as more important than all 
others, there are some passages which suggest the over-riding 
importance of saddhä in the Tathägata , for example: 
13 
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If he has enough faith in the Tathagata, enough regard, then he 
will have these things, that is to say the faculty of faith, the 
faculty of energy, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of 
concentration, the faculty of wisdom. This, monks, is called 
the person who is striving after faith. 
If it is correct to assume that the second occurrence of saddhä here, 
as in 'the faculty of faith', refers to doctrine, then one consequence 
of sufficient faith in the Tathä. gata is faith in the doctrine. Taken 
in this way, the passage depicts the former as the source or pre- 
condition of the latter. I mention this passage not to argue for one 
usage of saddhä as primary in general, but to offset the undue 
weight given to äkaravati saddhä (Jayatilleke: 'rational faith') . 
14 
Jayatilleke calls attention to a distinction presented in the 
Majjhirrna Nikaya between confidence based on checking some points 
of the doctrine by acquiring 'knowledge and vision' (which is called 
'rational faith', MN I 320), and the 'baseless faith' (am-ulikä saddhä) 
which the brahmins are said to have had toward the Vedas. Now 
it is important that he calls attention to this distinction, and although 
he shows awareness that there are many strands to the concept of 
saddhä, yet in his attempt to give an account of the concept, a re- 
ductionistic account in terms of propositional belief emerges accord- 
ing to which all uses telescope into the cognitive strand. 
15 
(659) The object of saddhä in the Nikäyas is most frequently 
the Buddha. The favourite phrase is 'having heard his doctrine 
he acquired faith in the Tathägata' (tam dhammam sutvä Tath- 
ägate saddham patilabhati, M. I. 179,267,344; M. III. 33). 
S If saddhä means 'belief', 'acquiring faith in the Buddha' is equi- 
valent to saying 'believing in the Buddha' and what is meant by 
believing in the Buddha is that one believes that what the Buddha 
says is true. As Woozley points out, 'certainly we do talk of 
believing in a person but there we mean that we believe that 
what he says is true. ' The verb, pasidati, 'to have faith in, 
appreciate' also has the person of the Buddha as the object (e. g. 
Sa tthari pasidim, M. I. 320) but pasäda - in the compound 
aveccappasäda - (v. supra, 655) frequently has the Buddha, 
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his teaching (Dhamma) and his Order (Sangha) as the objects. 
Here 'faith' or belief in the Dhamma means the statements 
that constitute the Dhamma or the teachings of the Buddha. 
Likewise, believing in the Sangha implies believing in the 
truth of the utterances of the Sangha; since these were more 
or less derived from the Buddha, it again ultimately implies 
a belief in the statements of the Buddha. 
The third sentence above in particular states that believing in 
the Buddha and believing that what the Buddha says is true are 
equivalent. What Jayatilleke is doing here is giving an account of 
saddhä. such that all its uses are parast)ira1 upon its cognitive use. 
There are two major difficulties with this attempt. First, it is 
mistaken to suppose (with Woozley) that believing in a person is 
tantamount to believing that what he says is true. For as Mitchell's 
parable of the Stranger shows, belief in a person sometimes occurs 
even where it is recognized that the person says things that are 
false. Secondly, even if this supposition of equivalence were phil- 
osophically defensible, it would not be factually correct to think 
that in early Buddhism the cognitive sense of saddh7a is primary or 
fundamental. For prior to knowing the doctrine saddha is sometimes 
important, as in 'if faith is born, then he approaches' and 'had he 
no faith he could not attain whatever is to be won by faith'. There 
is thus an affective element in saddhä , which is ignored if one treats 
believing in the Buddha as equivalent to believing that what he says 
is true. 
Unfortunately Jayatilleke's atte:, dance at some of Wittgenstein's 
lectures does not help him to avoid the 'craving for generality' that 
underlies his search for a basic, general meaning of saddh5. as cog- 
nitive. Seeing the futility of this search has implications for the 
Buddhist empiricism thesis to be discussed in III, and facilitates a 




In 'St. Paul's Damascus Experience' Stewart Sutherland 
drives a kind of Humean line against interpreting unusual expe r- 
iences as evidence for religious belief. He argues for the view 
16 
that 
Initially and fundamentally a religious experience is charac- 
terized as such in the light of the role which it plays in the 
life of the individual in question, rather than in the light of 
any unusual perceptions, 'or celestial fireworks display which 
may accompany that experience. 
The conclusion results from a consideration of two possibilities 
regarding religious experience, and in particular, St. Paul's 
Damascus road experience, as to whether or not there being diver- 
gent accounts of such an experience matters for understanding 
religious belief. A skeletal paraphrase of the argument might be 
that, where p means 'God spoke to Saul', there are three possib- 
ilities: p is denied, p is taken as equivocally true, and p is taken 
as univocally true. All of these responses take it as obvious that 
divergent accounts of the experience matter, but Sutherland argues 
17 
that certain common features of these responses imply 
a view of faith in which the role given to religious experience 
is that of justifying or providing grounds for belief. The auth- 
enticity or credibility of faith then rests upon the validity of 
the claim to have had authoritative or credible religious 
experience. 
And this, the argument continues, results in a cleavage between 
religious life and belief on the one hand, and a somehow isolated 
religious experience on the other. Thus, since the hypothesis that 
divergent accounts of religious experience matter for understanding 
religious belief has led to this absurdity, Sutherland examines the 
alternative concerning St. Paul, favoring the view 'that the discrep- 
a 
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ancies in the three accounts of St. Paul's experience are not sig- 
18 
nificant. ' 
Sutherland's movement from a Christo-centric consideration 
of religious experience on the road to Damascus to 'general 
conclusions' about 'our understanding of the nature of religious 
experience' may be questioned by those who are not convinced by 
the force of a single example, however central that example may 
be to Christianity. 
19 In what follows I propose to examine religious 
experience under the bodhi, tree on the bank of the river Neranjarä 
in order to see if corroboration of the general conclusion is avail- 
able in Buddhism. 
As far as 'celestial fireworks' and the like are concerned the 
Buddha is depicted as warning against using magical tricks in order 
to gain converts. And, as Jayatilleke cleverly puts it, 
20 
he speaks of the dangers of performing wonders and of thought 
reading in public, while speaking in praise of 'the miracle of 
instruction' (anusäsanipät. I häriyam, D. I. 214), which in fact 
was instruction without a miracle. 
Further, that enlightenment in early Buddhism is not just a momen- 
tary psychological state of a' trivial sort but one which is explained 
by reference to beliefs is evident from the Udäna passage allegedly 
uttered just after Buddha's enlightenment: 
21 
When, indeed, things appear 
To the brahman in deep reflection, 
All his doubts disappear 
As he under stands their causal nature. 
Two points of agreement between the Damascus road and the 
Neranjarä river experiences emerge: first, the experiences are 
not just titilations of individual awareness in a dramatic way, but 
involve a change in beliefs. Secondly, this change in beliefs is 
marked by actions which show conviction that the path is right. 
i 
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The first point, change in beliefs, might be considered the 
religious analogue to paradigm shift in science. Basil Mitchell 
22 
remarks: 
when a choice has to be made between high-level scientific 
theories or paradigms, the choice cannot be determined 
wholly by observation or by strict rules of logic; for both 
the rival paradigms are logically in order and both have 
access to the same observations and can give an account of 
them. 
Historically viewed early Buddhism emerges out of a context in 
which the Buddha had utilized Hindu meditation techniques common 
at the time. Yet it is also said that the Buddha did not rest content 
with the teachings of his mentors, ; Klara Kälama and Uddaka Rama- 
23 
putta. As an important addition to their views he added the sixth 
abhinna: knowledge of the destruction of defilements (-asavas) which 
keep one within the cycle of birth and death. 
Of the Hindu sages who meditated, some claimed that the ätman 
is perceivable. While one strand of Upanisadic talk about atman re- 
p0 
gards it as perceivable, another regards it as unknowable. It is a 
curious fact that in the early dialogues Buddha never encounters 
anyone who actually claims to have seen the ätman. It is specula- 
tive as to whether this is due more to careful editing by the Bud- 
dhists who compiled t Pali Canon or to the availability of a medita- 
tor willing to make such a bold claim. There is a conceptual 
difficulty with what an experience would be like so as to guarantee 
that the attribute of permanence applies to a soul substance alleged- 
ly known through introspection. And according to the Buddhist 
paradigm it is clear that there is no room for ätman. 
It is well-known that the Buddha rejected both the eternalist and 
annihilationist views. The rejection of the former is a rejection of 
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ä. tmaväda, soul theory, in any formulation -- particularly the con- 
cept of a permanent thing which it involves. This does not of 
course rule out the stream of consciousness view of rebirth, for 
the stream is, like everything else in the world, viewed as imper- 
manent. The rejection of annihilationism is, I submit, a rejection 
of Cä rvä. ka ('materialism') in its denial of kamma (action) having 
an effect is another life (whether understood in Hindu or in Buddhist 
terms of continuity). If my suggestion is correct, then it is a mis- 
take to think that the Buddha's rejection of annihilationism is a re- 
jection of the idea that 'final enlightenment' (parinibbana) is extinc- 
tion. But this way of putting the matter leaves open the problem 
of interpreting 'the deathless' (amata) as an attribute of enlighten- 
ment, a problem which ;_ 'shall take up in Ch. 6. 
As there are different points of view from which Buddhism 
may be described, there are accordingly different doctrines which 
may appear as central. I do not want to make any claim about 
what the 'central philosophy' of Buddhism is, but to say that to 
take two examples, causality and rebirth, either can show that the 
early Buddhist position is different from pre-existing tradition. 
Clearly the early Buddhist view of rebirth is distinctive. E. J. 
Thomas, however, comes all too close to stating that the Buddha 
says only what the Hindus had been saying all along about rebirth 
and karma , when he claims that Buddhism 'inherited' these views24 
At as$ idently lofty level of generality, of course, one might claim 
that Buddhist and Hindu views are 'the same' in holding that 'we will 
live on, unless liberated', but this move is useless for understand- 
ing the distinctive contributions of each. 
I would like now to return and develop the second point of 
agreement between Damascus road and Neranjarä, bank, that is, 
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that the change in beliefs precedes a change of life. On Sutherland's 
25 
view of the Damascus road experience 
to understand the significance of that experience -- what makes 
it religious -- is to grasp the role which it plays in the life of 
the believer. The experience modifies how he sees his life, 
how he behaves, and so on, and in parallel fashion the way in 
which he sees the experience in question may alter in the light 
of his developing biography. The attempt to understand a par- 
ticular experience in the absence of at least some access to the 
subsequent biography is doomed to produce a distorted picture. 
It would be tempting to say that Buddha and St. Paul are not on 
a parity in the way the Buddha and Christ are with respect to carry- 
ing out vs. inventing the path. But it must be remembered that, 
simplistic textbooks and bhakti cult deviations aside, 
26 
the Buddha 
Gotama is not regarded as the Founder of Buddhism -- only as a 
pathfinder in this eon. The belief is that there were previous 
Buddhas, and that more are to come. Since the dhamma is eternal, 
it is only from a very much more restricted time-span than is 
operative in early Buddhism, that Gotama is the Founder. Histor- 
ically viewed against the backdrop of Hindu culture, Buddhism 
appears as a new religion, and yet the lineage claimed goes beyond 
recorded history. Therefore it cannot be accurately maintained 
that whereas Buddha invented a path, Paul was converted to an 
already existing one, as a basis for excluding their comparison. 
In both the careers of Buddha and St. Paul after their most 
important religious experiences, a conviction which changes their 
lives is apparent in each case. Buddha claims an insight into 
things as they really are ( aý thä bhütarp) and Paul insists that his 
doctrine is revealed and is no mere human invention. I do not 
think that religious experience necessarily results in a change of 
life. It might be impossible to tell what would have : resulted if 
N 
there were no religious experience, in which case one cannot 
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attribute the change specifically to the religious experience. Also, 
having a religious experience might result in a confirmation of 
existing behavior patterns rather than a change in them, in cases 
where the patterns were already close to a religious ideal. 
But even in the case of religious experience functioning to 
confirm, rather than to change, behavior patterns, having the 
experience matters in the person's life. It matters even if one does 
not know what would have happened without it, since the individual 
takes it as revelatory of reality itself. Sartre has said that there 
are no omens, or, if there are, it is we as individuals who choose 
27 
what they must mean. What Sartre's point reminds us is that no 
religious person may deny responsibility for his choosing a path on 
the grounds that the truth appeared to him in a flash. Even though 
Buddha and St. Paul claim that their experiences inevitably and 
certainly must be interpreted as they do, their holding this does not 
make the experience objective in the sense that a tape-recorder 
and television would report the event in the same way they interpret 
it. In contrast to mechanical reports, reports of religious exper- 
ience are obviously the expression of human experiences which 
matter in life. 
Next I would like to discuss the relationship between rationality 
and following rules on the one hand, and between checking points of 
doctrine and 'rational faith' on the other. It is tempting to think 
that saddhä in early Buddhism must, as an a priori point, conform 
to a 'consequent to checking' pattern if it is to be 'rational', in 
line with the Buddhist empiricism thesis also emphasized by Jaya- 
tilleke. The conclusion would then be irresistable that since it 
does not always so conform (as section I shcwy,, it is not always 
'rational'. But since rationality is not always a matter of following 
pre-conceived rules, as Mitchell points out, there is no need for 
I 
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a set of rules with which to check points of doctrine in order fof 
saddhä to be rational. 
28 Consequently it does not follow that those 
instances which do not conform to the 'consequent to checking' 
pattern are less than rational. A corollary of this view is that 
there is no primary occurrence (vs. secondary) which is taken to 
be the more rational type of occurrence. 
Now the time is right to introduce the topic of abhinna and 
evidence. A crucial difference between the ancient Cärväka and 
Buddhists is expressed by Jayatilleke thus: 
29 
(285) The Materialist condemnation of the Vedic tradition, as 
we have shown above, was absolute. According to them the 
authors of the Vedas were both utterly ignorant as well as 
vicious; they are called 'buffoons, knaves and demons' (v. supra, 
121) but the Buddhists held that the original seers who were the 
authors of the Vedas merely lacked a special insight (abhinna) 
but did not doubt their honesty or virtue... . 
Here the importance of the abhinnä to early Buddhism is evi- 
dent. Its relevance . to an issue of major philosophical significance, 
that of the nature of religious belief, becomes clear when seen as a 
key concept in all those studies which favor seeing early Buddhism 
as a form of empiricism. According to this view abhinnä supply 
the evidence on the basis of which points of doctrine can be con- 
firmed. Part of the initial plausibility of this view derives from 
the lack of a detailed examination of saddhä and the consequent 
failure to notice that saddha is not always consequent to checking. 
But the view of early Buddhism as grounded on evidence provided 
by those who take the time and effort to master abhinnä is a very 
important one in that it raises the question of whether religious 
belief can rise or fall with the evidence. Colin Lyas thinks that, 
as far as Christian belief is concerned, it could not, and holds 
30 
- iS position 
if true to entail certain ways of establishing beliefs are suspect 
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when applied to the case of religious belief in God. That is 
why I say that as we use the term religion, a religious belief 
in God could not rise or fall with the evidence. I feel that 
the only way to undermine that entailment is to show that what 
I have said about religion is not true. 
Earlier in the same symposium Norman Malcolm says that 
religious belief waxes and wanes, but not with the evidence. On 
this point he and Lyas are agreed. Could early Buddhism rightly 
be considered an example of a religion which does 'undermine that 
entailment' in providing an example of a religious position on 
which belief is regarded as appropriate only insofar as it is sup- 
ported by evidence? The following examination of abhinnä will be 
helpful in answering this question. 
31 
In early Buddhism the abhinnä are: 
1. iddhividha (psychokinesis) 
2. dibbasota (clairaudience) 
3. cetopariya`i W- a 3. (telepathy) 
4. pubbenivasamussatinäna (retrocognition) 
5. dibbacakkhu (clairvoyance) 
6. ä savakkhayanärla (knowledge of the destruction of 
defilements or äsavas 
Concerning these Jayatilleke says 
32 
Of the six only three are necessary for the saving knowledge. 
The first is retrocognition with which he verifies the fact of 
pre-existence (v. supra, 754). The second is clairvoyance, 
with which he verifies the fact of karma (v. supra, 755). The 
third is the 'knowledge of the destruction of the defiling irr- 
pulses' (äsavänarpkhayananäij. a, M. I. 348). With this he 
verifies the Four Noble truths (loc. cit. ). 
Hence the importance of becoming a 'three-fold knowledge' tisso 
vijjä) adept. Not everyone who tries can attain this easily, and 
one passage mentions that only 60 were successful out of a group 
of 500.33 As to why some monks can attain the 'three-fold know- 
ledge' and are consequently 'freed by mind' (cetovirnutti), while 
others cannot but instead are 'freed by insight (or wisdom' 
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(pannavimiitti) the answer is given that this is due to a difference 
in their abilities (indriyavernattatarc). -34 For the one freed by 
pann 
35 a JayatilJ. eke observes: 
The doctrine of rebirth and karma and the greater part of 
the theory of Buddhism would have had to be accepted on 
faith by such a person since he did not have within him or 
develop the power of verifying them. This explains the 
conception of the saint with faith (saddhä) in the Pali Canon... 
It is still open to the advocate of'Buddhist empiricism' to argue 
that in principle , even though not always in practice, kamma and 
punabhhava are verifiable. 
Rather than raise conceptual and empirical difficulties at the 
outset about any of the abhinnä in particular, it is assumed for the 
sake of argument that these terms have some meaning in order to 
go on to raise the question of what verification is supposed to be 
here. At Digha Nikaya 1 81 a passage cited by Jayatilleke runs36 
I was in such a place with such a personal and family name, 
such a status, having such and such food, such and such 
experiences and such a term of life. Dying there I was born 
in such and such a place; there too I had s, -ich a name.. . 
Dying there I was born here. 
This is compared to someone visiting various villages recalling 
details of the journey. It also shows a point not emphasized by 
Jayatilleke, that retrocognition here concerns one's own case in 
contrast to clairvoyance which, he continues 
37 
Is directed towards gaining a knowledge of the decease and 
survival of beings and acquiring an understanding of karma: 
'With his clear paranormal clairvoyant vision he sees beings 
dying and being reborn, the low and the high, the fair and the 




Ab i1 means that one sees contemporaneous events beyond 
the ken of normal vision. 
It is important to notice that the quotation is not about all beings 
including oneself, but about other bein s. By clairvoyance, their 
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rebirth in accordance with a moral order concerning action (kamma) 
is supposed to be known. Keeping the underlined features in mind 
one turns to Jayatilleke's remark a few pages later that retro- 
cognition 'verifies the fact of pre-existence' and clairvoyance 
'verifies the fact of karma. 
3,8 
The inaccuracy should now be apparent. The distinction is not 
between faculties verifying respective doctrines as Jayatilleke 
thinks. The texts he mentions shows a distinction that goes unmen- 
tioned viz. , that one difference between retrocognition and clair- 
voyance is that the former concerns my own case and the latter that 
of other beings recognized in the Buddhist world view. Rebirth is 
thought to be seen in both precognitive and clairvoyant experience, 
so that 'the fact of pre-existence' is not verified exclusively by 
retrocognition. That kamma affects other beings is what is taken 
to distinguish clairvoyant experience here. 
Concerning the last of the 'three-fold knowledge', Jayatilleke 
cites D. 1 84 where suffering, its cause, cessation and the path 
to its cessation (i. e. , the 'four noble truths') as well as the defile- 
ments, their cause, cessation, and path to their cessation (know- 
ledge of the destruction of defilements) are known. But he links 
this discussion to anumäna which he translates 'inference' and 
anvaye nänar, translated as 'inductive knowledge'. Anurn na is 
not just inference in general, however, although commonly trans- 
lated as such, but is of the 'just as... so too. .. 
' analogical type. 
And anvaya (in anvaye naparp) has no specific meaning of induc- 
tion, but when used with näna means 'logical conclusion of' accord- 
ing to the PTS dictionary. Jayatilleke's use of the term 'induction' 
is exemplified as follows: 
39 
In the S. amyutta Nikäya are described a number of causally 
correlated phenomena such as that 'with the arising of birth 
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there is the arising of decay and death, and with the cessation 
of birth there is the cessation of decay and death', etc. (jäti- 
samudaya jarämaranasamudayo jatinirodh . 
jarämarana nirodho 
... S. II. 57). Knowing these causal correlations or sequences 
is called 'the knowledge of phenomena' (dhamrne nänam, S. II. 
58). Then it is said, 'This constitutes the knowledge of phen- 
omena; by seeing, experiencing, acquiring knowledge before 
long and delving into these phenomena, he draws an inference 
(nayam neti) with regard to the past and the future (atitanagate, 
loc., cit. ) as follows: 'All those recluses and brahmins who 
thoroughly understood the nature of decay and death, its cause, 
its cessation and the path leading to the cessation of decay and 
death did so in the same way as I do at present; all those re- 
cluses and brahmins who in the future will thoroughly under- 
stand the nature of decay and death... will do so in the same 
way as I do at present -- this constitutes his inductive knowledge 
(idam assa anvaye nanam, loc. cit. ). 
This is an argument from what is true in my own case now using 
certain procedures of checking to what is true -irrespective of time 
(in past and future) for others using the same procedures. Thus, 
it has an analogical quality not covered just by calling it inductive. 
To sum up, retrocognition is taken to reveal punabbhava in my 
own case, clairvoyance to reveal punabbhava and kanirna in other 
beings' cases and the knowledge of the destruction of äsavas to 
re veal that what is true in my own case now is true in the past and 
the future for others using similar procedures. This can be said 
on the basis of textual evidence. But there is no basis for going 
further to say that these faculties verify the doctrines of rebirth 
and action in the strong, usual empiricist sense of 'verify' accord- 
ing to which falsification must be in principle possible. There is 
an ambiguity in the expression 'rebirth doctrine'. If taken as view 
in the sense of picture, in full recognition of there being no prop- 
ositional sense here, then of course Buddhisfishave a 'doctrine'. 
But if taken as a theory to be defended with argument, in view of 
the condemnation of ditthi as speculative view, there is no early 
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Buddhist doctrine in that sense. It is well-known that theories of 
the relation between soul and body were set aside, as well as 
speculation on the state of the Tathä. gata . This shows the unwilling- 
ness to become 'entangled' in a specific philosophical theory of 
rebirth. 
What of the possibility that 'knowledge and vision' (p_ý, ý 
da. s sana) might play an analogous role to 'verify' in English. 
Consider: 
40 
It is in the nature of things (dhammatä) that a person in the 
state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees what really 
is. A person who knows and sees what really is, does not 
need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce. 
It is in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees 
as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces. One who has 
felt disinterested and has renounced does not need an effort of 
will to realize the knowledge and insight of emancipation 
(vimutti-nänadassanam). It is in the nature of things that one 
who has felt disinterested and renounced, realizes the knowledge 
and insight of emancipation. 
Here, however, there is no mention of kamma, punäbbhava or any 
other specific doctrine being known and seen. 
There are cases where 'knowing and seeing' refers to know- 
ledge of physical objects, as when a man cannot know and see his 
face in water due to the water's turbulent sui-face. Thus knowledge 
and vision is not always applied to religious concepts in the Buddhist 
texts. On the other hand, Jayatilleke emphasizes its religious 
application in saying: 
41 
Now it is said that 'the decease and survival of beings is to 
be verified by one's (clairvoyant) vision' (sattänam cutüpapä. to 
... cakkhunä sacchikaraniyo, A. II. 183). But with this clair- 
voyant vision one is also said to notice a correlation between 
the character of a person and his state of survival. 
The crucial word in Pali, sacchikatvä ('verified', 'seen') takes 
an emphatic yo form here as sacchikaraipiy o. It is prima facie 
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odd that this word has not been one of the Pali terms often used 
in English language expositions of the Buddhist empiricism line. 
Sacca means 'true' or 'correct' (it does not distinguish between 
propositional/ontological), and katvä, 'made' or 'established'. 
'True' is here not used as a property of a proposition, but as a 
property of utterance, congruent with the findings of Ch. 3. Since 
the concern of logical empiricism or positivism is with the meaning 
and verification of propositions (and often, the ` oZibdffi4 ý11 fPt*n 
Cip! e of falsification is emphasized), the conc ern of early Buddhism 
with sacca cannot be the same. Eo ipso, sacchikaraniyo cannot 
refer to verification in the positivist's sense. Now it can be sur- 
mised why none in the Buddhist empiricism tradition of interpreta- 
tion make much of sacchikatvä or its related forms: their Pali 
scholarship was too good to let them fall into the trap of interpreting 
the term as relating to propositions. Perhaps they realized that 
there is no term for 'proposition' in early Buddhism. But one must 
not let this crucial term pass unnoticed, and once its usage is 
understood, all talk of verifying propositions is ruled out. 
This by itself is not, however, a sufficient argument to elim- 
inate the Buddhist empiricism thesis, because it might be argued 
that even without 'the logician's notion of proposition' (which itself 
is not entirely free of difficulties in philosophy of logic), there may 
still be, and have historically been, empiricist positions. While 
this reply is correct, it is of no avail against the following further 
considerations. 
Leaving aside all claims of comparison with logical empiricism 
for which the notion of proposition is essential, the more restricted 
comparison to some form of empiricism which does not involve a 
notion of proposition has yet to account for the in principle falsifia- 
154 
bility of a 'view' . 
This may be seen clearly in section III when 
my 'parable of the bhikkhu' is presented. 
The following remarks are intended as a transition to section 
III where some further considerations against the Buddhist empir- 
icism thesis are presented. Whether Tathägatas arise or not the 
dhamma is eternal -- this saying shows that the truth of a doctrinal 
'view' is never regarded as contingent on man's realization: al- 
though checking is not irrelevant, it takes on a different sense from 
checking a proposition or hypothesis. The investigation takes the 
general form: P examines religion X to see if there is anythingin 
it for-=F him. Religious texts and believers typically make the claim 
that something is indeed 'in it', whether the merely curious can see 
it or not. This should not obscure the fact that 'religious discovery' 
is at least partly a matter of what the investigator is, what he 'brings 
with him' to the search. 
If my line of thinking is correct, then it is a mistake to think 
that there is a body of propositions which can be rightly labeled 
'religious knowledge', in a sense even roughly analogous to scien- 
tific knowledge. Unlike 'religious knowledge', there may indeed 
be 'religious wisdom', but if there is, it is to be found embodied 
in the lives of religious people, and as with 'philosophical wisdom' 
cannot be defined in a set of propositions but is embodied in prac- 
tices. Unlike knowledge, wisdom is thus necessarily spared the 
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III 
In what follows I argue for two inter-related theses: (1) that 
early Buddhism is not a form of empiricism, and (2) that con- 
sequently there is no basis for an early Buddhist apologetic which 
contrasts an empirical early Buddhism with either a metaphysical 
Hinduism on the one hand, or with a baseless Christianity on the 
other. 
Here 'early Buddhism' is understood as the Buddhism of the 
five Nikäyas. And 'empiricism' is understood as a theory of know- 
ledge which holds that some (on a weak view) or all (on a strong 
view) knowledge or the materials of knowledge is either derived 
from sense experience or is in some sense dependent on sense 
experience. The link between this section and the interpetation of 
kamma and punabbhava is important in that these two concepts are 
sometimes interpreted as part of an empirical theory of survival. 
A distinguished group of Pali Buddhist scholars, notably K. N. 
Jayatilleke and his former students, David J. Kalupahana and 
Gunapala Dharmasiri, have interpreted early Buddhism as an empir- 
ical viewpoint. Jayatilleke holds that early Buddhism is a sort of 
empiricism. 
1 
Kalupahana picks up this line and applies it in order 
to contrast an empirical early Buddhism with a metaphysical 
Hinduism, and in order to compare early Buddhism with logical 
positivism. 
2 
Dharmasiri also picks up the 'Buddhist empiricism' 
refrain, but uses it differently in order to contrast a rational, 
scientific, and empirical orientation in early Buddhism with an 
3 
irrational, baseless one in Christianity. 
In order to see what sort of case can be made for a 'Buddhist 
empiricism' some of Jayatilleke's work is particularly relevant, 
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especially the following passage: 
(793) We have tried to show that perception (normal and 
paranormal) and inductive inference are considered the means 
of knowledge in the Pali Nikaya s. The emphasis that 'knowing 
(janam) must be based on 'seeing' (passam) or direct perceptive 
experience, makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism. We have, 
however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not 
only that all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience, 
but from extrasensory experience as well. This extension we 
believe is justified in the light of the reasons that we gave 
earlier (v. supra, 735). The definition of the term in Runes' 
Dictionary of Philosophy also allows us to use the term 'empir- 
icism' to include the entire conscious content of the mind and 
not merely the data of the senses: 'That the sole source of 
knowledge is experience. ... Experience may be understood as 
either all conscious content, data of the senses only or other 
designated content' (s. v. ). Its empiricism is also seen in its 
attitude to the problems of substance (v. supra, 535), cause 
(v. supra, 778), the 
_a 
priori (v. supra, 429,436), perception 
(v. supra, 744), meaning (v. supra, 536 f. ) and lastly meta- 
physics (v. supra 377 ff. ; infra, 816). 
As for the reasons which Jayatilleke refers to here as given 
earlier which he believes justifies the extension of the word 'empir- 
icism' to include early Buddhism, they are: first, that it is held 
that the data of intuitive experience may be misinterpreted and 
erroneous inferences drawn from it; secondly, that Buddhism makes 
no claim about mystical knowledge derived from an unaccountable, 
allegedly supernatural source, instead basing its knowledge claims 
on a view of the natural development of mind in accordance with 
causal processes; thirdly, that it does not regard the content of 
meditative experience as identical with ultimate reality; and fourthly, 
that it does not reject normal perception but uses it as did the 
Materialists as a basis for drawing many of its conclusions. In the 
discussion which follows I am not going to question whether these 
reasons, taken in themselves, are acceptable, but instead to 
a 
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question whether it follows from them that it is a justifiable 
extension of the word 'empiricism' to have it cover early Buddhism. 
For it may be that there are other considerations in the light of 
which one would not accept such an extension, regardless of 
whether or not one accepts Jayatilleke's reasons here. 
Aligning early Buddhism with empiricism may be seen from 
the point of view of Buddhist apologetics to offer some advantages. 
Both the prestige = of science and the popularity in the West of 
empiricism might be harnessed in support of an ancient way of life. 
But from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion and of accuracy to 
the Pali texts, this sort of view is prima facie open to suspicion. 
It surfaces recently as the background for Gunapala Dharmasiri's 
interesting work, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of 
God. Here Dharmasiri continues the tradition of his late mentor, 
K. N. Jayatilleke, and goes on to attack theism as baseless in con- 
trast to an empirical early Buddhism. 
At the heart of Jayatilleke's conception of 'Buddhist empiricism' 
and that of his former students, Kalupahana and Dharmasiri, is the 
notion that it is a justifiable extension of the word 'empiricism' to 
have it cover the mind as a sixth sense where this concept of mind 
includes abhinnä . The abhirina are variously translated as 
'psychic 
powers' and (less grammatically but more frequently as) 'higher 
knowledge s' , to indicate a range of ' abilitie s acquired 
through years 
of meditation. Some of these abilities, such as retrocognition of 
past lives, are thought to provide a basis for knowledge claims 
concerning kamma and rebirth. Above Jayatilleke has observed that 
'experience' may mean 'either all conscious content, data of the 
senses only or other designated content' (following Runes), so that 
it might seem open to anyone to accept a broad definition of empir- 
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icism on which 'experience' is understood as including 'all con- 
scious content'. But empiricism cannot be understood in this 
way, for then it would include e. g. , mathematical truths and 
would not distinguish conceptual truths from empirical ones. 
The definition in terms of 'all conscious content' thus includes too 
much. It includes so much, that it would even be tautologous to 
say, on this view, of any datum at all that it is an empirical one. 
Nor can one accept the vague phrase 'or other designated content' 
in a definition of empiricism. ' Hence, the phrase 'data of the 
senses' remains, and taken in a very broad manner, according to 
this conception early Buddhism would be a sort of empiricism 
based on six 'senses' -- the last of which being the mind! Why not 
allow such a stipulation? 
First, there are textual considerations. Di hi, which literally 
means 'view' and very often 'speculative view' , was condemned 
by Buddha, the idea being that his message is not one view among 
others, not a theory to be argued about but a way of life to be 
practiced. But empiricism on the other hand is a theory, a theory 
of knowledge which is opposed to others, especially to rationalism. 
As such, empiricism is regarded as tenable by its proponents to 
the extent that it can be argued for. By contrast, the Buddha's 
procedure is to present his dogma on the basis of seeing things 
'as they really are' ( ay thä bhuýtarp) through meditative experience. 
6 
Speculation di hi) as well as argument and counter-argument 
(takka) are equally foreign to his approach. This last sentence is 
common knowledge among Pali scholars, but Jayatilleke, for one, 
interprets it as if it were a rejection of metaphysics and rationalism 
respectively in favor of empiricism. Inherent in this sort of view 




of another type. This picture is questionable, however, for in 
rejecting di hi (views) and takka (argument and counter-argument 
or logic) he was rejecting philosophy as this term is currently 
used in Britain and America rather than just certain types of 
philosophy. 
Unfortunately, Jayatilleke fails to see this. After pointing to 
a text which shows that the Buddha did not regard himself as preach- 
ing a doctrine which is the product of reasoning (takka and specu- 
lation (di hi , he concludes that the Buddha is no rationalist , 
elsewhere in many places depicting him as an empiricist. As the 
PTS dictionary shows, however, the terms takka and di hi are 
much wider in scope than these types of philosophy (rati. onalism 
and metaphysical speculation), and hence it is not specifically 
these parts of philosophy that are rejected. 
While Jayatilleke is wary of identifying or of closely compar- 
ing early Buddhism with a particular form of empiricism and 
points out a comparison between logical positivism and ancient 
Indian materialism , Kalupahana by contrast concludes his book, 
Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, with the para- 
8 
graph: 
All this may lead to the following conclusions. Rejecting 
an Absolute (such as the Brahman or Atman of the Upanisads) 
or a transempirical reality, the Buddha confined himself to 
what is empirically given. Following a method comparable to 
that adopted by the modern Logical Positivists, he sometimes 
resorted to linguistic analysis and appeal to experience to 
demonstrate the futility of metaphysics. As a result of his 
empiricism he recognized causality as the reality and made it 
the essence of his teachings. Hence his statement: "He who 
sees causality sees the dhamma". 
If this is the logical conclusion to which the Buddhist empiric - 
ism thesis may be pushed, then it is at the same time its reductio 
a 
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ad absurdum. For the activities and utterances of early Buddhism 
are religious ones, the wordy warfare' of philosophers being pur- 
posely avoided in early Buddhism. Although Kalupahana knows this, 
he would probably insist that insofar as early Buddhism has a way 
of verifying its knowledge claims it is to that extent empiricist. 
It has already been noted that there are no notions of proposition 
and falsification here, making the comparison to logical positivists 
like Ayer, e. g. , dubious. And if, as I suggest in calling attention 
to the terms di hi and takka, the texts show a distinction between 
the method of early Buddhism and the method of philosophy, then 
neither empiricism, positivism, linguistic analysis, nor any other 
sort of philosophy can sum-. up the method of early Buddhism. 
Fur-, her evidence accrues from the consideration of two other Pali 
concepts, deva and opapätika. 
Although propitiating the gods (deva) is out of the question from 
the early Buddhist point of view, the texts do assume their existence 
and even modify their character as M. M. J. Marasinghe points out 
in his book, Gods in Early Buddhism. It is thought that one may be 
reborn as a deva, man, animal, or inhabitant of niraya (a sort of 
purgatory). There is also a belief in opapätika births, 'those of 
spontaneous origin'. Although it is common to all who take a 
Buddhist empiricism line to view causality as an important doctrine, 
in the Majjhima Nikäya there is a reference to opapätika births 
9 
Deva and beings in niraya are said to be born in this manner. Neither 
the belief in such beings nor their somewhat strange manner of 
arising are easily compatible with the view of Buddhism as empir- 
icism or positivism as these terms are understood in Western 
thought, nor are they easily compatible with the emphasis given to 
causality by Kalupahana et al. 
a 
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Leaving aside Pali textual material for a moment I would like 
to turn now to some considerations concerning the usual usage of 
the term 'empiricism'. Typically 'empiricism' is used in contrast 
to 'rationalism'. Empiricism is a theory of knowledge which holds 
that some (on a weak view) or all (on a strong view) knowledge or 
the materials of knowledge is either derived from sense experience 
or is dependent upon sense experience rather than on reason. On 
a rather crude interpretation; reasoning is thought of as taking 
place 'in' the mind, whereas the sensesare thought of as quite dif- 
ferent in kind from the mind and as the sources of knowledge. The 
clearest formulation of this unsophisticated version is perhaps in 
Locke's writings in which the mind is thought of as a blank slate 
which is written on by means of sense activity. Here there is a 
contrast of experience on the one side and mind on the other. But 
in early Buddhism the mind is not envisaged as different in kind 
from the sensesbut rather as one gateway alongside the five senses. 
Hence, Locke's view of 'sensory experience' would be one-sided 
and unacceptable to the early Buddhist view. 
A consideration of 'verifiability' and 'falsifiability' is also 
relevant to interpreting 'empiricism'. The anti-metaphysical 
thrust of the verifiability principle as formulated by Ayer, say, 
seems to require the assumption that our experience cannot be 
radically different from what it ordinarily is. A proponent of the 
Buddhist empiricism thesis may argue that, if a Buddhist is con- 
fronted with Ayer's contention that one cannot verify the medita- 
tor's claims, but only the the claims that meditators have report- 
ed certain experinces, then the Buddhist can reply that Ayer is 
refusing to carry out the requisite meditational practice in order 
to verify the claim. 
I 
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But first, meditation-based claims are not always verifiable 
by those who attempt to check them, as one group of monks who 
failed to develop the abhinna and are said to be liberated by 
insight shows. And secondly, even where verification is in some 
sense possible, if there is nothing in principle which counts 
against meditation-based claims, then on a strong notion of verif- 
iability nothing counts for them either. As an illustration of this 
second point, consider my parable of the bhikkhu: 
Two men hear a sermon on Buddhism in which it is char- 
acterized as a 'come and see doctrine', not requiring faith in 
scripture, but confidence in the meditation instructor. They 
decide to put it to the test. After five years of disciplined 
meditation under the same teacher, they meet again. The 
first says: 'I have verified rebirth by seeing the arising and 
passing away of beings'. The second replies that he has seen 
no such thing. They resume meditation practice, and after 
five years the same stalemate is reached. Finally after they 
had both been meditating for twenty years they return to their 
teacher, who is by then old and grey. The second man says: 
'I have heard that this is a 'come and see' doctrine, but al- 
though I came I have not yet acquired knowledge and vision of 
Buddhist doctrine. Is not the doctrine falsified? 
' Then comes 
a great laugh resounding (as if from Zarathustran heights), and 
following it the words: 'Fool, go and meditate some more'. 
After the teacher's advice it became clear that the issue is 
not an experimental one, although each takes his experience as 
the basis for interpretation. The sceptical bhikkhu thinks: I 
have had many experiences of meditating without acquiring 
knowledge and vision of rebirth, for example. So, if the 
teacher will not allow that any of my experience counts against 
the rebirth doctrine, then I do not see how anything could count 
for it either. If you can't falsify it, then you can't verify 
it 
either. The believing bhikkhu thought: poor 
fellow' He does 
not know and see what I have known and seen. I 
have verified 
the doctrine. The skeptical monk left the Order, while the 
other continued meditating. 
Dharmasiri criticizes the theists for not meeting Flew's 
challenge by specifying which events would falsify 
belief in God. 
But when he comes to discuss the meaningfulness of early 
Buddhist 
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doctrines, he does not there require the possibility of falsification 
(in principle) for meaningfulness. Thus one finds a shift in what 
counts as the requirement for meaningful statements, a shift which 
enables him to conclude that Christianity is baseless while Bud- 





Moreover, he even arrives at the comparison of 
1.1 
the Buddhist path with scientific methodology: 
Thus 'faith' in Buddhism resembles very much the faith a 
scientist reposes in a particular hypothesis. He has faith 
that the latter might work because of the credibility and 
reliability that is suggested by the preliminary observations. 
Faith in Buddhism works only as a starting point in the 
scientist's sense and therefore it has necessarily to be re- 
placed later by direct personal knowledge. Consequently, an 
Arahant is described as 'one devoid of faith' and it is ofter 
pointed out that the Arahant must be in a position to claim the 
highest knowledge without having to rely on faith. 
I would submit that the early Buddhist path is not at all like 
scientific hypothesis and test for precisely the reason that Dharma- 
siri adduces in the case of Christianity, but fails to apply to early 
Buddhism. The doctrines of early Buddhism are not falsifiable by 
any experience, as the parable of the bhikkhu siigge. sts. 
In concluding this chapter I would like to consider an objection 
to the view that no doctrine of early Buddhism is falsifiable. It 
might be argued that there is at least one falsifiable belief in early 
Buddhism viz. , that there was a man named 
Siddhärtha Gautama 
(Pali: Gotama) who attained enlightenment (nibbäna) 
Would not this basic Buddhist belief be falsified if it could be 
shown that no such individual ever lived -- for instance, by the 
discovery of texts which gave reliable eviäence for the view pro - 
posed ? 
There are three different ways of arguing against this which 
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I sketch as follows. First, take the 'in practice reply'. In 
practice it would make very little difference to Buddhists in Sri 
Lanka, for example, if it could be shown that no Gotama Buddha 
ever lived. What would make a difference is if it could be shown 
that noone had ever attained the status of Buddhahood, but it is 
not clear how this could be done. The 'in practice reply' empha- 
sizes that Buddhism is basically a belief that there is a certain 
path to the eradication of suffering (dukkha), and people could 
continue to practice it quite independently of the historicity of 
Gotama. Statues of the Buddha are then interpreted as represent- 
ing an ideal, and could be ritually used in any event. 
The second reply is the 'how conclusive? ' query. When it is 
claimed that it might be shown that no such man ever lived, it 
may be asked what the evidence would be like such that we would 
be entitled to conclude this. If it is replied that the evidence would 
take the form of some recently discovered manuscript, which gives 
reason to believe that the Pali Canon accounts of the life of Buddha 
are fabrications, then granting X to be comparatively more re- 
liable, it could nevertheless turn out that at a subsequent time 
book XI would be discovered which negates X's account on the 
point and is comparatively more reliable to X1, and so on, back 
and forth in an open-ended series. In short, the best of evidence 
could only ensure a tentative conclusion, and would fall short of 
anything like conclusive verification. 
The third reply is the 'logical status reminder'. Here it is 
suggested that the logical status of belief in the historicity of 
Gotama is not that of a doctrine but that of part of the background 
against which doctrines emerge. The main outlines of Buddhism, 
expressed in such schemas as the four noble truths, the eight-fold 
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noble path, the three marks of existence, and the five aggregates 
constituting a person are stated without necessary reference to 
the historical Gotama. And if a follower of early Buddhism said 
some-thing of the form, 'The Buddha said that p', where 'PI is 
some doctrinal point, then one can take it that: (1) if he knows 
his Buddhism he is not basing the proposition p on the alleged 
fact that the historical Gotama stated it, for it is a well-known 
emphasis that nothing should be accepted on the basis of report, 
hearsay, or a teacher's testimony (including Gotama's) but on the 
basis of its being known and seen personally (in the ideal case, 
leaving the 'freed by insight' aside); (2) even if there were no 
historical Gotama, p would be regarded as true by Buddhists, 
since the texts say that the doctrine (dhamma) remains even if 
there were never any Tathägata in past, future, or present. 
The Buddhist empiricism thesis can best be understood as a 
form of apologetics for Buddhism. A polog , tics admits of greater 
or lesser degrees of accuracy when viewed as exposition, and its 
main purpose is to defend and promote a religion. Judged accord- 
ingly, the Buddhist empiricism apologetic has met with some suc- 
cess insofar as it has called attention to the earliest recorded 
stratum of Buddhism. This attention is important in at least two 
ways. Historically, understanding early Buddhism is the sine qua 
non for understanding what counts as a change as Buddhism devel- 
ops. Sociologically, for many educated people who have been 
exposed to both Eastern and Western cultural influences (especially 
in Sri Lanka) the attention to the Buddhist empiricism view has 
been an important way of attempting a synthesis of old and new. 
But viewed philosophically and with textual considerations in mind, 
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The Deathless (Amata) 
The problem of the reidentification of the person across lives 
discussed in Ch. 4 cannot be solved by appeal to the Buddhist 
empiricism thesis, as Ch. 5 shows. But in rejecting this thesis 
it is not being claimed that parinibbana is a 'transcendent state'. 
How, then, does one interpret 'the deathless' (amata) in early 
Buddhism? This is the problem to be solved in the present chapter. 
Some writers on early Bilddhist 'immortality' see it as easily 
assimilable to a position they admire, such as Hinduism or Christ- 
ianity. For example, Radhagovinda Basak writes: 
' 
It is, indeed, very interesting to find in the Buddhist canons 
this nirväiga described as a -kata (akýta, the uncreated) and 
a-mata (amrta, the immortal), i. e. it is neither created, nor 
does it ever die. Hence, it may be presumed that it is a siddha- 
vastu, eternally existing thing, and it may be equated with the 
Brahmanic +dkaofBrahman. 
Whether the 'eternally existing thing' is thought of in Hindu or 
in Christian terms, there is no such thing in Buddhism. This much 
can be seen already, in the light of Ch. 4, but it is the contention 
of the present chapter that amata nevertheless has a clear Buddhist 
meaning. To explain what meaning 'the deathless' has in early 
Buddhism which is different from the notion of something which 
never dies (N. B. Basak's way of construing 'eternal'), it is nec- 
essary in the first place to look at the texts. In doing so the con- 
ventional distinction between nibbäna and parinibbäna is used here, 
and is defended against a recent attack by Peter Masefield. The 
argument is developed here on the basis of the texts that arnata 
means 'immortal' in the sense of 'eternal life' and not 'endless 
life' as these senses of 'immortality' are distinguished in some 
a 
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contemporary philosophy of religion (N. B. not in Basak's sense). 
It is also demonstrated how misinterpretations of amata as 'end- 
less life' persist down to the present day in writers like Kalan- 
suriya. 
Gombrich has said2 
Scholars have endlessly lucubrated, and are still lucubrating, 
over what the Buddha meant by his no-soul doctrine; but in so 
far as they assume his meaning to be something other than 
what Buddhists have taken him to mean, I consider that they 
are wasting their time. 
Certainly there have been novel, polemical, and even apologetical 
interpretations of Buddhism. Perhaps even the very word 'Buddhi -n' 
specifically the 'ism' of it, have led scholars to think of it as just 
another 'ism', easily comparable with empiricism, rationalism, 
idealism or what-have-you. Thinking of it in this way makes it a 
di hi in the sense of a philosophical view up for argument and 
counter-argument, and that is a travesty that no clear-thinking 
Buddhist could accept. Indeed, if this is the sort of thing Gombrich 
has in mind, as the following quotation suggests, he is being charit- 
able: 'The style of modern exegesis merely replicates the efforts 
of traditional commentators -- except that it usually does the job 
less well. ' In this study no reference to 'what the Buddha meant' 
3 
is required. For whether there was a historical Gotama Buddha, 
and whether and to what extent his -utterances overlap with those 
embodied in the Nikäyas are questions which cannot be ascertained 
beyond any doubt. And if one understands the study of early Bud- 
dhism as the study of texts, then expressions like 'what the Buddha 
meant' have no role to play, unless used as eliptical for 'what the 
Buddha meant as depicted in the texts'. 
Although elucidating the early Buddhist position may make it 
easier to accept, the concern is not with acceptance but with 
172 
understanding, as pointed out in the Introduction. And in making 
comparisons between what the texts say and what philosophy of 
religion works say, the comparisons are not regarded as valuable 
somehow in their own right, nor as causal influence accounts, nor 
as concealed apologetics to make Buddhism seem respectable (for 
the view taken is that it i s respectable), but only for the sake of 
understanding. If it turns out that there is some clarity in the 
Buddhist vision (along with some difficulties), this should not be 
surprising, nor taken as evidence of apologetic intent. Hence, if 
the philosophy of religion can on some . points aid understanding 
without doing violence to the texts, the absence of exact Pali equi- 
valents to its distinctions (say, between 'endless' and 'eternal' 
life as two kinds of 'immortality') will be excusable as a matter of 
course. 
With this methodological reminder concluded, consider some 
uses of 'amata' in the Nikäya literature. The PTS dictionary char- 
acterizes amata as 'the drink of the gods, ambrosia, water of 
immortality', and in painstaking manner details its usages. What 
follows is not meant as an exhaustive summary , but is sufficiently 
developed for present purposes. 
'Amata' is used as a synonym for 'ribbäna', and as shorthand 
for 'the destruction of passion, hatred, and confusion' (räga, dosa, 
and moha) . There are expressions like knocking at the 'door of the 
deathless' dvära -amata), and knowing the causal relation is some- 
times said to be a prerequisite of knocking atthatdoor. The death- 
less is sometimes characterized as the purification of citta free 
of grasping, and sometimes it is said that 'purposive thoughts' 
(sankappa-vitakka, A. N. IV 385) are merged in the deathless. 
Some thoughts are said to be particularly beneficial for attaining 
the deathless. Also found are expressions like 'plunging into the 
" 
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deathless', and 'the deathless way to peace', and the 'drum of 
deathlessness' . 'Amata' is called 'an element, 'security, a 
'quarter' (though this last is metaphorical; not spatial), and the 
Buddha is styled 'giver of the deathless', and 'teaching the death- 
less path'. Buddhists take the deathless as goal or c onsu, ation, 
and it must be 'seen for oneself'. 
'Amata' as end or goal may be a synonym for 'nibbäna', but 
in some places like the following it is an attribute of nibbäna: 
4 
Yath7a asankhatari tathä vitthäretabbam tatruddänam 
asankhatam antam anäsavam saccanca param nipunam su- 
4duddasarm anidassanarn nippapanca santa. ri amatari 
panitänca siva1 ca khemam taghakkhayc, acchariya? ica 
a}ibhutam anitikam anitikadhammam nibbänam etam 
sugatena de sitars. 
K. N. Upadhyaya translates this passage as: 
5 
This is the Nibbäna, the uncompounded, the ultimate, free 
from defilements, the truth, the further shore, the subtle, 
very difficult to see, the unfading, the stable, the undecay- 
ing, the ineffable, the undifferentiated, the peaceful, the 
deathless, the excellent, the good, the security, destruction 
of craving, the wonderful, the marvellous, free from ill, 
the state free from ill, the harmless, the passionless, the 
uric , the release, the non-attachment, the island, the 
cave, the protection, the refuge and the goal which the well- 
accomplished One has taught. 
To begin our discussion it is important to distinguish between 
nibbäna in one's lifetime from nibbäna at death in the case where 
one will not return (i. e. , parinibbAna). The objective is to ex- 
plain what meaning the deathless has which is different from that 
of something that never dies, and this turns on the understanding of 
parinibbäna . Kalansuriya sets out 
'two views of nibbä. na' and 
argues for Jayatilleke's notion of nibbäna (perhaps also parinibbäna, 
though this is unclear), as against Kalupahana's view of parinibbäna 
as extinction. 
6 
In so doing he seems to think that throwing doubt 
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on the latter's Buddhist empiricism view lends support to his own 
view. While not agreeing to the Buddhist empiricism thesis, I 
hope to show that Kalupahana is more nearly correct on the question 
of extinction, and why, strictly speaking, neither the transcendental 
state view nor the extinction view is in keeping with Buddhism. 
Nowhere in the Nikäya literature does the Buddha assert any 
view about the afterlife of the Tathägata. In the discussion of the 
four-fold logic it was shown in Ch. 2 that the early Buddhist view 
is to set aside from consideration, but without denying, the four 
recognized possibilities concerning the Tathägata. Simply put, 
there is a refusal to philosophize about the matter,. for philosophy 
is seen as just another source of attachment. 
Kalansuriya calls attention to a Sarpyutta passage which is as 
important as it is occasionally misleading -- one sometimes 
referred to as 'Yamaka's di hi' . It reminds one that, rightly 
stated, the early Buddhist view is not that the Tathä. gata is extinct 
after death, but that the five aggregates are dukkha and are all 
destroyed on the Tathagata's- death. Yamaka, under questioning by 
Buddha, changes his tune from the former to the latter character- 
ization. In the English paraphrase there is a problem with 'extinct', 
since nibbäria is sometimes rendered as 'extinction' where par- 
nibbäna is meant, and of course the Buddhists are perfectly willing 
to say that a Tathägata may be in parinibbäna. But in the sense in 
which one commonly uses 'extinction' to mark the goi ng out of 
existence, the Buddhists do not say that the Tathagata is extinct. 
Hence, if one emphasizes the importance of Yamaka's ditthi and 
ignore others like the Sabbasutta, it may seem as if the door to 
the deathless wings open to a 'transcendental state' of existence. 
In commenting on Yamaka's di hi Kalansuriya take it that the 
Buddha (or the Buddhist position) denies the conclusion that 'once 
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the external object (the external person) ceases to exist, ontolog- 
ically, nothing exists', and at the end of the day the way to see 
Buddha's denial that he is an annihilationist is to see him as an 
eternalist, only not an Upani. sadic eternalist. An examination of 
the following citations will bear this out: 
7 
To put it yet more explicitly, the dissolution of the aggregation 
is but the non-existence of the object or person or whatever is 
referred to. Characteristically, this is the knowledge which 
comes by way of sense-experience (sense -perception). Once 
the external object (the external person) ceases to exist, 
ontologically, nothing exists. It is this conclusion that the 
Buddha denies, according to the nikäya literature, when he 
was charged with being an annihilationist with reference to 
the summum bonum - nibbana, of his teaching. The Buddha 
claims that he lays down simply a doctrine about anguish and 
the stopping of anguish and not the cutting off, the destruction 
and the disappearance of the existent entity. Therefore, we 
conclude that Kalupahana's reading of the meanings of advanced 
Western thoughtinto the Dhamma of Buddhism is uncalled for. 
It is worth being clear about this since it will clarify the logical 
status of the notion of nibbana in the Dhamma. ... 
From a rejection of metaphysics (that is, the eternalistic meta- 
physics of the Upanisadic seers) on the one hand, and from a 
rejection on the other hand of materialistic empiricism, it does 
not follow necessarily that all metaphysical views are rejected. 
A metaphysical theory about nibbana very different from that 
of the Upanisadic ätman is not necessarily foreign to the central 
notions of the Dhamma. 
Here 'denies', 'external person', and 'not necessarily 
foreign' require scrutiny. Kalansuriya thinks the Buddha (or the 
Buddhist position) denies the statement: 'once the external object 
(the external person) ceases to exist, ontologically, nothing exists. 
There are a number. of considerations here. The text does not 
depict Buddha as denying this in explaining Yamaka's ditthi . Perhaps 
Kalansuriya takes it that annihilationism (ucchedaväda) is correctly 
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described in the statement above, and that Buddha is depicted as 
denying it. He does not mention the Sabbasutta, however, and 
can hardly be unaware that Kalupahana lays a great deal of empha- 
8 
sis on it. There, the statement which Kalansuriya takes as annihil- 
ationism is asserted . If icalansuriya is to make a case for his view, 
he would have to supply an interpretation of the Sabbasutta or some- 
how argue that it is less important than Kalupahana thinks. But as 
he has done neither of these things, one cannot feel any the 
wiser by being confronted with a different text, that on Yamaka's 
ditthi, thereby diverting attention from the Sabba s utta while not 
explaining the discrepancy between his statement of what the Buddha 
denies and what the Sabbasuta actually asserts. 
On my reading of early Buddhism one has to interpret uccheda- 
va-da very differently from Kalansun iya. Interpreted as the 
view of C. ä rvä. ka that there is no rebirth, that at death one is com- 
pletely destroyed ('the cutting off of an existent entity' is the phrase), 
the Buddha's insistence that he only illuminates suffering and the 
way to the eradication of suffering makes a good deal of sense. It is 
then really a middle path in the sense of an alternative between 
Hindu eternalism of the Upanisads and the materialism of C. ärvaka. 
On the view I suggest, there is no difficulty reconciling the Sabba- 
sutta with Yamaka's di thi, such as Kalansuriya would encounter 
if he confronted it. Since annihilationism is, pace Kalansuriya, 
not the statement he presents but that there is no rebirth or trans- 
migration of any sort, the Buddha's unwillingness to accept it (N. B. 
he does not in any case deny it), and concern to clarify what he does 
say -- I preach dukkha and its cessation -- does not in any way con- 
flict with the Sabbasutta passage. 
" 
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I have already given reasons for opposing the Buddhist empir- 
icism thesis. Thus I am in agreement with Kalansuriya's con- 
clusion on this particular point, although not with his argument for 
his conclusion. For as that argument misinterprets ucchedaväda 
and slurs the logical independence of the Buddhist empiricism 
thesis and the parinibbäna as extinction thesis, it is unacceptable 
as an argument, however much one may agree with its conclusion. 
If my arguments are correct, then the former thesis is unaccept- 
able, while the latter (on parinibbäna) is acceptable in a qualified 
manner as an implication of the early Buddhist doctrine, but not 
as a paraphrase of what is explicitly said in Pali. That is, there 
is no place in the Nikäya literature where the Buddha is depicted 
as saying ' parinibbäna is extinction'. On the other hand, he says 
that rebirth depends on conditions and that when the conditions are 
not there no rebirth occurs; that it would be absolute, complete 
folly to assert the continuance of any mind-related element under 
such circumstances. 
Kalansuriya fails to distinguish between metaphysics, as a 
branch of philosophy, and religion. Sometimes he characterizes 
Buddhism as 'a simple religion with a difficult goal' and sometimes 
as metaphysical: 
9 
From a rejection of metaphysics (that is, the eternalistic 
metaphysics of the Upanisadic seers) on the one hand, and 
from a rejection on the other hand of materialistic empiricism, 
it does not follow necessarily that all metaphysical views are 
rejected. A metaphysical theory about nibbana very 
different 
from that of the Upanisadic atman is not necessarily foreign 
to the central notions of the Dhamma. 
Thus, while agreeing with Kalansuriya's admirable attempt to 
elucidate the dhamma within its proper context, 
it does not seem 
to be entirely successful in that he here tacitly 
does just what he 
a 
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accuses Kalupahana of doing: regarding the Buddha as a philosopher 
rather than as a religious teacher. Only in this case Buddha is seen 
as a disguised metaphysician rather than as a disguised empiricist. 
I want to say, not that the Buddha is an example of an unreflective 
person, but that he is not an example of an epistemologist, meta- 
physician, or any other sort of philosopher as this term is used in 
the West. Of course this is not to dispute that philosophical train- 
ing may be useful in elucidating Buddhism. Nor is it necessary to 
assume, falsely, that there was a sharp distinction between religion 
and philosophy at the time of the Buddha, but only this: one sees 
in the character of his life as reported, concerns which one should 
now call primarily religious rather than primarily philosophical. 
The setting aside of views (dit hi in contexts where this means 
'speculative views' is not just a setting aside of metaphysics, but 
of philosophy as it is known in the West. 
II 
Part of the argument of the precedin section turns on the 
distinction between nibbäna and parinibbäna, and it is the defense 
of this distinction from a recent attack that is now undertaken. 
Peter Masefield argues that while there is some textual evidence 
for the above-mentioned distinction, it cannot be maintained. He 
writes: 
9 
Had the expression parinibbana and its related terms been 
found only in such contexts one might have been justified in 
assuming that parinibbana was always and only to be attained 
at death. Other passages, however, suggest that one already 
parinibbuto (9) could continue to live and remain active in the 
world; it is said, for instance, in the Udumbarika-Sihanada 
Sutta that the Lord, himself parinibbuta teaches Dhamma for 
the sake of (the attainment of) parinibbana (10), which must 
surely imply that at the time he was neither dead nor dying. 
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Similarly several passages elsewhere, dealing with those 
either attaining parinibbana or already parinibbuta, give 
no reason for us to suppose that the individuals in question 
are either dying or already dead (11). 
And he supports this with notes: 
10 
9 Past participle of parinibbayati and thus 'who has attained 
nibbana'. 
10 Parinibbuto so Bhagava parinibbanaya dhammam deseti 
--D iii 5 5. 
11 See e. g-. S iv 204; Sn 514 etc. 
The choice of topic here is an ingenious one, for if it could 
be shown that there is no distinction operative an important con- 
tribution to Buddhist scholarship would be made. Nevertheless 
the argument in unsound, for the following reasons. 
First, nothing at (10) guarantees the implication 'that at the 
time he was neither dead nor dying'. For (10), which may be trans- 
lated as 'The Exalted One, having been finally enlightened, teaches 
the way by final enlightenment'. This does not mean that Buddha 
is somehow alive and teaching It means that the Buddha has 
taught the doctrine by example. One can mean this and say that he 
teaches the way by example, just as one can say that Thomas More 
teaches the importance of conscience even if one has no thoughts 
of heaven and of Mors continued existence. Since the Pali does 
not guarantee Masefield's implication, then D iii 55 is not conclusive 
evidence, and one need not agree that there is 'no reason for us to 
suppose that the individuals in question are either dying or already 
dead. ' On my reading, the present tense of deseti is being used in 
a way which does not imply that Buddha is alive. 
There may be other passages which Masefield is thinking of 
(see 11, 'etc. '), but the ones supplied at 11 are no more compelling 
than D iii 55, S iv 204 runs thus: 
Yatha cetä nirujjhanti magganca khayagänriinam 
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Vedanänam khayä bhikkhu 
nicchäto parinibbuto ti. 
This has been translated as: 
l 
They cease, and what the way to feelings' end. That brother 
who hath ended them, therefor 
No longer hungereth. He is set free. 
The context is that one who has eliminated pleasant, painful, and 
neutral feelings (vedanä) is parinibbuto. 'Set free' should not be 
taken as free in a relative sense (from something), where what is 
set free can go on existing. . 
For Buddhist parinibbäna is not free- 
dom from this or that particular condition, but 'freedom' in an 
extended sense -- freedom from all conditions. And talk of one 
who has eliminated pleasant, painful, and neutral feelings is not 
evidence that such a one is alive. 
The other passage adduced as evidence, Sutta Nipäta 514, goes 
as follows: 
12 
Pa jje na kat e na att a nä 
parinibbänagato vitinnaka_ti kho, 
vibhava9l ca bhava i ca vippahäya, 
vusitavä khinapunabbhavo, -- sa "bhikkhu". 
13 
Lanman' s translation reads,: 
The 'Alm sman true' is he 
who treads his chosen path 
up to Nirvana, quit 
of doubts, not troubling if 
life closes or runs on, 
-- the man who greatly lived 
and now bath slain rebirth. 
Here the fact that rebirth is ended shows that parinibbäna in the 
usual sense as death of an Arahant is meant. There is no 
implication that he is actually 'in' parinibbäna while alive, but 
rather (as the translation shows), he has gone 'up to' this 
limit and 
has no concern for his own continuance. 
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It is not necessary to trace the other arguments Masefield 
gives concerning Buddhaghosa, the commentator, since I am 
just interested in safeguarding the nibbäna/parinibbana distinction 
for early Buddhism, since the argument presented in section I here 
depends on it. This defense does not, however, involve the claim 
that 'parinibbäna' is only used as 'death of an Arahant'. As 
Gomb ric h observes: 
14 
In Pali literature parinibbäna is sometimes a synonym 
of nibbäna (technically called sa-upädi-sesa); but modern 
Sinhalese usage, to which I have conformed, confines it to the 
death of an arhat (technically an-upädi-sesa). 
Agreeing here with Gombrich I think that even if Masefield's argu- 
ments were successful, that would not show that in the sense in 
which pa rinibbäna means death of an arahat 'the attainment of 
parinibbana need not always entail the death of the individual con- 
cerned'. And to say: 
15 
Now, that one could attain parinibbana and yet continue to 
live suggests that the distinction between the state attained by 
an enlightened person during his lifetime and the state attained 
by such an individual at his death cannot be maintained, or at 
least when this distinction is expressed in terms of nibbana 
and parinibbana. 
is to vitiate the point by the last mentioned qualification ('or... '}. 
For it may be admitted that sometimes ' pa rinibba-na' is used synon- 
omously with 'nibbäna' so that the distinction is not between 
nibbäna and parinibbäna simpliciter, but between nibbäna and one 
sense of parinibbäna (to which it is contrasted as 'death of an Arhat'). 
That is all that needs to be 'maintained'. From the statement that 
one could attain 
is no distinction 
parinibbä. naI and 
to be maintained 
live, it does not 
between nibbäna 
follow that there 
and parinibbýina 
(where p2 = 'death of an A rahant ). 
Given that there are uses of parinibbäna according to which it 
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is applied to a living being, it does not follow that it is not used 
in a different way in contrast to nibbäna. Masefield argues that 
the distinction 'cannot be maintained'. In fact, the nibbäna/pari- 
nibbäna distinction is maintained, not only in contemporary Sri 
Lankan usage (as Gombrich observes), but in the Nikäyas them- 
selves. The underlying assumption of Masefield's view on the 
matter seems to be that if one can show any instances counter to 
the general employment of 'parinibbäna' in opposition to 'nibbäna', 
such that it is used synonomausly with nibbäna sometimes, then 
there is no distinction between the two. This is to treat the laby- 
rinth of language as if it had to conform to the logician's 'real 
definition'. Quite independently of particular textual data, this is 
a specious argument, for from the fact that a word, n, is some- 
times used synonomously with p1, it does not follow that there is 
no usage where n is contrasted with the other word in a different 
sense, p2. 
A good example to support my point concerns the use of the 
word di thi. It is sometimes used just to mean 'view', even a 
correct view, and often to mean 'speculative view' in opposition to 
the dhamma which is according to 'right view' (sammä-ditthi). But 
from the fact that it is sometimes used in contexts where the view 
referred to is a 'right view', it does not follow that there is no 
opposition between ditthi and dhamma in the way in which these 
terms are often opposed. 
III 
Using the distinction between nibbäna and parinibbäna defended 
in I I, what does amata mean as applied to nibbäna ? In the following 
important passage the meaning of 'the deathless' is explained so 
a 
183 
that it is clear that 'endless life' is not meant: 
16 
Savatthi was the occasion.. . 
Then a certain monk... said this to the Exalted One: 
"'The restraint of lust, the restraint of hatred, the 
restraint of illusion, " lord, is the saying, 
Pray, lord, what does this restraint imply ?t 
'It implies, monk, the realm of Nibbana. By it is meant 
the destruction of the asavas. ' 
At these words that monk said to the Exalted One: 
"'The deathless! The deathless " lord, is the saying. 
Pray, lord, what is the deathless, and what the way to 
the deathless ?' 
'That which is the destruction of lust, the destruction 
of hatred, the destruction of illusion, monk, -- that is 
called "the deathless". This same Ariyan eightfold way is 
the way to the deathless; to wit, right view... and the rest 
... right concentration. 
Here 'the deathless' is simply the destruction of what defiles: 
passion, hatred, and confusion (raga, dosa, moha). This applies 
to nibbä na, and now I would like to take up the question, what is 
meant by amata in case parinibbäna is alluded to by this term? 
In answering this question it is necessary to articulate an 
important conclusion arguments for which have been provided in 
Ch. 4.. I conclude that those who think that early Buddhism holds 
a belief in an immortal (in the sense of 'endless') psychic some- 
thing which exists in a transcendental state after parinibbäna2 is 
reached are mistaken. 
Following on from this my task now becomes one of giving 
some answer to the question just posed which is consistent with 
the texts and also makes sense philosophically. A word about 
'consistent with the texts': I do not mean that the texts set forth 
in unambiguous terms the particular interpretation which is to be 
given here, but that this interpretation which follows is nowhere 
contradicted by the texts and that textual evidence rules out alter- 
1O `t 
native readings, such as ätmaväda. As for 'makes sense philos- 
ophically', there, too, certain things are ruled out. For the 
identity and conceivability problems of the view of immortality as 
17 
'endless life' are insurmountable, so that this would not be a live 
option to consider even if, counterfactually, the early Buddhist 
position embraced a view of 'endless life'. These problems are 
real ones for the early Buddhist 'rebirth link' view (as mentioned 
in Ch. 5), but they do not apply to parinibbäna as understood below. 
Armed with these provisos I want to consider a remark from 
James Van Evra's article, 'On Death as a Limit': 
18 
Pressing the analogy then: if my life has no end in just 
the way that my visual field has no limit, then it must be in 
the sense that I can have no experience of death, conceived as 
the complete cessation of experience and thought. That is, if 
life is considered to be a series of experiences and thoughts, 
then it is impossible for me to experience death, for to exper- 
ience something is to be alive, and hence to be inside the 
bound formed by death. 
Parinibbäna functions as a limit in an analogous way, I submit, 
only here it is the death of an arahat -- not just any death -- that 
counts as the limit of life, for life in early Buddhism is thought to 
continue often from death to rebirth. The distinction between the 
process of dying and death as a limit parallels that between nibbäna 
and parinibbäna, with the differences that nibbäna is 'dying to the 
world' rather than dying simpliciter, and parinibbäna is the limit 
of a 'person's' experience when conceived in the early Buddhist 
way. Dying is, but death is not, a process which can be experienced. 
And the depiction of parinibbäna par excellence, that of the Buddha, 
shows him lying prone in death, rather than dying convoluted with 
involuntary stomach pains due to Cunda the blacksmith's poisonous 
mushrooms. Parinibbäna, in the sense in which the term is con- 
trasted with nibbäna, is the limit of a Buddhist stream of life, not 
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an experience in that stream. 
Light from contemporary philosophy of religion along with 
sensitive textual analysis can together, I think, make very plain 
the sense in which immortality applies in early Buddhism, and 
thus answer a question which has puzzled commentators for 
centuries. First, it should be noted that there are two types of 
negation. And when 'amata' is predicated of nibbäna (as in the 
salient text in section I), this is not tantamount to asserting the 
utterance 'the Tathägata exists after death', but instead is to 
deny that the word 'mata' (opposite of 'amata') applies to the 
Tathägata. The Tathägata leaves no tracks, is traceless, but 
not because he has invisible feet. Rather, ended is sarpsära for 
the former person (collection of five khandha), where samsära 
has attributes which do not apply to nibbäna. 
The sense in which 'the deathless' applies in early Buddhism 
may be elucidated by extrapolating from Sutherland's treatment 
of immortality in the Christian tradition. 
19 
Opting for neither of 
the two traditional views of immortality as disembodied conscious- 
ness or as resurrection of the body, he develops an alternative one. 
Sutherland claims that the belief in immortality is indeed a Christian 
belief, thus separating himself from those (like John Hick) who take 
the resurrection of the body view as primary and the immortality 
of the soul as a Greek accretion. Yet he reinterprets what this 
'immortality' means so as to rule out of consideration the disem- 
bodied consciousness view. 
With a respectful nod in the direction of Kierkegaard ('only in 
the ethical is there immortality in eternal life', Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript), Sutherland goes on to develop the idea 
that 'immortality', taken in the sense of 'eternal life' rather than 
lb b 
'endless life', means not mortal, not limited by death. A belief 
in eternal life is, then, a belief that it is possible to live in such 
a way that one is not limited by, but is independent of, death. 
What kind of independence is Kierkegaard claiming obtains here? 
Sutherland suggests: one can make one's life have an in itself 
ethical dimension. One is not vulnerable to chance or change in 
living in this way. 
There will doubtless be those who are unconvinced and who 
wish to interpret not just nibbäna in this life but parinibbäna also 
as some sort of 'transcendental state'. It is not clear whether 
Kalansuriya wants to go this far or just to interpret nibbäna in this 
life as transcendental. He sets out 'two views of nibbäna' and 
argues for Jayatilleke's interpretation of nibbä na as extinction. In 
this kind of talk it is sometimes not clear whether the nibbäna of 
a living adept is called 'transcendent' or that of the Arahat. In 
the former case it illuminates nothing whatsoever to use this word, 
and in the latter case it smacks, perversely of the eternalism set 
aside by the Buddha. In what follows I argue that neither of the 
'two views of nibbäna' Is- acceptable, and that Kalupahana's view 
is the more nearly correct one on this point. 
Nowhere in the early Buddhist literature does the Buddha 
assert any thesis about the afterlife of the Tathägata. As previous- 
ly discussed, he is shown as setting aside from consideration, witl- 
out denying, the four possibilities viz. , that the Tathägata exists 
after death, does not, both exists in part and does not in respect 
to another part, and neither exists nor does not exist (as 'exists' 
does not apply). Simply, on the early Buddhist position one does 
not philosophize about the matter, because philosophizing is 
just 
Another source of attachment.. It is worth noticing that the fourth 
alternative, set aside by the Buddha, is compatible with the 
a 
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'transcendental state' view of nibbäna. This fact should make one 
cautious of accepting that view, but is not by itself reason enough 
for rejecting it. 
Although the early texts do not assert a philosophical view of 
the afterlife of a Tathägata, there are textual considerations which 
point to the conclusion that, if one is to state what the early Buddhist 
position on parinibbäna suggests (but does not explicitly state), 
then one should say that it suggests the Tathägata's extinction 
rather than his continued existence. For first, the early Buddhist 
view takes it that the person is a composite of five aggregates 
(khandhas 
, while taking nibbäna as not a composite of any kind 
(asankhata). And consciousness (vinn"aga) depends on conditions, 
in such a way that when the conditions are absent there is no con- 
sciousness. 
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This passage, by the way, is one which Kalansuriya 
ignores in the article cited, and is one which gives Kalupahana's 
contention of an extinction view in early Buddhism much of its 
plausibility. 
Secondly, it is clear that nothing could 'survive in' parinibbäna.,, 
since anything which exists is compounded, conditioned, and part 
of the samsaric wheel of becoming, and hence plagued with dukkha, 
none of which could be true of the Tathägata after death. Thus, 
the early Buddhist position is to be precisely stated as there is 
dukkha and its cessation (more fully in terms of the four noble 
truths, the last of which dovetails into the eight-fold noble path), 
rather than in terms of any thesis about the afterlife of a Tathägata. 
Yet the early Buddhist position does suggest that there is no 
question of anything surviving in parinibbäna once the conditions 
for rebirth are gone. Consequently, if anyone wants to know 
(as 
Yamaka did) what the early position on the Tathägata's continued 
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existence after death is, the correct answer is that there is none, 
since the question is not addressed pro or contra, but instead in 
keeping with the middle path (in one sense of that ideal), the empha- 
sis is on dukkha and ending it. And if anyone wants to know what 
the early position suggests about the possibility of an immortal 
life in the sense of 'endless life' for the Tathägata, one may point 
out that there is no question of anything existing as nothing remains. 
Why, then, does one not find the early texts explicitly saying 
that parinibbäna2 is extinction? First, I think that the answer to 
this lies in the persistent, religiously-oriented intention to avoid 
putting forth philosophical views up for argument and counter- 
argument, repeatedly expressed in early Buddhism. Secondly, 
since -Cärväka believes that extinction occurs, and since early 
Buddhism (by contrast with Cärväka) suggests that extinction 
must be earned by adherence to a religious path, it may have been 
thought important not to state the latter point explicitly in order 
to avoid any possibility of a wrong-headed confusion of early 
Buddhism with C irva-ka. Thirdly, it is a conceptual, philosophical 
point (not an empirical one about unverifiability) that if parinibbäna2 
is extinction, then one cannot (logically) experience both sides of 
this limit. Thus in one's own case there is no question of being 
able to 'experience extinction' (as opposed to becoming extinct), 
and knowledge of the end of rebirth in the case of other beings 
would have to be distinguished from the sort of knowledge involved 
in one's own case, so that philosophical problems abound and it is 
unsurprising that early Buddhism remains aloof. 
In conclusion, 'the deathless' (amata) when applied to nibbäna 
is just the destruction of passion of passion, hatred, and confusion 
(raga, dosa, and moha in the life of the living Buddhist adept. If 
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it is thought of as applied to parinibbäna, as Basak implies in the 
quotation with which section I here began, nothing in the texts 
justifies thinking of it as an everlasting thing or transcendental 
state. As for parinibbäna 2, 
it could be amata only in the sense 
of being a limit of the flux of rebirth, as the death -- not the 
process of dying -- of an A rahat . The 
deathless does not in either 
case involve belief in immortality as 'endless life', but only as 
'eternal life', in Sutherland's sense. 
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Concluding . Remark 
The conclusion in outline is that although internal and external 
understanding are not mutually exclusive (Ch. 1), and early 
Buddhism is neither logically (Ch. 2) nor emotively flawed funda- 
mentally (Ch. 3), there is a problem with the reidentification of 
the person on its view of rebirth (Ch. 4). This problem cannot be 
dispelled by appeal to the Buddhism empiricism thesis, according 
to which one properly trained can 'see' rebirth (Ch. 5). But in 
rejecting the Buddhist empiricism thesis it is not being suggested 
that parinibbäna is a 'transcendent state', for it may be understood 
as 'eternal life', rather than as 'endless life', in a way which does 
not conflict with the anatta doctrine (Ch. 6'). 
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